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A. POLITICAL VIEWS IN VENEZUELA
Just before the Geneva conference was due to be convened the daily Guiana Graphic on Monday 14 February 1966 carried this report from its foreign correspondent:
Tremendous political pressures have built up in Caracas during the past fortnight on Venezuela's territorial claim to five-eights of British Guiana.
And Venezuelan delegates who on Saturday night flew off to Geneva for this week's discussions with the UK and BG about the border left with their ears ringing with declarations by leading political parties that the land should either be obtained by peaceful means - or it should be seized by force.
The use of force as the ultimate means of "recovering" the land most Venezuelans believe belongs rightly to them is a course of action seriously suggested by many well-known and otherwise responsible political leaders ranging from the official Opposition COPEI - which is backed by the powerful Catholic Church - to the URD, the second largest member of President Leoni's three-party coalition Government.
On the 15 February, the same correspondent reported for the Guiana Graphic: "From the Essequibo eastwards we are willing to be brothers to Guyanese. But west of the Essequibo is a different matter. That land is ours and we demand it."
The man who said that to me was no street corner demagogue. Rather it was one of Venezuela's leading jurists, Dr. Orlando Tovar, Professor at Caracas University, legal adviser to the Venezuelan Government, and - more importantly - spokesman on international affairs for his party, the URD. The URD is the second largest party in President Leoni's three-party coalition Government.
In Caracas itself tension was whipped up. On the 16 February, the day the Geneva Conference opened, there was a demand for the seizure of British properties and holdings in Venezuela if the Venezuelan claim was not recognized. The Guiana Graphic carried this report from Reuter:
It was reported in Caracas yesterday that State Legislators have called for the confiscation of all British properties and holdings in Venezuela if their territorial claim is not recognized. Meeting at Ciudad Bolivar, the Presidents of Venezuela's 20 States signed a declaration asking the Government to consider economic sanctions against Britain if the nation's claim fails.
Undoubtedly, political manoeuvres were made before, during and after the sessions of the Geneva Conference. Significantly, the London Times, a newspaper of great influence, predicted on the 15 February that the Conference would reach a settlement. The Guiana Graphic on the following day reported the prediction of the Times:
The Venezuelan case is clearly, and it may be said, irretrievably weakened by the fact that an award of an Arbitration Court in Paris in 1899 was accepted by both sides as a full, final and perfect settlement.
The paper made the suggestion that the Geneva meeting will reach an agreement - without any cession of territory - upon the joint development by Venezuela and Guyana of a large area of land west of the Essequibo River. This area is known to be rich in mineral resources and an excellent hydro-electric potential exists.
The Financial Times of London hoped that any agreement reached at Geneva would include joint development of the Essequibo region. In its issue of the 15 February, the paper declared that "joint development should make economic sense if it proves politically possible. If this fails the next developments would be unpleasant..."
B. THE GENEVA CONFERENCE
The two-day Geneva Conference was duly held on the 16 and 17 February 1966.The British Guiana delegation, which teamed up with the British delegation, included Burnham, Minister of State Shridath Ramphal and a team of advisers. On the first day of the Conference, Burnham delivered an exceptionally strong speech in which he told the delegates that British Guiana (and ultimately the new independent state of Guyana) was not prepared to yield even a square inch of soil to Venezuela. The Guiana Graphic correspondent at Geneva, Colin Rickards, in a report on the first day of the Conference, stated:
After the Prime Minister's very positive stand, the Venezuelans shifted from actual discussion of the boundary itself to the question of how they as a friendly nation could show their good neighbourliness by helping to develop the Guyanas through economic aid.
It took the whole day to discuss this. . .
Further discussions continued on the following day with speeches made by the Foreign Ministers of both Great Britain and Venezuela who exchanged numerous suggestions for solving the controversy. The Conference ended later that day with the signing of the following document which became known as the Geneva Agreement:
THE GENEVA AGREEMENT
Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in consultation with the Government of British Guiana, and the Government of Venezuela, Geneva, 17th February, 1966.
The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in consultation with the Government of British Guiana, and the Government of Venezuela;
Taking into account the forthcoming independence of British Guiana;
Recognising that closer co-operation between British Guiana and Venezuela could bring benefit to both countries;
Convinced that any outstanding controversy between the United Kingdom and British Guiana on the one hand and Venezuela on the other would prejudice the furtherance of such co-operation and should therefore be amicably resolved in a manner acceptable to both parties;
In conformity with the agenda that was agreed for the governmental conversations concerning the controversy between Venezuela and the United Kingdom over the frontier with British Guiana, in accordance with the joint communiqué of 7 November, 1963, have reached the following agreement to resolve the present controversy:
ARTICLE I
A Mixed Commission shall be established with the task of seeking satisfactory solutions for the practical settlement of the controversy between Venezuela and the United Kingdom which has arisen as the result of the Venezuelan contention that the Arbitral Award of 1899 about the frontier between British Guiana and Venezuela is null and void.
ARTICLE II
(1) Within two months of the entry into force of this Agreement, two representatives shall be appointed to the Mixed Commission by the Government of British Guiana and two by the Government of Venezuela.
(2) The Government appointing a representative may at any time replace him, and shall do so immediately should one or both of its representatives be unable to act through illness or death or any other cause.
(3) The Mixed Commission may by agreement between the representatives appoint experts to assist the Mixed Commission, either generally or in relation to any individual matter under consideration by the Mixed Commission.
ARTICLE III
The Mixed Commission shall present interim reports at intervals of six months from the date of its first meeting.
ARTICLE IV
(1) If, within a period of four years from the date of this Agreement, the Mixed Commission should not have arrived at a full agreement for the solution of the controversy it shall, in its final report, refer to the Government of Guyana and the Government of Venezuela any outstanding questions. Those Governments shall without delay choose one of the means of peaceful settlement provided in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations.
(2) If, within three months of receiving the final report, the Government of Guyana and the Government of Venezuela should not have reached agreement regarding the choice of one of the means of settlement provided by Article 33 of the Charter of the United nations, they shall refer the decision as to the means of settlement to an appropriate international organ upon which they both agree or, failing agreement on this point, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. If the means so chosen do not lead to a solution of the controversy, the said organ, or as the case may be, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall choose another of the means stipulated in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations, and so on until the controversy has been resolved or until all the means of peaceful settlement there contemplated have been exhausted.
ARTICLE V
(1) In order to facilitate the greatest possible measure of co-operation and mutual understanding, nothing contained in this Agreement shall be interpreted as renunciation or diminution by the United Kingdom, British Guiana or Venezuela of any basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in the territories of Venezuela or British Guiana, or of any previously asserted rights of or claims to such territorial sovereignty, or as prejudicing their position as regards their recognition or non-recognition of a right of, claim or basis of claim by any of them to such territorial sovereignty.
(2) No acts or activities taking place while this Agreement is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in the territories of Venezuela or British Guiana or create any rights of sovereignty in those territories, except in so far as such acts or activities result from any agreement reached by the Mixed Commission and accepted in writing by the Government of Guyana and the Government of Venezuela. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim to territorial sovereignty in those territories shall be asserted while this Agreement is in force, nor shall any claim whatsoever be asserted otherwise than in the Mixed Commission while that Commission is in being.
ARTICLE VI
The Mixed Commission shall hold its first meeting at a date and place to be agreed between the Governments of British Guiana and Venezuela. This meeting shall take place as soon as possible after its members have been appointed. Thereafter the Mixed Commission shall meet as and when agreed between the representatives.
ARTICLE VII
This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature.
ARTICLE VIII
Upon the attainment of independence by British Guiana, the Government of Guyana shall thereafter be a party to this Agreement, in addition to the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Venezuela.
In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.
Done in duplicate at Geneva this 17th day of February, 1966 in the English and Spanish languages, both texts being equally authoritative.
For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
MICHAEL
STEWART
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
L.F.S.
BURNHAM
Prime Minister of British Guiana
For the Government of Venezuela:
IGNACIO
IRIBARREN BORGES
Minister of Foreign Affairs
C. UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S LETTER
A joint Communiqué which reflected the decisions and the purpose of the Geneva Agreement was issued immediately after the Agreement was signed.
Shortly after the signing of the Geneva Agreement, Venezuela's Foreign Minister, Dr. Ignacio Iribarren Borges, sent a copy of the document in a letter to the UN Secretary-General, U Thant. On the 4 April 1966, the Secretary-General replied to the Venezuelan Foreign Minister:
Most Excellent Sir,
I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the text of the agreement signed in Geneva on the 17th day of February, 1966, by the Venezuelan Foreign Minister, the Foreign Relations Minister of the United Kingdom and the Prime Minister of British Guiana. I have made note of the obligations that eventually can fall on the Secretary-General of the United Nations by virtue of Paragraph 2 of Article IV of the agreement and it pleases me to inform you that the said functions are of such a nature that they can be appropriately carried out by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
I take this opportunity to reiterate to Your Excellency my highest and most respectful consideration.
(Signed) U Thant
The Geneva Agreement was eventually registered with the UN Secretariat on the 5 May 1966 as an official UN document.
D. VENEZUELAN REACTION TO THE GENEVA AGREEMENT
Immediately following the signing of the Geneva Agreement, press reports indicated that the Agreement was well received in Venezuela and most Venezuelan newspapers headlined the decision as a victory for Venezuela's efforts to reach an understanding. La Republica, Venezuela's semi-official daily, on the 18 February greeted the four-year negotiation period as "the re-opening of the controversy". The paper stated that if the decision of 1899 was not annulled at least it would be revised.
And on the 25 February, the Caracas English language paper, The Daily Journal, reported on a press conference given the day before by the Venezuelan Foreign Minister on his return from Geneva: Foreign Minister Ignacio Iribarren Borges yesterday once more pointed out that it had been Great Britain and not Venezuela who had changed her position at the last meeting of the parties in Geneva.
Speaking at a press conference, Iribarren Borges said that the joint communiqué to which Great Britain had subscribed had been drafted originally in London, and that its signature now actually meant that the 1899 decision would be reconsidered.
He also denied rumours that Great Britain was no longer a party to the dispute, pointing out that the agreement to arbitrate had been between Venezuela and Great Britain with British Guiana as a consultant who when it was granted its independence would become a full partner to the agreement.
Questioned as to why British Guiana was dealing directly with Venezuela when it was not an independent body, Iribarren Borges replied that Great Britain had agreed to approve anything signed between British Guiana and Venezuela.
As for the independence and recognition issue, Iribarren Borges said that when British Guiana becomes independent Venezuela may recognise her but not the territory in dispute.
Asked if he had confidence that a new arbitration tribunal would reverse a 70-year decision, the Foreign Minister said he did, and added that Venezuela was not to blame for the size of the territory which was taken from her in 1899 and that was now two-thirds of British Guiana.
Another point raised was whether Venezuela did not fear another "unjust" decision would be rendered, to which the Foreign Minister answered that Venezuela has "valid facts" to prove the 1899 decision to be null and void and it was against that arbitration ruling, not against the institution of arbitration itself.
But the Foreign Minister refused to term the recent Geneva meeting as a "diplomatic triumph" for Venezuela, saying that as head of the delegation that went to that talks, it would be improper for him to say so. . .
E. STATEMENT BY THE PPP
In British Guiana, the PPP, in a response to the signing of the Geneva Agreement, issued the following statement on the 19 February 1966:
In the light of the decisions of the Geneva Conference on the British Guiana-Venezuela border issue, the People's Progressive Party wishes to denounce the so-called settlement for the reasons that it gives substance and status to a spurious claim that has no legal basis and also compromises the sovereignty of this country by associating an aggressor Government in a special arrangement in relation to the territory which is the subject of controversy and the basis for a threat of aggression.
It should be noted that the present Government of British Guiana had declared that it would refuse to recognise that Venezuela had any claim to territory in British Guiana. In discussions with representatives of the PPP, the Prime Minister had also said that the British Guiana Government would not agree to any arrangements for the joint development of the territory claimed by Venezuela on conditions which would give to that country any special rights or imply any special status for Venezuela in relation to the territory claimed. The PPP had sought representation at the Conference with the object of strengthening the Government's bargaining power by presenting a united front.
The British Guiana Government has yielded ground at the Conference on both of these vital issues with the result that Guyana is committed to joint action with Venezuela in seeking a solution to a dispute which has no legal basis but which is now given international status. In addition to this, Venezuela appears to have been given special consideration with regard to the exploitation of the natural resources of what that country calls Guyana-Essequibo - the territory which is the object of the claim. These conclusions are borne out by the Conference Communiqué and by press comments in Venezuela.
The PPP is most unhappy over the outcome of the Conference and declares its determination to work steadfastly and strenuously for reversals of the decisions of the Geneva Conference in so far as they prejudice the interests of the people of Guyana and threaten our country's territorial integrity.
In his booklet, Venezuela Border Issue and Occupation of Ankoko - A Sellout by the Coalition Government, (published by the PPP in 1967), Jocelyn Hubbard, an executive member of the PPP, pointed out that "one of the features of the agreement which is of utmost importance is the decision that Britain shall remain party to the Agreement after independent Guyana comes into being. This clearly reveals the political nature of the Agreement since independent Guyana should inherit all Britain's rights and obligations in respect of Guyanese territory on the attainment of independence".
The PNC-UF coalition Government, on the other hand, welcomed the Agreement, and on the 5 March 1966, Prime Minister Burnham insisted that there was no question of the Geneva Agreement being regarded by his Government as a compromise on Guyana's territorial integrity. Interestingly, in a separate comment, Attorney General Shridath Ramphal admitted that the Agreement "became a requisite to independence".
However, PPP Leader, Dr. Jagan, who returned to British Guiana in early March from abroad, declared that the Geneva Conference had only shelved the issue until it was expedient to raise it again.
A resolution to approve the Geneva Agreement was tabled in the British Guiana House of Assembly during April. In a general debate on the 28 April, the Government and the Opposition disagreed strongly, but it was finally approved with the PPP voting against.
F. POLITICAL MANOEUVRES BEHIND THE SCENE
Obviously, there were political influences at work long before the Geneva Agreement was worked out. The political manoeuvres leading up to the signing of the Agreement were explained explicitly in the New York Times of the 22 February 1966:
Venezuela undoubtedly was concerned at the possibility that Dr. Cheddi B. Jagan might return to power and make independent Guyana a base for Marxist subversion against its neighbours.
The agreement on the boundary question after a two-day conference in Geneva will bolster the prestige of Premier Forbes Burnham's coalition Government at an opportune time and remove at least one major problem from its very full plate.
With this report, the New York Times, no doubt, was deliberately throwing the task on Venezuela to carry out the US State Department manoeuvre to prevent a progressive government under the PPP from coming to power in an independent Guyana. This political manoeuvre was therefore aimed at making Guyana available to the United States as a base to carry out its destabilising plans against any pro-socialist government in the Caribbean and Latin America.
Then on the 24 February 1966 the authoritative pro-government Venezuelan newspaper, La Republica, in a most revealing statement in an editorial, showed very clearly the pro-imperialist reason for the settlement in Geneva. The paper said that Venezuela should not force the frontier issue with British Guiana to a point which might cause the overthrow of the Government of the Burnham Government. The editorial revealed that the four-year period agreed on for the negotiations between Venezuela and the shortly-to-be independent Guyana was a concession by Venezuela which demanded that in return Britain and British Guiana should recognise the Venezuelan case in depth and agree to discuss it. In effect, according to the editorial, both Britain and British Guiana agreed to the Venezuelan demand.
La Republica added: We have already said that in this kind of negotiations one cannot be inflexible. Besides, the original proposition of the British Guianese delegation was for a period of twenty years.
We must not lose sight either of certain political requirements which suggested yielding on this point. The Government of Burnham is pursued by extremist adversaries. . .
To force the situation on the part of Venezuela could precipitate a popular reaction in Guyana capable of pulling down a Government which identifies itself with ours in the defence of democratic principles and in struggle against extremist aggression. . .
G. INTERPRETING THE AGREEMENT
The aim of the Geneva Agreement was to afford Venezuela an opportunity in essentially a bilateral context to have examined its contention of nullity of the 1899 Award. (Venezuela has never managed to establish such a contention).
In the maintenance by Venezuela of its claim, the Geneva Agreement was also a logical part of the process of examination of documentary material to establish nullity, the onus being on Venezuela to produce such evidence. But there was an important difference. The Geneva Agreement unlike "an offer" was now an international Treaty which was legally binding. Thus the Geneva Agreement provided an agreed legal mechanism for continuing the process started in 1963, that is, of examining the Venezuelan contention of nullity of the 1899 Award.
The provisions of the Geneva Agreement also maintained the position taken by the British in 1962, that is, the Agreement was in no way related to substantive talks about the revision of the frontier. The Geneva Agreement was therefore a legal basis for dealing with the political situation caused by Venezuelan revanchism in asserting and maintaining a claim to two-thirds of Guyana's territory.
From the beginning, Venezuela ignored the main role of the Agreement. Under the Geneva Agreement a Mixed Commission was established to deal with the Venezuelan contention of nullity of the 1899 Award. The Commission was given a maximum of four (4) years to complete its task. At the very first meeting of the Commission the Venezuelan Commissioners were invited by their Guyanese counterparts to produce evidence to support their contention of nullity. However, the Venezuelans took the position that the Commission should not be concerned with such a question but rather with the revision of the frontier. The Mixed Commission in subsequent meetings was unable to fulfil its mandate largely because Venezuela declined to deal with the question of their contention of the nullity of the 1899 Award.
Venezuela consistently misinterpreted the Geneva Agreement which appointed the Mixed Commission comprised of Guyanese and Venezuelans and given a period of four years to carry out a certain mandate. That mandate contained in Article I of the Geneva Agreement specified:
"A Mixed Commission shall be established with the task of seeking satisfactory solutions for the practical settlement of the controversy between Venezuela and the United Kingdom which has arisen as the result of the Venezuelan contention that the Arbitral Award of 1899 about the frontier between British Guiana and Venezuela is null and void".
During the existence of the Mixed Commission, the Venezuela representatives refused to face the fact that the central issue was the contention of their Government of the nullity of the 1899 Award.
The Venezuela argument and actions during the term of the Mixed Commission were designed to have a discussion on the revision of the frontier. However, the Geneva Agreement never allowed for such a demand.
In citing the Geneva Agreement, especially Article I, the Government of Venezuela attempted at subsequent meetings of the Mixed Commission to limit the scope and application of the Geneva Agreement. Venezuelan officials emphasised on the words "the practical settlement of the controversy" to the exclusion of all other phrases in the relevant provisions. Shortly after, they began to described the issue as a "territorial controversy". However, Guyana stated that there was no "territorial controversy" - only a controversy over the contention by Venezuela of the invalidity of that the Arbitral Award of 1899. According to the Guyana Government, in any discussion with a view to finding a solution to any controversy, Venezuela must agree that the prior issue to be discussed was its contention of the nullity of the 1899 Award. (Actually, Venezuela has never proven before any international tribunal the nullity of the Award).
H. ARTICLE 33 OF THE UN CHARTER
Significantly, the Geneva Agreement recommended that both Venezuela and Guyana should revert to Article 33 of the United Nations Charter to bring about a peaceful solution to the issue. Article 33 states:
1. The parties of any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their disputes by such means.
Of interest to note is that a corollary of Article 33 seems to be reflected in Article 36 (3) of the UN Charter. This Article which is of significance to matters like the Guyana-Venezuela border issue, specifies:
In making recommendations under this Article, the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should, as a general rule, be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.
Interestingly, the Geneva Agreement did not specify what should follow if all the means of peaceful settlement, as specified in Article 33 (as well as Article 36) of the UN Charter had been tried and had failed to produce a solution.
I. THE MIXED COMMISSION
With the signing of the Geneva Agreement, the Mixed Commission, formed of representatives of the Governments of British Guiana and Venezuela, was established. The Venezuelan appointees were Dr. Luis Loreto and Dr. Garcia Bustillos, while those appointed by British Guiana were Sir Donald Jackson and Dr. Mohamed Shahabuddeen. The Venezuelan advisers to the Commission were General Luis Ordonez, Padre Hermann Gonzalez-Oropeza, Padre Pablo Ojer-Celigueta, Dr. Luis Herera Campins (later to become President of Venezuela in 1980), Captain Euclides Russian and Dr. Oscar Arnal Nunez. Shirley Patterson (later to be known as Shirley Filed-Ridley) was the lone adviser of British Guiana to the Commission.
The Commission held its first meeting in Caracas in July 1966 and the second in Georgetown in September 1966. Two months before the first meeting, on the 26 May, British Guiana became the independent state of Guyana and, thus, became a full partner to the Geneva Agreement.
As stipulated by the Geneva Agreement a Sub-Commission of experts was also established. Its members were Dr. Oscar Arnal Nunez, Dr. Pedro Pablo Azpurua and Dr. Rivas Casado of Venezuela and Shirley Patterson of Guyana. This Sub-Commission did not hold its first meeting until January 1968.
Meanwhile, at around the same period when the Mixed Commission was being established, rumours were rife in that Venezuela was covertly interfering in Guyanese internal affairs especially aimed at undermining the loyalty of the Amerindian population in the Essequibo region of the country. In May 1966, just before the independence celebrations, a political party called the Guyana Amerindian Party was launched. It was headed by a former leading Amerindian member of the PNC, Anthony Chaves. This party, which did not survive for long since it failed to attract support, was suspected of being funded by Venezuela.
I. NOTE OF RECOGNITION FROM VENEZUELA
With Guyana becoming a fully independent nation on the 26 May 1966, Venezuela was one of the first countries to formally recognise the establishment of the new State. However, it must be noted that on the day before, a Communiqué issued by the Venezuelan Foreign Affairs Ministry indicated that it would not recognise Guyana's control over the western Essequibo. (This was to be later repeated by the Venezuelan Foreign Affairs Minister in a statement on the 16 September).
The Venezuelan Government, through its Foreign Minister, Ignacio Iribarren Borges, sent this Note of Recognition on Guyana's Independence Day to the Guyanese Minister of External Affairs, Prime Minister, Forbes Burnham:
Excellency,
I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that the Government of the Republic of Venezuela, considering that this 26th day of May, 1966 has been proclaimed the independence of the State of Guyana, has decided, with special pleasure, to grant it its recognition with the reservation that is explained in this Note.
The Government of Venezuela entrusts me to express through Your Excellency its cordial greetings to Her Majesty Elizabeth II, and to Honourable Mr. Forbes L. Burnham, Prime Minister of that friendly nation.
Under these circumstances, the Government of the Republic of Venezuela wishes to establish relations with the State of Guyana on the basis of common interest and mutual respect, and is willing to exchange diplomatic representatives with the Government of Your Excellency, whenever both countries deem it convenient.
The Government of Venezuela, recognising the new independent State of Guyana, wishes to express the joy which overcomes all the National Community when witnessing the birth of a new country on American soil upon the old vestiges of colonialism, thus incorporating its strong and hard working inhabitants into the community of free nations of the world.
According to the Agreement subscribed at Geneva, on the 17th February, 1966 between the Government of the Republic of Venezuela and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, this latter in consultation with the Government of British Guiana, and by virtue of Article VIII of the aforesaid Agreement, as of today the 26th May, 1966, the Government of Your Excellency becomes part of the referred to Agreement.
Consequently, in view of what is stipulated in Article V of the said Agreement, the recognition that Venezuela makes to the new State of Guyana, does not imply on the part of our country waiver or reduction of the claimed territorial rights, nor in any manner does it affect the sovereign rights which emerge from the claim risen by the Venezuelan contention that the so-called 1899 Paris Arbitral Award about the Venezuela-British Guiana boundary is null and void.
Therefore, Venezuela recognises as territory of the new State the one which is located on the east of the right bank of the Essequibo River, and reiterates before the new State, and before the international community, that it expressly reserves its rights of territorial sovereignty over all the zone located on the west bank of the above-mentioned river. Therefore, the Guyana-Essequibo territory over which Venezuela expressly reserves its sovereign rights, limits on the east by the new State of Guyana, through the middle line of the Essequibo River, beginning from its source and on to its mouth in the Atlantic Ocean.
The Government of Venezuela expresses its sincere wishes so that the exercise of activities of the Government of Your Excellency shall become a source of benefits for the sister nation.
I make use of this opportunity to reiterate to Your Excellency the testimony of my highest and distinguished esteem.
(Signed)
Ignacio Iribarren Borges
Minister of Foreign Relations of the Republic of Venezuela
J. REPLY TO THE VENEZUELAN NOTE FROM GUYANA
The Guyana Government eventually replied to the Venezuelan Note of Recognition in a letter to the Venezuelan Minister of Foreign Affairs on the 19 August 1966:
Your Excellency,
I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's Note of the 26th May, 1966, the date of the proclamation of Independence of the State of Guyana, and to put on record, in the name of the people of Guyana, our esteem for the expression of faith and hope formulated by the Venezuelan Government in the feeling that the action taken by the Guyana Government will lead to countless benefits.
My Government takes note of the pleasure with which the Government of Venezuela has granted its recognition of Guyana, but observes, with regret, that the Government of Venezuela has delineated the middle line of the Essequibo as the western boundary of the State of Guyana which is in contradiction with the 1905 agreement, being the result of the work of the Boundary Commission, which laid out and delineated the boundary west of the Colony of British Guiana along the rivers, Cuyuni and Wenamo.
In this respect I desire to point out that Article I (2) of the Guyana Constitution stipulates that the territory of Guyana embraces all that area, which immediately before the 26th May, 1966, comprised the old Colony of British Guiana, together with the area which by Act of Parliament may be declared as part of the territory of Guyana. The territory which extends between the middle line of the Essequibo on the east and the boundary of the old Colony of British Guiana all along the rivers Cuyuni and Wanamo on the west, was already included on the 26th May, 1966, judicially and administratively, within the old Colony of British Guiana and forms part of the State of Guyana.
Your Excellency's Note refers to the Geneva Agreement of 1966. I wish to assure the Government of Your Excellency that the Government of Guyana intends, in conformity with well established international practice, to carry out all obligations of the said Agreement.
We have noted the desire of the Venezuelan Government to interchange at the proper time, diplomatic representatives.
Because of our limitations in so far as trained personnel and our limited financial resources, the Government of Guyana regrets the fact that it does not find it possible at this time to establish a diplomatic mission in Venezuela. However, the Government of Guyana would receive any decision on the part of the Government of Your Excellency to raise the actual Consulate-General of Venezuela in Georgetown to the status of Embassy and appoint, whenever it is convenient, an Ambassador to represent Venezuela in the State of Guyana.
We appreciate the greetings of Venezuela's satisfaction because Guyana has at last freed itself from colonialism, and I desire to ratify to the Government of Venezuela the assurance that Guyana will join its efforts with all nations of the world in search of peace and democracy as well as in the opposition to all the remainder of colonialism or intention to install it.
(Signed)
L.F.S. Burnham
Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs
It will be recalled that the objective of the Geneva Agreement was to preserve the pre-existing state of affairs, unless and until it was changed by a decision properly taken in accordance with the peaceful procedures set out by that Agreement. The Agreement provided that "no new claim or enlargement of an existing claim to territorial sovereignty in these territories (of Venezuela and British Guiana) shall be asserted while this Agreement is in force, nor shall any claim whatsoever be asserted otherwise than in the Mixed Commission while that Commission is in being".
On the 11 September 1966, a Venezuelan destroyer arrived in Georgetown bringing an eight-man team for the second meeting of the Mixed Commission. However, while this meeting of the Commission was in session, Venezuelans, including a well-armed group of soldiers, had already encroached upon territory on the Guyana side of the border. This encroachment which apparently had been taking place over the past few months, unknowing to Guyana Government, occurred on the island of Ankoko at the confluence of the boundary rivers, Cuyuni and Wenamu (Wenamo), and took the form of the introduction of military and civilian personnel and the establishment of an airstrip and the erection of other installations and structures, including a post-office, school and military and police outposts.
The incursion on Guyanese territory on Ankoko Island by Venezuela was reported to the Guyanese authorities early in October 1966, just after the conclusion of the second meeting of the Mixed Commission, by a diamond prospector who happened to be in that forested and almost uninhabited area at the time. On the 12 October, a Guyanese team of senior officials, including police officers, visited the island and verified what had occurred.
On the morning of the 14 October 1966, Forbes Burnham, as Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs of Guyana, dispatched the following protest to the Foreign Minister of Venezuela:
I energetically protest the intromission by Venezuelan personnel on Guyanese territory and request that
immediate steps be taken by your Government to guarantee the withdrawal and removal of the installations and
thus carry out the stipulations of the Geneva Agreement.
On the 12th October, a Guyanese mission discovered Venezuelan personnel occupying a portion of Ankoko
Island in the Cuyuni River which is Guyanese territory. The Venezuelans also constructed an airport within
Guyanese territory.
Following the dispatch of the protest, Burnham called in the Leader of the Opposition, Dr. Jagan, to brief him of the situation.
The first public announcement of the incursion on Ankoko was made later that morning of the 14 October by Prime Minister Burnham in a radio broadcast. He said:
Some time during last month a number of Venezuelans crossed into the Guyanese side and have since been
carrying out certain works on our territory.
The report of this came to the notice of the Government a few days ago, and an inspection party of senior
officials and two senior police officers visited the island day before yesterday, Wednesday 12th October. This
party verified and confirmed the earlier report through unofficial channels.
In the opinion of the Government this intrusion by Venezuelans constitutes a breach of the Geneva Agreement
entered into between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Venezuela on the 17th February, 1966, to
which the Government of Guyana is now a party, and I have today sent a cable to Dr. Iribarren Borges, the
Foreign Minister of Venezuela, strongly protesting the intrusion of Venezuelan personnel into Guyanese territory
and asking that immediate steps be taken by the Government of Venezuela to ensure the immediate withdrawal of
such personnel.
I have this morning informed the Leader of the Opposition of the situation and held discussions with him.
Meanwhile, I await a reply from the Venezuelan Government.
I consider it my duty to inform this nation of the latest development and to assure you that every step is being
taken to retain our territorial sovereignty by peaceful means.
Your Government proposes to abide by the terms of the Geneva Agreement and it is hopeful that the Government
of Venezuela will do likewise.
You are asked to remain calm and to await further information.
Long live Guyana!
At one point of Guyana's western border with Venezuela, the Wenamu River flows into the Cuyuni River and
there is an island at this junction called Ankoko Island of about two or three square miles. According to the map
in existence since 1904 the border runs roughly through the centre of Ankoko Island from north to south so that
the western part of the island is Venezuelan and the eastern Guyanese.
Burnham's announcement received a mixed reception in Guyana. But despite the scepticism and bewilderment it created, all Guyanese condemned Venezuela's actions. A few hours after the broadcast, members of the Progressive Youth Organization (PYO) and the Young Socialist Movement (YSM), the youth arms of the PPP and the PNC respectively, mounted a large protest demonstration outside the Venezuelan Consulate General in Middle Street, Georgetown. In the course of the noisy demonstration, some of the protestors invaded the compound and pulled down the Venezuelan flag from the mast and then proceeded to burn it on the street.
An immediate protest to the Guyana Government was made by the Consul General, Senor Aranguren. During the evening regrets over the incident were issued in a letter to the Consul General by the External Affairs Ministry. On the following morning, the 15 October, the Minister of State and Attorney General, Shridath Ramphal, sent a Note of regret over the flag-burning incident to the Venezuelan Foreign Ministry and later the same day, Burnham met with the Consul General to personally express regrets over the matter.
The PPP, on the 15 October, issued a statement condemning the Venezuelan incursion on the Guyanese side of Ankoko Island and expressed the hope that this action of Venezuela was not a manoeuvre to prevent the withdrawal of British troops which were expected to be removed from Guyana at the end of October. Some days later, the youth section of the United Force at a public meeting in Georgetown condemned the Venezuelan action.
The Venezuelan Foreign Minister replied on the 18 October to the protest sent by Guyana four days before. In a Note to the Minister of External Affairs, (Burnham), he stated:
In reply I have to inform Your Excellency that the Venezuelan Government does not accept the said protest, as the
island of Ankoko is Venezuelan territory in its entirety and the Republic of Venezuela has always been in
possession of it.
At the same time, I wish to point out to Your Excellency that if the Honourable Government of Guyana should
have any reclamation to formulate, it should do so through the Mixed Commission which was created for the
effect by the Geneva Agreement dated 17th February, 1966 in accordance with Paragraph 2 of the fifth Article of
the said treaty.
I have the honour to state to Your Excellency that I have received your cablegram on the 14th instant, in which
the Honourable Government of Guyana formulated a protest for the presence of Venezuelan personnel in the
island of Ankoko in the confluence of the Wenamu and the Cuyuni Rivers.
As a result of the flag-burning incident outside the Venezuelan Consulate General in Georgetown, the Venezuelan Foreign Minister, also on the 18 October, sent the following protest to Burnham:
The Venezuelan Government estimates that, due to the tone and content of Your Excellency's radio broadcast on
the 14th instant, your Government should have taken the necessary steps to impede the carrying out of the
exercises which could not be classified as unforeseen. The Venezuelan Government hopes that, in similar cases,
the Honourable Government of Guyana acts with due diligence to guarantee the protection of the Venezuelan
representation in your country.
I have the honour to state to Your Excellency and to ratify in the name of the Venezuelan Government, the protest
made by the Consul General in Georgetown, for the violation by an organized group of persons in the Consulate
compound and the vandalism against the national flag of Venezuela.
On the following day Burnham sent this response to the Venezuelan Foreign Minister:
On the night of the 14th October, the Government expressed its regrets to the Consul General in Georgetown, and
the following day in the name of the Government, the Minister of State sent a note of excuse to be transmitted to
Your Excellency. On the same day I personally presented excuses to Mr. Aranguren. I ratify and confirm to Your
Excellency all these expressions of regrets which have already been given to the Consul General.
The demonstration that took place on the afternoon of the 14th October, outside the Venezuelan Consulate
General in Georgetown was spontaneous reaction to reports of Venezuelan personnel entering on the island of
Ankoko on the Guyanese section, and could not be attributed in any way to the tone or content of my radio
message of this day, as I avoided carefully, in one or other respect, to inflame Guyanese public opinion.
Nevertheless, the Guyanese Government, conscious of its obligation to protect the property and the accredited
personnel of Your Excellency's Government in Guyana, desires to confirm the assurances already given to Your
Excellency, and accepted by your Consul General in Georgetown, in the sense that all types of precaution will be
taken by the Guyana Government to make sure that the Consul General, and members of his family, employees
and the properties of the Consulate General, shall be properly protected.
I have the honour to refer to Your Excellency's telegram to me dated 18th instant, relative to the incident of the
14th October when the Venezuelan flag was torn and destroyed outside the consulate in Georgetown. The
Guyana Government profoundly deplores this lamentable act.
There continued an exchange of diplomatic notes between the Guyana and Venezuela during October over the Venezuelan incursion on the Guyanese part of Ankoko Island. A suggestion by Guyana that in preference to the matter being raised at the United Nations, representatives of both Governments should carry out a joint examination of the boundary map, prepared in 1905 by a joint team of British and Venezuelan surveyors, for the purpose of determining the position of Ankoko in relation to the existing boundary, was rejected by Venezuela. Venezuela reiterated that if Guyana wished to discuss the matter it must be done through the Mixed Commission.
In a booklet entitled The Ankoko Affair, (published by the Ministry of External Affairs of Guyana in 1967), the Guyana Government carefully analysed its protest over the incursion on its part of Ankoko Island. It stated that in protesting against the Venezuelan incursion on the territory given to Guyana by the Arbitral Award, it was upholding the Geneva Agreement while at the same time complaining of its unilateral abrogation. The object of the Geneva Agreement was clearly to keep matters in the pre-existing state until it should be otherwise decided under the procedure laid down by the Agreement. A party which was asserting rights larger than those assigned to it under the map was, therefore, asserting a claim, and if it did so otherwise than through the Mixed Commission, it was in breach of the Geneva Agreement. The Mixed Commission was entrusted with certain tasks under the Agreement, but these tasks did not include jurisdiction to consider breaches of the Agreement itself. Any such breaches should be pursued by the parties by the diplomatic processes normally available, for example, negotiation, arbitration, or reference to the United Nations.
The Guyana protest, therefore, indicated that Venezuela, acting outside the Mixed Commission, was asserting by military means certain rights larger than those accorded to it and was, thus, in breach of the Geneva Agreement. The Venezuelan suggestion that Guyana's protest amounted to an assertion of claim, which could only be done through the Mixed Commission, was fallacious and misleading. Its absurdity was demonstrated by the possible situation in which Venezuela might have encroached by force of arms on the area of more than half of Guyana which it was claiming. It would have been a strange answer to Guyana's protest in that case to say that Guyana should pursue the matter through the Mixed Commission while its territorial integrity remained despoiled.
The Guyana protest sounded a warning of the expansionist nature of Venezuela's ambitions and its unwillingness to be deterred either by the general principles of international law or by specific terms of bilateral or multilateral international agreements that it had solemnly concluded.
The Arbitral Award of 1899 had provided that the boundary should run "along the midstream of the Acaribisi to the Cuyuni, and thence along the northern bank of the River Cuyuni westward to its junction with the Wenamu to its westernmost source..." At the junction referred to can be found the island of Ankoko.
In connecting the boundary from the north bank of the Cuyuni to the midstream of the Wenamu, the Mixed Venezuelan-British Boundary Commissioners drew a line passing through the island and dividing it from north to south in roughly equal parts -- the eastern part falling on the British Guiana (Guyana) side of the boundary and the western part falling on the Venezuelan side. A boundary map showing these details was signed on the 7 January 1905 by the Boundary Commissioners, Harry Innis Perkins and Charles Wilgress Anderson of Great Britain and Abraham Tirado and Elias Zoro of Venezuela.
In addition to the authenticity of the boundary as shown on that boundary map, the Commissioners also wrote an account of the manner in which they established and marked on the ground the boundary line across the island. In the official report of the work of the Boundary Commission submitted on the 9 January 1905 to the Government Secretary of British Guiana by Harry Perkins, the Senior British Boundary Commissioner and published in the public records of British Guiana for that year, this statement was made:
...At the Wenamu mouth we verified our astronomical work of the previous May, and fixed the course of the boundary line from a point on a large island called Anacoco opposite the midstream of the Wenamu to a point on the other side of the same island, and from thence to a point on the mainland on the left bank of the Cuyuni where the Colony's boundary continues to the Akarabisi, etc. We marked the points by driving posts of bullet tree some six feet in length into the ground, and surrounding each with a pyramid of stone collected from the river bed, and carefully packed around them. These should last for many years if not for ever. A line had previously been cut and surveyed across the island by me during our work on the Cuyuni earlier in the year, and this was made use of to determine the boundaries of the boundary marks.
Ever since the completion of the work of the Boundary Commission, the eastern part of Ankoko was recognised as juridically and administratively part of Guyana and totally within its boundaries. The Venezuelan Government had never before challenged the validity or accuracy of the map produced by the Boundary Commissioners and had at no time asserted sovereignty over the entire island of Ankoko. The Geneva Agreement and the discussions which led up to it concerned the sole issue whether the Arbitral Award of 1899 was null and void; they involved no challenge to the accuracy with which the boundary line as shown on the 1905 map reflected the terms of the Award.
The boundary of Ankoko as shown on the 1905 map was indeed reproduced on Venezuelan maps published in 1911 and 1917, the former having been issued under the express authority of the administration of General Gomez, then President of Venezuela, and signed by F. Alicantara, the Venezuelan Minister of Internal Affairs.
But the most convincing demonstration of the degree to which the 1905 delimitation had to all times before been accepted by Venezuela was shown on the 13 December 1965 when the Legislative Assembly of the State of Bolivar formally acknowledged that the eastern part of Ankoko Island was in fact Guyanese territory.
The State of Bolivar, a constituent State of the Republic of Venezuela, forms part of the that country's boundary with Guyana in the vicinity of Ankoko Island. An Extraordinary Gazette of the State of Bolivar on the 3 January 1966 published the relevant portion of the law passed by the Legislative Assembly which declared the boundary with Guyana to be. . .
. . .down the River Acarabisi to its mouth with the Cuyuni and from this point upstream along the River Cuyuni on
its left bank as far as the Island of Anacoco, where running from north to south it divides it into two portions, the
western portion belonging to the State of Bolivar and the eastern to British Guiana; from the southern terminal of
this line on the above mentioned Island of Anacoco it follows the left bank of the River Wenamo...
However, despite the wealth of historical and legal evidence to prove that eastern Ankoko was Guyanese territory, the Venezuelan Government continued to maintain that eastern Ankoko was its territory. And even though Guyanese soldiers were rushed to the border area to establish a military post at Eteringbang on the south bank of the Cuyuni River in the vicinity of Ankoko Island, the Venezuelans refused to withdraw its personnel from the eastern part of the island. Shortly after the incursion, the Venezuelan Foreign Minister, Dr. Iribarren Borges, at a press conference in Caracas insisted that the entire island "has always been Venezuelan and the presence of Venezuelans there is permanent".
In addition, while the Guyana protest was being considered in Caracas, the semi-official newspaper, La Republica, on the 17 October 1966, said that Venezuelan national Guardsmen had been installed in eastern Ankoko six weeks before the incursion was discovered by Guyana and that Burnham's protest "completely lacks foundation". The paper also questioned the motives of Burnham in "provoking an incident like that which caused the burning of the Venezuelan flag in Georgetown". La Republica added:
The action against the Venezuelan Consulate and against our flag by a small group of youths of the parties of Mr. Burnham and Dr. Jagan constitutes a grave provocation which has already prompted a protest from our Consulate and also one which our energetic Foreign Minister will send today to the Guyanese Prime Minister.
Noting that Guyana's protest should have been directed through the Mixed Commission, the paper stated that Burnham preferred to make a prior "demagogic posture" in addressing the Guyanese people on the radio. The paper further claimed that the Guyanese Prime Minister made a political blunder when he sought the support of Dr. Cheddi Jagan in the "unfounded protest against Venezuela. . . One does not know to what point the demagoguery which Jagan is putting into practice against our country might lead, as deduced from his recent speeches".
No doubt, the Venezuelan newspaper was referring to speeches made at public meetings in Guyana in which Dr. Jagan severely castigated Venezuela for seizing Guyanese territory, and urged the Guyana Government to raise the matter in the UN Security Council.
La Republica concluded:
We hope the Government of the neighbouring Guyanese nation admits it has committed a grave error which
could affect profoundly the relations between Georgetown and Caracas. . .
Venezuela desires to maintain the closest and friendliest relations with the Government of Guyana but naturally
cannot take well incidents like the one provoked on Friday (14th October) by the Head of Government himself,
founded on an unfounded claim, since we insist that the island of Ankoko has been and is Venezuelan territory.
At the beginning of 1967, Venezuela upgraded its Consulate General to that of an Embassy. On the 26 April 1967, the Guyanese evening newspaper, Evening Post, featured on its front page the following article which was based on an interview with the Venezuelan Ambassador to Guyana, Walter Brandt:
He said that he was not aware that any negotiations were going on between the Venezuelan Government and the
Guyana Government over Ankoko.
In explaining his Government's stand on the Ankoko dispute, Senor Brandt said that the Venezuelans had always
considered the island theirs. He said that when the Guyana Government had objected to Venezuela's occupying
the eastern sections of the island, the impression was gained that the Venezuelans had just invaded the island.
But the Venezuelans had been living on the island years and years ago. As a matter of fact, the island became
known as ANAKOKO because a Venezuelan woman named Ana used to sell coconuts on the island, Senor
Brandt said.
After the Guyana Government had protested to the Venezuelan Government, his Government suggested that the
matter be referred to the Mixed Boundary Commission (sic) that had been set up to investigate the Venezuelan
claim to 50,000 square miles of Guyanese territory.
But the Guyana Government did not agree and suggested Government to Government discussions, a proposal
that Venezuela rejected. Senor Brandt went on to say that his Government was moving ahead with its plans to
develop the island for the inhabitants and to use it as one of the country's many border outposts. The island, he
said, was not being used as a military base, and he claimed that the airstrip on the island was built to allow for an
air service to be operated between the island and the more civilized sections of Venezuela so that the islanders
could get provisions and medicine.
Senor Brandt said that the whole island is being cleared and roads and other communal amenities were being built
for the inhabitants. He said that the people on the island do farming and coconuts and cassava were the two main
crops. The relations between Guyanese on the Cuyuni River and the Venezuelans on the island were very
friendly. Guyanese and Venezuelan soldiers mix freely, he added. They visit each other and play dominoes and
other games, exchange food and gifts and they seem to like each other, Senor Brandt said.
He said that no Guyanese soldiers were stationed on Ankoko and the flag of Venezuela is the only one flying on
the island.
Venezuela does not consider any part of the island of Ankoko to be part of Guyana and does not intend to yield
any section of it to Guyana. As a matter of fact, the island is now one of Venezuela's border outposts, Senor
Walter Brandt, Venezuela's Ambassador in Guyana told the Evening Post yesterday.
In the light of criticisms from the PPP over the manner in which the PNC-UF coalition Government was handling the border issue, and the allegation that US imperialism was deeply involved behind the scenes in encouraging Venezuela, the United Force (UF), the junior partner in the coalition Government, made the following statement on the 22 October 1966 in an editorial in its weekly newspaper, the Sun:
Since the boundary line runs through the river, and the river flows around the island, it is to be assumed that the
boundary line runs in the centre of the island, and part of this should be Venezuelan and part Guyanese. But
according to reports, this island has been used by the Venezuelans for a long time and is perhaps a lucrative gold
bearing region.
Within recent times, according to other reports, the Venezuelans built a runway and are developing an airport on
the island, while national guards have been stationed in the area. Because of this the Guyana Government has
now taken official notice and the Prime Minister made his dramatic broadcast on Friday last.
But a number of lessons are to be learnt in this latest test of survival as a nation. The first is that Guyana cannot
become a nation with its people only concentrated on the coastland leaving the vast underdeveloped interior an
empty area. It will soon be taken over by our neighbours. Next, the overemphasis even at the UN of that
outmoded concept which keeps stressing that because of imperialism our ancestors were brought to these parts
against their will, and thus by implication the country does not belong to us, and that our home is far away,
should give place to a new concept. We cannot complain about imperialism while at the same time claiming all the
rights and treaties left behind by the same imperialists.
If a claim to be Guyanese is made, it must include all persons of all ethnic groups, in particular the Amerindians
and not just persons who claim they were brought here by "imperialism". In which case what would the
Amerindians in the area think of the question, and what would the world think for that matter.
The next lesson to be learnt is who will be our friends if there is a showdown over the Venezuelan crisis? Will it
be the Afro-Asian block with whom we have allied ourselves to pass a number of resolutions that cannot be put
into effect? Will it be the British for whom we showed so much anxiety to be rid of? The opposition PPP was only
too glad to use the issue to declare that this latest Venezuelan move must not be used as a ruse to let the British
troops stay on in Guyana. At the same time they have begun a rumour campaign that the Americans are behind
the Venezuelans to push the claims for Guyana lands. Behind this is the move to alienate American sympathy for
the Guyanese people in the huge problem facing us with the development of the interior, and they plan to
denounce America in next week's Assembly debate.
It is likely sooner or later some elements might use the Americans as the scapegoat in the Ankoko dispute and
there have been allegations that the American Government must have known about this before. As afar as is
known the Venezuelans were supposed to have occupied Ankoko Island for a very long time now, even during
the regime of the PPP. Nobody took notice of it until now. Is it that the American Government or the American
people knew of the existence of Venezuelan occupation of Ankoko before the Guyana Government? Even if they
did know, what were they to do about it? Suppose they told the Venezuelans to leave and they refused, what
should be done? Should they send GI's to Guyana to help defeat the invading Venezuelans, when we have never
expressed any sympathy over the American action in Vietnam or even in the Dominican Republic? On these
things we must think deeply and how we conduct international affairs.
With the political agitation over Rhodesia and talk about leaving the Commonwealth if the Smith regime is not
ended now faded into the background, a new problem has now arisen in international relations. The Prime
Minister reported last week that Venezuelans have intruded into the island of Ankoko in the river that forms the
boundary between Guyana and Venezuela.
On the 25 October, about two weeks after the incursion was announced to Guyanese, the National Assembly (Parliament) of Guyana met to hear a statement from Prime Minister Burnham. The statement set out the background to the drawing of the boundary line through the island of Ankoko and gave details of the border controversy up to that time. A motion by Dr. Jagan, the Leader of the Opposition, to debate the issue was refused by the Speaker of the Assembly who said that the time was not opportune. As a form of protest over this action of the Speaker and the refusal of the Government to agree to a debate, the PPP representatives staged a walk-out from that sitting of the Assembly.
Jocelyn Hubbard, in his booklet, Venezuelan Border Issue and Occupation of Ankoko, summed up the situation:
It is appropriate here to point out that with Venezuela in occupation of Ankoko Island, any dispute over the occupation would have to take the form of a claim to possession of the territory by Guyana which is in fact what happened. The Venezuelans appear to have acted as they did to ensure that Article V (2) of the Geneva Agreement should apply. At the very least, Venezuela had created a genuine border dispute with Guyana.
Matters
surrounding the seizure by Venezuela of Guyana's half of Ankoko Island reached
a stalemate after October 1966. The Guyana Government refused to raise the issue
in the UN Security Council, and Guyana's representatives on the Mixed Commission
(established by the Geneva Agreement earlier in the year) refused to raise the
issue at the third meeting of the Commission held in Caracas in December of
that year.
A. MEETING OF AMERINDIAN CHIEFS
Relations between the two countries simmered down for a while. But on 14 April 1967 the Guyana government announced that a meeting of Amerindian chiefs held at Kabakaburi on the Pomeroon River (in the western Essequibo area claimed by Venezuela), a Venezuelan diplomat and the British husband of a Guyanese Amerindian participated and carried out subversive activities relating to the border controversy with Venezuela. The government claimed that the chiefs were influenced by these persons to move a resolution in favour of "joint development" by Guyana and Venezuela of the western Essequibo region.
One week later, the chiefs were summoned to Georgetown for a meeting with the Minister responsible for local government and Amerindian affairs. At the end of this meeting, they issued a statement denying that they had advocated joint development, and insisted that they were always loyal to the Guyana government. But the fact remained that the chiefs indeed passed the resolution as was indicated in the Government's announcement of 14 April, and it was widely believed that they were pressured to issue the denial at the meeting with the minister.
The Amerindian Association, whose Chairman was Stephen Campbell, a United Force Member of Parliament and a member of the coalition Government, was alleged to have organised the meeting of Amerindian Chiefs at Kabakaburi, but this was later denied by the Association.
B. EXPULSION OF VENEZELAN DIPLOMAT
There was much mystery surrounding the Kabakaburi meeting, and all that Guyanese were told was that the police authorities were carrying out investigations. Eventually, an Englishman, Michael Wilson, was arrested and while he was in detention, amendments to the Expulsion of Undesirables Ordinance were rushed through a specially summoned meeting of the National Assembly. These amendments gave the government additional powers to deport any non-Guyanese in the interest of "good order" by removing the conditions that persons facing deportation should first be placed before the courts.
On 27 April 1967, Wilson was deported to the United Kingdom where the British police gave him a rigorous searching and questioning. In a comment on Wilson's involvement of what the Guyana authorities considered to be undesirable political activities among the Amerindians, the Sun, the newspaper of the United Force, described Wilson on 29 April as a "European well known for his far-left tendencies".
Then on Sunday, 1 May 1967, Leopoldo Talyhardat, Vice-Consul for Venezuela in Guyana, returned to Venezuela after the Guyana Government declared that he was "unacceptable". Here again, there was mystery surrounding his departure, but newspaper reports indicated that he was linked with the Kabakaburi conference.
The Guyana Government closed the incident with the following statement to the press on 1 May:
". . .The Government of Guyana regards the Government of Venezuela as its friend. This was stated this morning by the Principal Assistant Secretary to the Ministry of Information. He said that Guyana wishes at all times to maintain friendly relations with neighbouring Venezuela and the question of Señor Leopoldo Talyhardat being unacceptable to the Government should not be regarded as an indication of any new policy on the part of Guyana towards Venezuela."
The government carefully avoided stating directly that Talyhardat had interfered in Guyanese affairs. However, there was no doubt that his expulsion was due to his involvement in the Kabakaburi affair which was regarded by the Guyana government as a clandestine attempt by Venezuelan diplomatic personnel to interfere in the internal affairs of Guyana through the subversion of members of Guyana's indigenous Amerindian community.
C. SIGNS OF DIVISIONS IN THE COALITION
It must be noted that throughout the "Kabakaburi Affair", the Prime Minister had no consultations with the Leader of the Opposition, a situation which was heavily criticised by the PPP.
It was about this time that the Guyana Minister of Finance and Leader of the United Force, Peter D'Aguiar, announced that he would be visiting Venezuela with a party of Guyanese to engage in mountain-climbing. The PPP was sharply critical of D'Aguiar's plans, especially since he was a leading member of the Government. The Party in a statement on 19 May 1967 suggested that with the recent exposure of the Kabakaburi affair and the expulsion of a Venezuelan diplomat, D'Aguiar's visit to Venezuela was an impropriety which was likely to embarrass the Government of which he was a member. The United Force's newspaper, the Sun, expressed annoyance with the PPP statement with this revealing comment:
". . .It is no secret that the Venezuelan claim to this country is made out of fear of Jagan and his friends in Cuba with their terrorist bombs, and their friends in the Soviet Union with their rockets, plus addition to the vast army of socialist "scholarship winners" training in the Soviet Union, and awaiting their chance to come home and take over. Jagan is a perpetual embarrassment to the people of Guyana."
The PNC newspaper, the New Nation, on the same day took a different view when it stated:
. . . Any neighbour who claims half of our household is no friend of ours. We must respect the forms of international comity but we must never go out of our way to accommodate those who seek to despoil us. This is the advice to every citizen whether he is a member of the Cabinet or trade union. . .
In a comment on the statements of the UF and the PNC newspapers, the PPP-supportive Mirror on 23 May 1967 had this to say:
"All these facts suggest that Venezuela is not merely playing a cat and mouse game with the People's Progressive Party as the United Force suggests. After all, one of Mr. Burnham's first tasks as Prime Minister was to visit Venezuela and hold talks with the top leaders of the Government of that country. Whatever may be the reality underlying Venezuela's claim to Guyanese territory there can be little doubt that the coalition parties do not see eye to eye on the matter."
D. VENEZUELAN PATTERN OF HOSTILITY
Meanwhile, Guyana was attempting to gain greater access in international organisations, but was finding that such access was not always very easy due to opposition from Venezuela. On 23 May, three days before Guyana's first independence anniversary, Guyana's Ambassador to the USA and the UN, John Carter, asked the Venezuelan Government to withdraw its claim to Guyana's territory so that Guyana could join the Organisation of American States (OAS). (The OAS Charter at that time precluded any country having a territorial dispute with a member-state from being accepted as a new member). However, Venezuela refused this request and maintained that its claim to the western Essequibo was just, and that Guyana's entry to the OAS could not be considered because of the existing territorial "dispute".
In relation to this matter, the Trinidad Guardian on 23 May made this editorial comment: ". . .This must be discouraging if not unexpected news for Guyana's Prime Minister, Mr. Burnham, and for other countries in the region. Further, it would appear that the Amerindians in the disputed areas are not wholly in support of the Guyana Government.
"This is a conclusion which can be drawn from the need to deport an alien, to exclude a Guyanese from the area, from the ousting of a foreign diplomat. All are accused of tampering with the Amerindians."
Throughout 1967, the Guyana Government's refrained from stating that the expelled Venezuelan diplomat was asked to leave Guyana because of his subversive activities among Guyanese Amerindians during that year. However, this was finally admitted by the Ministry of External Affairs in its information publication, Guyana Journal, Volume 1, Number 2 (published in December 1968) which wrote about the "pattern of hostility" of the Venezuelan Government and mentioned a number of previously unpublicised "hostile" actions against Guyana. The publication also implied that more than one Venezuelan diplomat was involved in the subversive activities. The Guyana Journal wrote:
". . . . This studied programme of treaty violation is only part of the pattern of hostility and aggression mounted by Venezuela against Guyana. Thus Venezuela has asserted her claim to stop Guyana from becoming a Member of the Organisation of American States. She has used her claim to bar Guyana from signing the Latin American Treaty of Denuclearisation. Despite repeated requests to the depository government that the date be set for Guyana to sign the treaty in conformity with General Assembly resolution 2286 and the express understanding of many delegations who spoke during the debate on that resolution, Guyana has not yet been permitted to sign.
"Venezuela has similarly used her claim to enter reservations against Guyana's participation at FAO Conferences, at the Pan American Conference on Roads, and on Guyana's accession to the International Telecommunication Convention, Montreaux, (Switzerland) in 1965.
"More recently, but less successfully, Venezuela in furtherance of her territorial ambitions attempted at the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties in April of this year (1968) to dilute the provisions of the International Law Commission's draft Convention dealing with the sanctity of treaties.
"Nor has this campaign been limited to external action. In 1966 Venezuelan diplomatic personnel in Guyana were engaged in a clandestine attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of Guyana through the subversion of members of Guyana's indigenous Amerindian community. As a result a second Secretary of the Venezuelan Embassy in Georgetown, Sñr. Talyhardat was expelled."
No doubt, the Kabakaburi affair and the expulsion of the Venezuelan
diplomat caused a deterioration in relations between Guyana and Venezuela. This
later (in early 1968) led to the Guyana Government's refusal to continue to
grant the Venezuelan Embassy radio time to broadcast a weekly 15 minute cultural
and information programme which it had been doing on a Guyanese radio station
for the past two years.
However, meetings at official level continued. But whatever caused a meeting of the Mixed Commission which commenced in Georgetown on the 30 October 1967 to be abruptly adjourned on the 6 November, when the Venezuelan delegation withdrew from the meeting, was not made known to the public. The Venezuelans eventually returned to continue discussions on the 28 November and the session ended on the 1 December.
Another session was held during December in Caracas with the main purpose to draft an Interim Report to be presented to the Venezuelan, Guyanese and British Governments, in keeping with the terms of the Geneva Agreement.
At the end of another meeting of the Mixed Commission held from the 1 to 4 July 1968 in the Venezuelan capital, Venezuela announced that it was withdrawing from the Sub Commission of experts established by the Mixed Commission, and claimed that by this action the Sub Commission was dissolved. At the time of this announcement, the Sub Commission had held only two meetings - the first from the 30 January to the 5 February 1968 and the other from the 5 June to the 17 June the same year. Both meetings were held in Georgetown.
A. STATEMENT BY GUYANA
In a statement on the Venezuelan withdrawal from the Sub Commission, the Guyana Ministry of External Affairs pointed out that Venezuela wished to raise territorial issues straight away in the Mixed Commission. However, Guyana took the view that the correctness of the existing boundary could not be discussed unless Venezuela first make good in the Mixed Commission its contention that the Arbitral Award of 1899, under which that boundary had been established, was null and void. This Venezuela had persistently refused to do and, as further progress could not be made on this issue, at the request of Venezuela, the parties agreed, without prejudice to their stand on it, to consider proposals for cooperation in development between the two countries. Guyana made it clear that such development should relate to its territory as a whole and not to any particular part of it. On this clear understanding the Mixed Commission set up the Sub Commission "to study possible areas of cooperation between Venezuela and Guyana".
At the second meeting of the Sub Commission which was held in June 1968, Guyana submitted proposals relating to three specific projects. Venezuela recognized the priority of these projects on technical grounds but rejected all of them because in its view, priority should be given to projects relating to territory it was claiming. In fact, Venezuela was demanding that cooperation in development should be limited to the western Essequibo region and, further, that it should be given extensive rights to joint administration over the joint development of the area. Such demands clearly threatened to impair Guyana's sovereignty over the area. They were inconsistent with the basis on which the Sub Commission was established.
In the circumstances, Guyana refused to accede to the Venezuelan demands and, because of this, Venezuela withdrew from the Sub Commission and claimed that in consequence the Sub Commission was dissolved. In the Guyana view, Venezuela's unilateral decision could only take effect as a withdrawal and could not dissolve the Sub Commission since this body was created by a decision of the whole of the Mixed Commission.
B. ECONOMIC AGGRESSION BY VENEZUELA
On Saturday 15 June 1968, the Venezuelan Ministry of Foreign Affairs placed an advertisement in the London Times stating that the Essequibo region of Guyana belonged to Venezuela, and that the Venezuelan Government would not in consequence recognise concessions granted in the region by the Guyana Government. The advertisement was in the following terms:
COMMUNIQUE FROM THE VENEZUELAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The Venezuelan Government, through an official statement issued by the Department of Geology and Mines (Ministry of Forestry, Lands and Mines) of the Guyana Government has learnt that with the help, in equipment and personnel of the United Nations and the United States of America, mine operations have recently been intensified in various parts of Esequivo Guiana.
In view of the fact that the Esequivo Guiana is claimed by our country, as by rights belong to it, the Venezuelan Ministry of Foreign Affairs publicly and categorically once more state that they do not recognise any type of such supposed concessions either granted or to be granted by the Guyana Government over the territory stretching to the west of the Esequivo River, from its source to its mouth, and this respect, they reiterate the Communiqué issued by the said Ministry and published in the press on the 25th May, 1966, as well as the statement given by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Ignacio Iribarren Borges, on the 16 September of that same year. These and other reservations which derive from the unwavering Venezuelan right over the Esequivo Guiana were upheld by the Geneva Agreement (Article V) of the 17th February, 1966. Caracas, 14 May, 1968.
C. NOTE OF PROTEST BY GUYANA
On the 28 June 1968, the Guyana Government sent a Note of Protest to the Venezuelan Government. It stated:
...In seeking through the medium of an advertisement in space bought from the publishers of the Times newspaper to assert a claim to the region of Guyana west of the Essequibo River, the Government of Venezuela has again acted in violation. . . of the Geneva Agreement. . .
Further, the Government of Guyana views the aforementioned advertisement as a deliberate attempt by the Government of Venezuela to retard the economic development of Guyana through the intimidation of persons, organisations or Governments genuinely prepared to contribute to the development of Guyana and to the advancement of the economic well being of its people. The Government of Guyana cannot but view this attempt as being entirely inconsistent with the professed desire of the Government of Venezuela to assist in the development of Guyana and to contribute to the advancement of the welfare of its people. The Government of Guyana is under solemn obligation to the people of Guyana and is pledged to the development of all the resources of the country for the benefit of its people. As a Government of one of the newly independent States of the Western Hemisphere and of one of the small developing countries of the world, the Government of Guyana places on record to the Government of Venezuela its protest against this new violation of the Geneva Agreement and this act of economic aggression.
The region of Guyana west of the Essequibo River is an area whose boundary with Venezuela has been established under an international arbitral award by which the Government of Venezuela is bound. That area has been consistently under the sovereignty and under the active administrative and juridical possession and control of the Government of Guyana, and before Guyana's independence on the 26th May, 1966, of the Government of the United Kingdom for over 150 years and, more specifically, ever since the determination of the boundary with Venezuela under international procedures in 1899. The Government of Guyana and the Government of the United Kingdom have at all material times granted concessions over this territory west of the Essequibo River and until Guyana's independence such concessions have never been questioned by the Government of Venezuela.
The Government of Guyana wishes to state unequivocally that nothing in the Geneva Agreement prohibits or restrains the Government of Guyana from continuing to grant concessions over any part of the territory within its existing boundaries and that nothing in the Geneva Agreement upholds or sustains what are alleged in the aforementioned advertisement to be "reservations which derive from the unwavering Venezuelan right over the Esequivo Guiana". The Government of Guyana rejects all assertions, whether contained in the said advertisement or otherwise, which suggest either expressly or by implication that the Geneva Agreement in any way curtails or restricts the sovereignty of the Government of Guyana over any part of its territory.
Despite the Guyana statement, two North American oil companies, Continental and Globe, which had been granted mining concessions in the Essequibo region of Guyana, gave up these mining rights and closed down their exploration operations. It was clear that these companies which held business connections with oil companies operating in Venezuela succumbed to intimidation following the publication of the Venezuelan advertisement.
D. VENEZUELAN DECREE OF THE SEA
Venezuelan economic aggression increased tremendously on the 9 July 1968 when Dr. Raul Leoni, President of Venezuela, issued a Decree which purported to annex as part of the territorial waters and contiguous zone of Venezuela, a twelve mile belt of sea lying along the coast of Guyana between the mouth of the Essequibo River and Waini Point, and requiring the Venezuelan armed forces to impose domination over that belt of sea.
It must be noted that this belt of sea became since 1954 internationally recognized as owned by Guyana when by the British Guiana (Alteration of Boundaries) Order in Council made by the Queen in Council of the United Kingdom, Guyana's territory was extended seawards to cover the entire continental shelf.
The Venezuelan Decree, which was published in the Official Gazette of Venezuela, proclaimed the following:
RAUL LEONI, President of the Republic by virtue of the power conferred on him by the National Constitution, and in conformity with the Law of the Territorial Sea, Continental Shelf, Protection of Fishing and Air Space and with the approbative Law of the Convention on the Continental Shelf:
CONSIDERING: That Article 2 of the Law on the Territorial Sea, Continental Shelf, Protection of Fishing and Air Space, and Article 4 and subsequent articles of the Ratifying Law of the Convention of the Continental Shelf, provide that in places where the conditions of the Continental seaboard and islands require it, straight line bases should be drawn by which the extent of the Territorial Sea should be measured:
CONSIDERING: That in many areas along the Venezuelan coastline there exist geographical conditions which require the fixing of such lines along sections of the Republic. It is decreed:
ARTICLE 1. - The following straight baseline shall be drawn on that part of the Venezuelan coast between the dividing line of the Essequibo River and Punta Araguapiche in the Federal District Delta Amacuro from a point with the coordinates 9 degrees 27 minutes 30 seconds North latitude and 60 degrees 52 minutes West longitude to another point with the coordinates 8 degrees 26 minutes North latitude and 59 degrees 34 minutes 30 seconds West longitude.
ARTICLE 2. - The Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone corresponding to Venezuela in the sector is measured from the straight baseline where it has been drawn and from the low water mark along the remainder of its length with the exception contained in Article 4.
ARTICLE 3. - The rights of sovereignty of Venezuela over the territorial waters, the restitution of which is claimed from Guyana are expressly reserved, that is to say, that 3 mile wide strip along the coastline of the territory between the mouth of the Essequibo River and the mouth of the Guainia River as well as over the internal waters of the said zone delimited by the straight baseline fixed by the present decree.
ARTICLE 4. - The straight baseline corresponding to the mouth of the Essequibo River will be that which shall be agreed upon in due course with the neighbouring state.
ARTICLE 5. - The Official Notes that are published hereafter will make clear the measures adopted by the present decree,
ARTICLE 6. - The Ministers of External Affairs, Defence, Public Works, Agriculture and Communications shall be charged with the execution of the present decree.
EXPLANATORY NOTE. - This decree by the National Executive, according to official information, has the following significance: The territorial sea of Venezuela is 12 miles wide, in accordance with Venezuelan law, and Guyana's is only three miles. In other words, the three mile area measuring from the coast of the territory under dispute presently pertains to Guyana, the remaining nine miles are considered by Guyana as "high seas". For Venezuela, as a natural consequence of her claim, this very strip is Venezuelan territory in which her sovereignty must be exercised, but before taking any material act of possession, Venezuela has to make public her title to dominion over the waters in question. And she can do so on the basis of the treatise of the straight baseline in the zone and in accordance with Venezuelan law and international conventions. In this way the Venezuelan State should exercise concrete acts of sovereignty in relation, for example, to the petroleum oil concessions which Guyana has granted in the area.
E. A VENEZUELAN COMMENT
Shortly after the Decree was published, a Reuter report on the 9 July quoted Miguel Zuniaga Cisneros, a member of the Guyana Recuperation Committee in Caracas, as saying that the Venezuelan armed forces should seize the western Essequibo and the offshore waters to prevent a "Communist takeover" which he expected following the up coming general elections at year end. Zuniaga felt sure that the Marxist oriented PPP of Cheddi Jagan would win the elections and warned that Venezuela might lose the territory altogether with the "United States taking over the land if a Communist Government takes command of Guyana".
F. STATEMENT BY BURNHAM
On the day after the Decree was published, Guyana's Prime Minister, Forbes Burnham, made a brief press statement condemning the Venezuelan action. On the morning of the 12 July he conferred with the Deputy Leader of the PPP, Ashton Chase, on the new situation, and in the afternoon, he addressed the National Assembly (Parliament) on the issue.
After reviewing the history of the Venezuelan claim to Guyana's territory, Burnham showed how Venezuela frustrated the work of the Mixed Commission and the Sub Commission and violated the Geneva Agreement. He revealed that Venezuela had on several occasions made territorial reservations in relation to Guyana's participation in various international meetings. One of the most serious instances of this, he said, was the major effort undertaken by Venezuela to prevent Guyana from signing the Latin American Denuclearisation Treaty. In addition, in April 1968, Venezuela attempted at the Vienna Conference of Treaties to dilute the provisions of the International Law Commission's draft Convention dealing with the sanctity of treaties.
Burnham continued:
...Now comes the preposterous Decree signed on the 9th instant by the President of Venezuela. The Decree is, we contend, a nullity and will be exposed for the unprecedented absurdity that it is. Whatever positions individual countries may take in relation to the breadth of territorial sea, it is palpably clear that only one state may possess sovereignty over the territorial sea relating to the same coast.
If this needed demonstration, it is shown by Article 1 of the 1958 Geneva Convention of the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, which provides that "the sovereignty of a State extends beyond its land territory and its internal waters, to a belt adjacent to its coast, described as the territorial sea". Venezuela signed the Convention on the 30th October, 1958, and ratified it on the 15 August, 1961, without any reservations relating to that Article. Indeed such reservations as there were related to Trinidad, Aruba and Curacao. The Convention itself came into force on the 10th September, 1964. Unless and until a decision in favour of Venezuela is forthcoming under the procedure of the Geneva Agreement, Guyana's sovereignty over the generally recognised continental shelf and territorial seas cannot be disturbed. Indeed, Venezuela has at all material times heretofore recognised Guyana's sovereignty over the territorial waters in relation to the coastline in question, and she cannot claim sovereignty over territorial waters relating to the same coastline.
In fact, by the same Convention all signatories to it specifically accept that where states are adjacent to each other the territorial sea of each cannot extend laterally beyond a line projecting seawards from the common land boundary. There are differences of opinion as to how the line should be defined but there is no dispute as to the general principle involved that two States may not both have sovereignty at the same time over the territorial sea (whatever the limit) relating to the same coast. The reason for this is apparent when it is recognised that the doctrine relating to the territorial sea finds its origin in the requirements of security of the coastal State, in the furthering of its commercial, fiscal and political interests and the right of its people to the exclusive exploitation and enjoyment of the products of the sea within its territorial waters.
There is yet another fundamental question which the Venezuelan Decree entirely ignores or callously disregards. It is indisputable that Guyana's territory extends seawards to cover the entire continental shelf and Guyana has consistently exercised sovereignty over it. Since the ownership of the territorial sea includes ownership of the sea bed, the Venezuelan Decree purports to relate to part of the continental shelf which is within the dominion of Guyana. Insofar, therefore, as the Venezuelan Decree was based, as it is expressed to be based, on the assumption that Guyana's sovereignty extends only three miles seawards, the Decree was founded on a false premise.
If further evidence be needed of the degree to which the Venezuelan Decree outrages the established tenets of international law and practice it is to be found in the terms of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone which, as I have said, Venezuela has both signed and ratified. Under Article 24 (1) of the Convention, Guyana has specified rights relating to police, customs, sanitation and other matters in the contiguous zone, that is, the belt of sea within 12 miles from the coast, and the existence of these rights excludes the competence of Venezuela or any other State to extend her sovereignty or jurisdiction over any part of that belt of waters.
The Venezuelan Decree is an unmistakable attempt to assert a claim to the Essequibo region of Guyana outside of the Mixed Commission and is, therefore, yet another calculated breach of Article V (2) of the Geneva Agreement which expressly provides that no claim whatsoever shall "be asserted otherwise than in the Mixed Commission while that Commission is in being".
It is serious enough on this account as one of a number of similar breaches; but what gives cause for particular concern about Venezuela's maturity and sense of responsibility as a member of international society is her threat, for such it is, to use armed force in support of the purported decree, since it must be obvious that any interference with Guyana's shipping, fishing or other rights would be an act of aggression violating the Charter of the United Nations and disturbing the peace of the Hemisphere. The conclusion is inescapable that Venezuela is prepared to renounce or ignore any international agreement, whether bilateral or multilateral, and to defy the Charter of the United Nations at any time that it suits her whims or seems to promote some particular interest that she may for the moment be pursuing.
In the present circumstances I have asked our Ambassador in Caracas to return to Georgetown for immediate consultations. Yesterday, at the request of our Permanent Representation in New York, the United Nations Secretary General circulated to all Member States of the United Nations a report of the Venezuelan decree together with the statement I issued on learning of it. In like manner I am arranging for this present statement to be communicated to Member States as well as to be specifically circulated to Commonwealth Governments through the Commonwealth Secretary General in London.
I have conveyed directly this morning to the British High Commissioner in Georgetown, whose Government is a party to the controversy with Venezuela and a signatory to the Geneva Agreement, the serious views which my Government takes of this recent development and the responsibilities which in our view devolve on the British Government as a result. I have also held discussions with the accredited representatives of other friendly Governments in Georgetown who are members of the United Nations, namely, Canada, the Republic of India, Trinidad and Tobago and the United States of America, informing them of the development and inviting their support for Guyana in the face of the Venezuelan acts of aggression. We are taking every step available to us to protect our interests and secure our territorial integrity. I also held lengthy discussions this morning with the Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Leader's unavoidable absence from Georgetown. This is a matter which transcends domestic political differences.
I cannot tell with any certainty where this ill advised course of action on which the Government of Venezuela has embarked will lead us. We must be prepared, however, for even more aggressive demonstrations of international lawlessness from the Government of Venezuela. We will need all our courage and strength to withstand these efforts to break our will and despoil our land. Venezuela has now made clear her intention to seek relentlessly to re-impose the yoke of colonialism on a young and small nation that has only recently succeeded in freeing itself from the tutelage of another imperial power. We have no quarrel with the Venezuelan people but we will not lack courage or resolve in resisting aggressive demands of a Venezuelan Government that is prepared to defile the traditions of Bolivar and to flout precepts of Hemispheric and world order and security.
In our stand for survival we shall call upon the conscience of all peace loving people to speak out in our cause and we shall need all our unity as a people so that our voice may be heard in all corners of the world and in all the Councils of the world's institutions for peace.
By agreement with the Deputy Leader of the Opposition, I propose . . . during next week to offer this House an opportunity to discuss and debate fully the subject of Venezuela's latest move of aggression against Guyana.
G. AMERICAN OPPOSITION TO THE DECREE
The United States government was concerned over this new situation and expressed it opposition to this decree. On Saturday 13 July, the Under Secretary of State, Nicholas Katzenbach, called in Venezuelan Ambassador Tejera Paris to discuss the developments. He told the Ambassador that the meaning of the decree was unclear to the American government and would appreciate an explanation since it was potentially serious both from the point of view of international law and also of internal Guyanese politics. He said that if the intent of the decree was merely to put the world on notice that "when and if Venezuela attained sovereignty over territory it claimed", the United States would have no problem with it although it was difficult to see what advantage there was to Venezuela in issuing this decree at that time. However, he added that the US did not accept decree's validity if it implied actual exercise of sovereignty and, if the matter came up in any international forum, the US could not support Venezuela.
The United States also viewed the decree as serious in terms of the Guyanese electoral situation. The American government felt that it was of more immediate interest to Venezuela and hemisphere if Forbes Burnham - whom the Americans were supporting - would win the forthcoming elections in December 1968 in order to prevent Cheddi Jagan from re-gaining power. Katzenbach believed that moves such as this claim made by the Venezuelan decree were not helpful because they eroded Burnham electoral strength and diverted his attention during the critical remaining six month campaign period. Accordingly, it also made it difficult for the American government to counsel Burnham to use moderation whenever he felt obligated to defend his position.
The details of this meeting were set out in the following telegram sent by the Secretary of State Dean Rusk to the US Embassy in Caracas. Copies were also sent to the American Embassies in Georgetown and London. (The telegram was published in 2003 by the US State Department in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico).
544. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Venezuela
Caracas, July 13, 1968, 2159Z.
202053. Following is uncleared memcon:
Under Secretary Katzenbach called in Venezuelan Ambassador Tejera Paris to discuss July 9 Venezuelan decree asserting sovereignty over territorial seas from 3 to 12 miles off of part of Guyana claimed by Venezuela. In cordial but serious discussion, Under Secretary made following points:
(1) Meaning of decree was unclear to us and we would appreciate explanation, as it was potentially serious both from point of view international law and point of view internal Guyanese politics.
(2) If intent decree were merely to put world on notice that when and if Venezuela attained sovereignty over territory it claimed, Venezuelan law with respect territorial waters would obtain, we would have no problem with it although it was difficult to see what advantage there was to Venezuela in issuing it at this time.
(3) If, however, as accompanying explanatory note seemed to suggest, Venezuela intended immediately to exercise rights of sovereignty in 3-12 mile zone we would take "most serious" view of situation. As international lawyer, he himself could not see how such claim could be asserted and doubted that Ambassador Tejera would, in his capacity as lawyer, defend it. International law was clear that maritime rights and rights to continental shelf (which Guyana always claimed) attached to coastal state and at present Guyana was clearly the coastal state. The U.S., therefore, did not accept decree's validity if it implied actual exercise of sovereignty and, if matter came up in international forum, we could not support Venezuela. While we would not make public statement unless we had to, we would have to advise U.S. shipping and other private interests if they asked that we did not accept validity of decree.
(4) We also viewed decree as serious in terms Guyanese electoral situation. It was, we thought, of more immediate interest to Venezuela than to us and hemisphere that Burnham win elections which would probably take place in December and that Jagan be excluded. Moves such as this claim were not helpful as they eroded Burnham electoral strength in difficult elections and diverted his attention during critical remaining six month campaign period. It also made it difficult for us to counsel Burnham to use moderation as he felt obligated to defend his position.
(5) We viewed explanatory note, with allusions such as "physical act of possession", as more disturbing than decree itself and wondered what intent of Venezuela was in light of assurances President of Venezuela and country's highest officials had given that Venezuela would not resort to force. Under Secretary again emphasized seriousness of our concern if Venezuela intended exercise soverei