The Suspension of the British Guiana Constitution - 1953 (Declassified British documents)

INTRODUCTION

In October 1953, the democratically elected Government of Guyana (then known as British Guiana) was removed from power by the British Government which was at that time the colonial ruler. What was essentially a coup d'etat against the People's Progressive Party (PPP), which had won a landslide victory in the April 1953 election, was engineered through the suspension of the British Guiana constitution by the British Government and the simultaneous landing and deployment of British troops in the country. The Ministers of the Government, as well as the House of Assembly, were dismissed by the British Governor, who proceeded to appoint an interim Government made up of persons who were political opponents of the PPP. Most of these persons had been defeated as candidates in the April general election. In the aftermath, many leading members of the PPP were detained without trial while, under a state of emergency declared by the Governor, civil rights were suspended.

The British Government took this drastic action after it was convinced by some of the anti-PPP politicians, who had lost their privileges after the April election, that the PPP was a "communist organisation" bent on "subverting the Government" and making it an ally of the Soviet Union. The British Government believed the untruths being peddled that the country was in a state of tension and that violence could break out at any moment. When the British troops arrived on 9 October they were very surprised to see people peacefully going about their normal activities. On the same day an international cricket match between Trinidad and Guyana began in Georgetown, and there was no sign of tension or violence anywhere.

As soon as it was clear that the PPP had won the April 1953 election, there developed an increased traffic of official communication between Georgetown and London and also between military offices in London and the Caribbean on the new political situation in Guyana, Many of these documents point very clearly to the fact that the British Government was surprised by the PPP electoral victory, and that it was intent to remove the new left-wing Government from power.

The source of these documents in this collection is the British Archives. They were declassified quite recently and were made available by the British Archives to the Cheddi Jagan Research Centre in Guyana. A few other documents (which were never classified or secret), and whose source is not the British Archives, are included in this collection to add to the historical perspective. The source for those additional documents is noted below the text.

For convenience, the documents are divided into time periods: May-September 1953, October 1953, November 1953, and December 1953 and after. In general, there is no special title given to any of the official documents. The title of each document shown in this collection has been formulated by the editor of this collection.

THE DOCUMENTS

MAY - SEPTEMBER 1953

1. INTERNAL COLONIAL OFFICE MEMORANDUM ON AVAILABILITY OF FORCES TO PREVENT DISTURBANCES IN BRITISH GUIANA
(13 May 1953)

DRAFT

DEF.123/30/01

Mr. Vernon ……….13/5
Mr. Edmonds ……. 13/5
Mr. Armitage-Smith 13/5
Mr. Mayle

Permt. U.S. of S.
Parly. U.S. of S.
Minister of State*
Secretary of State**

SECRET

Availability of Forces in the event of disturbances in British Guiana.

Source of Forces

The Police Force in British Guiana is up to strength and as far as we know is not disaffected. The lower ranks are predominantly African which may be a factor of importance if, as seems possible, disturbances are caused by East Indians. It is not recommended that Police Forces should be brought in from other Colonial territories.

British Guiana has a local Volunteer Force which would no doubt be the first reserve for the Police in the event of trouble. Its strength is 403.

A U.K. battalion is stationed in Jamaica, under the Commander, Caribbean Area, less one company in British Honduras. An air movement scheme has been prepared, and this should enable these troops to give assistance at short notice.

There is a small strategic reserve available in the United Kingdom for use anywhere in the world, but with military commitments in being or anticipated in Malaya, East Africa, Central Africa and Egypt, the possibility of a unit from this reserve being released for use in the West Indies is so remote as not to merit entertainment.

The Naval Commander-in-Chief, West Indies Station, has a variety of ships at his disposal, but none of them will necessarily be in West Indian waters at any particular time unless the Admiralty accede to any special emergency request made.

Method of calling up troops

The Governor should supply the Commander, Caribbean and the Commander-in-Chief, West Indies Station with an appreciation of the position as soon as he foresees the possibility of needing military aid. The Commanders will then make such troop and ship dispositions as they consider appropriate. The C.-.in-C. might, for example, keep a ship cruising in neighbouring West Indian waters. If trouble starts the Governor will call on the Commanders directly for support when he considers it desirable. It will be for the Commanders to ask London for reinforcements if they think the situation warrants it.

It is recommended that the Governor of British Guiana should be reminded to let the local Commanders have an appreciation of the situation if there is any cause to fear disturbances.

[Editor's Notes:
* Alan Lennox-Boyd
** Oliver Lyttelton]

2. MINUTES OF THE INAUGURAL SESSION OF THE BRITISH GUIANA HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY
(18 May 1953)

BRITISH GUIANA

FIRST HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY

FIRST SESSION

1953

MINUTES of the Proceedings of the inaugural meeting of the House of Assembly of the Colony of British Guiana held in the Chamber of the Legislature at the Public Buildings, Georgetown, Demerara,

AT 2 P.M. on MONDAY, 18TH MAY, 1953.

PRESENT:

His Honour the Speaker Sir Eustace Gordon Woolford, O.B.E., Q.C.

Ex-Officio Members -
The Chief Secretary, Mr. John Gutch, C.M.G., O.B.E.
The Attorney General, Mr. F.W. Holder, Q.C.
The Financial Secretary, Mr. W.O. Fraser, O.B.E. (Acting)

Elected Members
Mr. W.A. Phang (No. 1 - North West)
Mr. T.S. Wheating (No. 2 - Pomeroon)
Mrs. J. Jagan (No. 3 - Western Essequibo)
Mr. T. Lee (No. 4 - Essequibo Islands)
Mr. E.F. Correia (No. 5 - Bartica and Interior)
Mr. F. Bowman (No. 6 - Demerara-Essequibo)
Mr. Jai Narine Singh (No. 7 - West Bank, Demerara)
Dr. J.P. Lachhmansingh (No. 8 - East Bank, Demerara)
Mr. C.A. Carter (No. 9 - Upper Demerara River)
Mr. A. Chase (No. 10 - Georgetown South)
Mr. C.R. Wong (No. 11 - Georgetown South Central)
Miss J.I.S. Burnham (No. 12 - Georgetown Central)
Mr. F.O. Van Sertima (No. 13 - Georgetown North)
Mr. L.F.S. Burnham (No. 14 - Georgetown North-East)
Mr. Ramkarran (No. 15 - West Central Demerara)
Mr. S.E. King (No. 16 - Central Demerara)
Mrs. J. Phillips-Gay (No. 17 - East Central Demerara)
Mr. C.S. Persaud (No. 18 - Mahaica-Mahaicony)
Mr. S.M. Latchmansingh (No. 19 - Western Berbice)

Mr. W.O.R. Kendall (No. 20 - New Amsterdam)
Mr. Ajodha Singh (No. 21 - Berbice River)
Dr. R.S. Hanoman Singh (No. 22 - Eastern Berbice)
Dr. C.B. Jagan (No. 23 - Corentyne Coast)
Mr. M. Khan (No. 24 - Corentyne River);

Clerk of the Legislature - Mr. I. Crum Ewing
Assistant Clerk of the Legislature - Mr. I.R. King.

Members having taken their places around the table in the numerical order of their Constituencies immediately following those of the Ex-Officio Members, His Honour the Speaker entered the Chamber at 2 p.m. in procession preceded by the Marshal, the Clerk of the House and the Assistant Clerk.

ROLL CALL OF MEMBERS

The Clerk called the roll of Members, all answering as their names were called. The Clerk then reported to the Speaker that all Members were present.

GOVERNOR'S PROCLAMATION UNDER SECTION 82 OF THE BRITISH GUIANA (CONSTITUTION) ORDER IN COUNCIL, 1953.

The Clerk next read the Governor's Proclamation published in the Gazette of the 13th of May, 1953, appointing the 18th day of May, 1953, at 2 p.m., as the appointed day and hour for the first meeting of the House of Assembly.

OATH OF ALLEGIANCE UNDER SECTION 81 OF THE BRITISH GUIANA (CONSTITUTION) ORDER IN COUNCIL, 1953.

The Honourable the Chief Justice, Mr. E.P.S. Bell, administered the Oath of Allegiance to the Speaker and thereafter to the twenty-seven Members of the House.

PRAYERS

Prayers were read by the Most Reverend Dr. Alan John Knight, Archbishop of the West Indies.

Thereafter the Speaker addressed the House.

The Honourable Members for the Corentyne Coast (Dr. C.B. Jagan) and New Amsterdam (Mr. W.O.R. Kendall) congratulated the Speaker on his appointment and pledged the co-operation of the majority and the minority parties respectively, in the discharge of the business of the House. The Chief Secretary on behalf of the Ex-Officio Members of the House also joined in congratulating the Speaker on his appointment and asked that the Speaker's address should be printed and circulated for the information of Members.

ELECTION OF DEPUTY SPEAKER UNDER SECTION 45 OF THE BRITISH GUIANA (CONSTITUTION) ORDER IN COUNCIL. 1953.

The Clerk having read Section 45 of the British Guiana (Constitution) Order in Council concerning the election of a Deputy Speaker, the Speaker explained to the House that the Standing Rules arid Orders would have to be suspended to permit of a motion being moved for the approval of the appointment of the Deputy Speaker and also for the election of the six Members of the Executive Council.

The Elected Members then proceeded to vote by ballot for the selection of a Deputy Speaker, the Ex-Officio Members having decided to abstain from voting. The result of the voting was as follows: -

Mrs. Jagan received 17 votes (Member for Western Essequibo)
Miss Burnham received 3 votes (Member for Georgetown Central)
Mr. Wong received 2 votes (member for Georgetown South Central).

One Member abstained from voting, while another Member spoilt his vote.

Accordingly the following motion was moved by the Honourable Member for the Corentyne River (Mr. Khan) and seconded by the Honourable Member for Demerara-Essequibo (Mr. Bowman): -

That the Standing Rules and Orders be suspended to allow of a motion being made for the approval of the election of the Honourable Member for Western Essequibo, Mr. Janet Jagan, as Deputy Speaker of the House.

The motion was carried.

The Honourable Member for the Corentyne River (Mr. Khan) then moved the following motion: -

BE IT RESOLVED that this House hereby approves of the appointment of the Member for Western Essequibo, Mrs. Janet Jagan, as its Deputy Speaker.

The motion was seconded by the Honourable Member for the Corentyne Coast (Dr. Jagan) and carried.

ELECTION OF MINISTERS UNDER SECTION 9(2) OF THE BRITISH GUIANA (CONSTITUTION) ORDER IN COUNCIL, 1953.

The Clerk read Section 9(2) of the British Guiana (Constitution) Order in Council, 1953, providing for the election of six persons from among the elected members to be Ministers.

Members then proceeded to ballot for the election of the six members of the Executive Council.

The result of the voting was as follows: -

Mr. Burnham received - 19 votes.
Dr. Jagan received - 18 votes
Dr. Lachhmansingh received - 18 votes
Mr. Chase received - 18 votes
Mr. Jai Narine Singh received - 18 votes
Mr. King received - 18 votes
Mr. Lee received - 6 votes
Mr. Wong received - 6 votes
Mr. Kendall received - 6 votes
Mr. Carter received - 6 votes
Dr. Hanoman Singh received - 5 votes
Miss Burnham received - 5 votes
Mr. Wheating received - 1 vote.

The Official Members abstained from voting.

The following motion was moved by the Honourable Member for the Corentyne River (Mr. Khan) and seconded by the Honourable Member for the Corentyne Coast (Dr. Jagan): -

That the standing Rules and Orders be suspended to allow of a motion being made for the approval of the election of six members to be Members of the Executive Council in and for the Colony as provided for under the provisions of Section 5 of the British Guiana (Constitution) Order in Council, 1953.

The motion was carried.

The Honourable Member for the Corentyne River (Mr. Khan) then moved the following motion: -

BE IT RESOLVED that, in accordance with the provisions of Section 9(1) of the British Guiana (Constitution) Order in Council, 1953, this House hereby approves of the election of the following Members, viz. : -
Dr. C.B. Jagan
Mr. L.F.S. Burnham
Mr. A. Chase
Mr. S. King
Dr. J.P. Lachhmansingh
Mr. Jai Narine Singh

to be Member of the Executive Council in and for the Colony as provided for under the provisions of Section 5 of the British Guiana (Constitution) Order in Council, 1953.

The motion was seconded by the Member for the Berbice River (Mr. Ajodha Singh) and carried.

ADJOURNEMENT

There being no further business His Honour adjourned the House sine die.*

Confirmed,

(Signed) Eustace G. Wolford
Speaker

PUBLIC BUILDINGS BRITISH GUIANA
17th June, 1953

[Editor's note: * without stating a date for the next meeting.]
[Source: Parliamentary Library, Guyana]

3. EXTRACT OF MESSAGE FROM QUEEN ELEIZABETH II TO THE NEW LEGISLATURE OF BRITISH GUIANA
(30 May 1953)

It is indeed a happy coincidence that the year of my Coronation also marks the introduction of a new Constitution in British Guiana under which my peoples will assume more responsibility for their own affairs. . . .

The members of the Legislature have been entrusted with the heavy responsibility of advancing the prosperity and well-being of the territory and I know they will always bear in mind the high trust that has been placed in them in carrying out this task. To them and to my peoples in the territory, I send my greetings on this notable occasion and my good wishes for the success of the new Constitution.

[Source: National Archives of Guyana.
(Quoted from Legislative Council Debates: 30 May 1953)]

4. EXTRACT OF THE MESSAGE FROM COLONIAL SECRETARY OLIVER LYTTELTON TO THE NEW LEGISLATURE OF BRITISH GUIANA
(30 May 1953)

It gives me great pleasure to send a message of goodwill to the new Legislature of British Guiana on the occasion of its opening session. All who have taken part ever since the appointment of the visiting (Waddington) Commission in the framing of the new Constitution deserve our warm thanks and congratulations. With the opening of a new era in the political development of the territory a special responsibility rests upon the members of the Legislature to work together for the good of the people of the territory and to make a success of the Constitution. It is my earnest hope that the House and the Council will build up a tradition of obligation to the interests of the people of orderly debate and of good government. . . .

[Source: National Archives of Guyana
(Quoted from Legislative Council Debates, 30 May 1953)]

5. EXTRACTS OF THE SPEECH BY SIR ALFRED SAVAGE, GOVERNOR OF BRITISH GUIANA TO THE NEW LEGISLATURE OF BRITISH GUIANA
(30 May 1953)

. . . . We are not only witnessing history being made in this country but we ourselves are taking part in its making and our responsibilities to the present and future generations of Guianese are both heavy and immense.

I would first urge upon members of both Chambers and the general public the necessity to study carefully the provisions of the new Constitution. Its terms and purpose represent the most progressive constitutional changes which British Guiana has ever experienced. Here, as in other parts of the Commonwealth, the declared policy of Her Majesty's Government to advance the colonies to the goal of self-government as speedily as their political and economic development will allow has been applied in a most practical manner.

I am aware that the party in power (PPP) have expressed themselves as opposed in principle to the provision . . . . for a Second Chamber. They have suggested that it is superfluous, since in any case it has no power effectively to oppose the will of the House of Assembly. But I suggest to you that it is wrong to regard the State Council as an opposition. It is true that its function is to act as a check . . . . but I am confident it will exercise its function with discretion.

Similarly, the retention of the three ex officio members in the House of Assembly and the State Council . . . . has been criticised.

. . . . I appeal to all members of the Legislature and of the Civil Service to tackle this magnificent opportunity in co-operation and with confidence and enthusiasm and prove to the world that the Constitution cannot only work but will operate adequately and successfully. Only by so doing can we prove British Guiana's fitness for a further forward step towards full self-government.

British Guiana is not the first country in this world to have had radical constitutional and political changes. I have seen similar changes elsewhere, when, as we have, one section of a community have feared the worse because they felt that the speed of progress was too rapid while another section believed that at last all their problems would be solved.

To those who feel that El Dorado has now been discovered I would say you must not expect too early or too easy a solution to your problems. . . . .

If labour will give of its best and if capital will deal justly with its employees, the partnership of interests will be more apparent and the general industrial health of this country will be assured. . . .

Finally British Guiana has been described as "the land of six peoples" and a most heartening feature of the recent elections was the absence of racialism. . . .

[Source: National Archives of Guyana
(Quoted from Legislative Council Debates, 30 May 1953)]

6. TEXT OF LETTER TO GOVERNOR OF BRITISH GUIANA FROM N.L. MAYLE OF THE COLONIAL OFFICE
(3 June 1953)

COLONIAL OFFICE,
The Church House,
Great Smith Street,
S.W.1.
3rd June, 1953

DEF 123/30/1

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

At the end or his letter to you on the 30th May Lloyd asked for an estimate of the reliability of the Police Force and the local Volunteer Force in case of riots or disturbances arising out or political developments.

I do not know whether, in reply, to that request, you will be commenting on the question, which you have no doubt been considering, of increasing the efficiency of the Police Force to meet the risks of disturbances or riots, racial or otherwise, attached to the People's Progressive Party's victory at the Election. If not, we should be grateful if you would let us have a report as soon as possible on what is being done to carry out the recommendations made by Muller, in his letter to Gutch or the 24th March, together with your views on any other action which you think desirable in present circumstances to improve Police efficiency. We should be glad if you would include a further report on the extent to which the P.P.P. has supporters in the Police Force.

We have also considered, in a preliminary and quite tentative way, what outside Forces might be available for British Guiana in the event of a situation developing which called for such assistance. We do not of course envisage such a situation arising in the near future and this is very much a precautionary matter. At the same time, as you are probably aware, the Forces available for reinforcing internal Police and local Forces in the West Indies are not numerous and might not be available quickly. In these circumstances, it seems to us to be a wise precaution to let the Commander, Caribbean, and the Naval Commander-in-Chief, West Indies Station, to whom you would normally apply for assistance, have an appreciation of the situation now and keep them informed of developments. This will prepare them for a request and ensure that they have the necessary background if and when it is made. I hope that you will not think that we are being too pessimistic in considering this matter. If you agree with our views, perhaps you would arrange to keep the Naval Commander-in-Chief, West Indies Station, and the Commander, Caribbean, posted on the situation. We should also like to have copies of the appreciations sent to them.

(Sgd.) (N.L. Mayle)

[To:]
Sir Alfred Savage, K.C.M.G.,
Government House,
Georgetown,
British Guiana

7. SPEECH BY THE CHIEF MINISTER, DR. CHEDDI JAGAN, IN THE BRITISH GUIANA HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY ON 17 JUNE 1953
(17 June 1953)

"WE HARBOUR NO ILLUSONS"

Mr. Speaker,

This House of Assembly is pleased to record its appreciation of Your Excellency's address delivered at the State Opening of the present Legislative session.

To the Messages of goodwill from Her Majesty the Queen and Her Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies, the House respectfully requests that you convey to Her Majesty and her Secretary of State for the Colonies grateful appreciation and the assurance that we will strive to the utmost for the happiness and well-being of the people of British Guiana and will remove every obstacle which may be places on the road to peace, progress and prosperity.

The House observes with favour the initiative recently shown by Her Majesty's Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Sir Winston Churchill in attempting to ease the present tense world situation and hope that the same initiative will be shown in bringing about an end of racial discrimination and ruthless oppression of, and aggression against, colonial and native peoples, particularly in South Africa, Malaya and Kenya. In such efforts he can be assured of the full and enthusiastic support of the peoples whom this House represents.

Your Excellency's optimistic views about the new Constitution and in particular the State Council have been remarked. We however, harbour no illusions about the nominated State Council which can only serve the purpose of curbing the will of the people - a reactionary and undemocratic purpose.

The presence of three Civil Servants in the House and their control of the three key Ministries in the Government and the Governor's veto are an anomaly and contrary to the professed democratic principles of Her Majesty's Government. We shall continue to struggle for a democratic Constitution for British Guiana.

The House notes Your Excellency's views that the new Government has been handed a fairly good financial position by the old Administration. However, it is fully conscious of the legacy of privation, malnutrition, unemployment and disease which is bequeathed to us by the old order.

We are aware of the pressing needs of the people and agree with Your Excellency that large capital sums will have to be raised for further development for British Guiana. To this end, we will initiate schemes for the re-organisation of the material resources of the county and for raising capital by way of Government loans, both foreign and local.

The House is fully conscious of the roles which private capital is playing and will play in the development of British Guiana. We will take such steps as will encourage and attract private capital for the development of the country and above all, will guarantee that the Government will honour and fulfil all its obligations and undertakings.

The House, like Your Excellency, is anxiously awaiting the report if the World Bank Mission which recently visited British Guiana and trusts that the report will provide a comprehensive and acceptable plan as to the direction in which development should proceed as well as the means by which the programme can be financed.

The House notes Your Excellency's observations on the need for the development of a spirit of co-operation between "capital" and "labour". The relationship of capital and labour must not be based as hitherto on the whims of the capitalist but on the recognised rights of workers to organise and bargain through the trade unions of their own choice and to take and active part in the running of the industries in which they are engaged.

This Assembly notes with satisfaction Your Excellency's remarks in the encouragement of 'self-help' amount the people of the country assisted by Government grants and loans as being one aspect of development which should be energetically pursued. To this end, it will seek to democratize all organisations touching upon the lives of the people. Finally, the House wishes to join Your Excellency in your plea for internal harmony which is indispensable to progress and assures Your Excellency that all measures conducive to the welfare of the people of the Colony will receive its full support.

[Source: National Archives of Guyana; also Cheddi Jagan Research Centre, Guyana]

8. EXTRACT FROM LETTER TO N.L MAYLE FROM SIR ALFRED SAVAGE, GOVERNOR OF BRITISH GUIANA
(24 June 1953)

GOVERNMENT HOUSE
GEORGETOWN
BRITISH GUIANA
24th June, 1953

T.S.63/31
Top Secret and Personal

My dear Mayle,

Would you refer to your Top Secret and Personal letter of the 3rd June (DEF 123/30/01) about the reliability of the Police Force in the light of political developments?

In the first place I do not believe there is any reason to doubt the general reliability of the Police. Ward says that he considers them to be outstanding in both education and physique and high traditions of the Force. During his visit here last December Muller told Gutch that he was very impressed with their morale and efficiency and he confirmed this in paragraph 2 of his letter of the 24th March.

Ward adds, however, that the Police are very conscious of their rights and this factor will have to be more carefully watched than ever in view of political events. We fully appreciate that everything possible will have to be done to increase their efficiency, to look after their welfare, and to remove any justifiable cause for complaint as regards their service conditions. Equally one must appreciate that it is going to be difficult to secure approval of the new Government for any increased expenditure on the Police Force, though it may be possible to induce them to agree to expenditure on the welfare side, the rejection of which would react adversely on their prospects of ingratiating themselves with the Force.

I attach interim report by Ward giving the present position in regard to the various recommendations made by Muller in his letter of the 24th March. Since his arrival here Ward, of whom I have formed a high opinion, has carried out exhaustive investigations . . . .

(Signed) Alfred Savage

[To:]
N. L. Mayle, Esquire, C.M.G.

[APPENDIX]

INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMISIONER OF POLICE ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY W. MULLER C.M.G., INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE COLONIAL OFFICE

With regard to the Inspector General's report -

Paragraph 5 - The Special Reserve is now fully equipped with uniform and receives full co-operation from the Commissioner and his officers. Its members are now very keen and the Force is a valuable reserve in aiding the regular Force in crowd control, etc., or in permitting the mobilisation of the regular Force by taking over normal Police duties. I consider this Force should be given every encouragement and units established in other areas when money is available. Its members receive pay for training, parades and duty.

Paragraph 6 - The Depot has been reduced to an absolute minimum consistent with its functions and the maintenance of a small reserve at minimum security level. Steps are being taken to moderate the military side of training but it is to be borne in mind that Government relies upon the Police Force for the maintenance of internal security and military duties cannot be altogether neglected.

Paragraph 7 - The suggestion here is being implemented.

Paragraph 8 - The whole question of Force messes and [salaries*] is under consideration but a revision will of necessity take time if it is to be established on a sound basis.

Paragraph 9 - Mounted Branch. I agree that units of the Mounted Branch could be usefully employed in certain out-stations but there are administrative difficulties.

Paragraph 10 - The organisation of the Criminal Investigation Department and the investigation of crime generally in the Colony has been revised and the Criminal Investigation Department itself is in the process of reorganisation.

Paragraph 11 - The suggestions in this paragraph are also being implemented.

Paragraph 12 - The increase in the incidence of serious crime is causing concern and is being dealt with in my full report.

Paragraph 13 - I am in full agreement with the suggestions in this paragraph and have been in consultation with the Attorney General.

Paragraph 14 - This is being dealt with in my full report.

Paragraph 15 - This is one of the special duties of the Police.

Paragraph 16 - [Five lines in text illegible].

Paragraph 18 - Women Police are being established in the Force.

Paragraph 19 - The absence of proper quarters is the worst feature of this Force.

Paragraph 20 - It has been recommended that the Fire Brigade should be divorced from the regular Force.

Paragraph 21 - The Central Armoury is in the course of construction and a survey of security and arms has been made but again lack of funds precludes the carrying out of the measures suggested.

[Comments] - There is a great deal to be done with regard to the organisation and efficiency of the Force and any measure in this direction is appreciated by the men. The provision of proper housing, an increased number of higher ranks to be filled from within the Force and the general consideration for the welfare of the men are all essential measures. Efforts have, and are being made to increase personal contact between officers and men which is absolutely essential, and it is hoped that an increase of higher ranks at Headquarters will permit the Commissioner and his Deputy to be constantly on tour making contact with all ranks.

9. TEXT OF LETTER FROM N.L, MAYLE OF THE COLONIAL OFFICE TO SIR ALFRED SAVAGE, GOVERNOR OF BRITISH GUIANA
(8 July 1953)

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

COLONIAL OFFICE,
The Church House,
Great Smith Street
S.W.I
8th July, 1953.

Thank you very much for your letter of the 24th June and assessment given therein of the reliability of the Police Force in the light of recent political developments. We are very glad to have your reassuring reply and we note the action you have taken to keep the Commander Caribbean, and the Commander-in-Chief, West Indies Station, au courant with developments in British Guiana.

2. You do not mention the Local Volunteer Force in your reply. Since this force would presumably be the first reserve for the Police in the event of trouble we should also very much like to have your views on their reliability.

Sgd. (N.L.Mayle)

[To:]
Sir Alfred Savage, K.C.M.G.,
Government House,
Georgetown,
British Guiana.

10. LETTER FROM SIR ALFRED SAVAGE, GOVERNOR OF BRITISH GUIANA, TO N.L. MAYLE OF THE COLONIAL OFFICE
(20 July 1953)

Top Secret and Personal
T.S.63/31

GOVERNMENT HOUSE
Georgetown
British Guiana
20th July, 1953.

My dear Mayle,

You enquired in paragraph 2 of your Top Secret and Personal letter the 8th July (DEF 123/30/01) about the reliability of the British Guiana Volunteer Force. In Ward's view they could be relied on, in the event of riots and disturbances arising out of political developments, to carry out the limited function proposed for them, namely that of relieving the police by guarding vulnerable points. He does not consider their discipline and training for internal security duties sufficiently good for them to be used in an attempt to quell disturbances with which the police had failed to cope and I agree with him that in such an eventuality we should have to rely on military or naval assistance from outside.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) Alfred Savage

[To:]
N.L. Mayle, Esquire, C.M.G.,
Colonial Office,
London.

11. MEMORADUM FROM MILIRARY COMMANDER IN CHIEF, CARIBBEAN AREA HEADQUARTERS, TO WAR OFFICE
(3 September 1953)

TOP SECRET

153523

BY SECURE MEANS

PRIORITY
Recd. 3 Sept '53

From: HQ Caribbean Area
DTO. 021535R September

To: War Office

TOP SECRET

Info: C in C. WI

2961

For MO 3

British Guiana

First. Since elections victory of communist led Peoples (sic) Progressive Party general situation has been uneasy. During last month situation has deteriorated and indicated elected Government intended to precipitate crisis. This is clear from routine intelligence reports by Governor and police. I have not visited colony since elections as this would inevitably have been considered provocative by PPP but asked for appreciation by Governor and SLO. Former has not yet replied but latter reports of considerable number of PPP among police and possibility of widespread labour unrest within next 6 months.

Second. Governor now reports in Secret 338 to Colonial Office calling by union of general strike in sugar industry. Principal instigator is elected Minister of Government. Strike is already partly effective.

Third. I view the situation as disturbing in view of attitude of PPP Government since election and the volatile nature of their East Indian supporters in the sugar industry. Even if PPP Ministers do not want violence it may well come as result of their inflammatory speeches.

Fourth. Our usual IS procedure of sending one company if troops are called out will not be adequate for territory of size of British Guiana. I am therefore planning to move British battalion less company in British Honduras in phases as situation demands. I recommend also preliminary stages of SHERIFF should be studied with British Guiana as objective.

Fifth. Until situation becomes clearer I also recommend DMO's decision to reduce 1 RWF by 100 be held in abeyance.

Message Control

Distributed by MO 3

12. REPORT ON BRITISH GUIANA BY THE GOVERNOR, SIR ALFRED SAVAGE
(There is no date on document, but it was written in early September 1953.)

URGENT

NOTE BY GOVERNOR

British Guiana has a basic sugar economy of restricted output which provides frugal conditions of life for many people, a mining industry which gives good conditions for a smaller number and a growing rice industry which does not appear to be really economic at world prices, and whose workers depend also on sugar and P.W.D expenditure to support poor conditions of life. Coupled with this there is a rapidly increasing population which, unless there is hidden wealth in the interior, will mean poorer standards of living in the future. The generous grants of Her Majesty's Government have done much to assist the local situation but the economic outlook is grim.

I have now toured all the densely populated areas and seen for myself the general conditions of life. There is indeed, as elsewhere, much fertile ground for communists. The vast majority of the people are not communists but there is no doubt that they felt the voice of the common people was not heard in the previous councils of state and they demanded a change. Unfortunately, generally speaking, the only leadership offered was the highly organized P.P.P. party.

Local government, certainly in the rural areas, is almost dead. There is no real leadership among its members.

The District Administration bears no resemblance to that of the African colonies. It started too late. District Commissioners are in the main ineffective and almost ignored by all.

The Press has but little influence on the mass of the people.

The Churches are full and although their leaders do have some influence, in the main they do not affect the lowest income groups as only recently, with notable exceptions, they have appreciated their responsibilities in social affairs.

There is no real political opposition to the party in power. There are too many parties and independents and again no apparent leadership. Attempts are now being made to correct this in relation to the forthcoming bye election.

The European Guianese have not yet recovered from the shock of the elections but they are not prepared to enter politics and indeed anti-white feeling is growing, fed by propaganda, and soon no white candidate will stand a chance of being elected. Unfortunately there is a fairly strong feeling by local Europeans against overseas Europeans. There is no real leadership in the European community. The majority of the leading business men are employees.

In the above circumstances it is not surprising that the P.P.P. not only won the elections but have met with some success in strengthening their position subsequently. It is probably true that some of their supporters are becoming a little critical, particularly in Georgetown, but they are not an effective number. The outcome of the sugar strike may affect the position temporarily.

The party members are a very mixed lot ranging from labourers to professional men and owners of substantial property. The six opposition members are of poor quality.

The six Ministers are said to be made up of three Extremists (Jagan, King and Lachhmansingh) and three Moderates (Burnham, Jainarine Singh and Chase). There is no substance in Lachhmansingh and he is kicked around by his colleagues. The rest are very capable people and I believe far more intelligent than the previous Executive Council. After four months experience I trust only one of them (Chase). Jagan, Jainarine Singh and Chase appear to be working very hard and to a determined purpose to improve conditions. Burnham, whose popularity is said to be waning in Georgetown, is lazy, acid and flippant; King holds paper sup and is vicious in his attacks, while Lachhmansingh flounders helplessly in everything he touches.

Every one of these men has a deep bitterness of feeling against Britain, the past administration and/or against society generally. Jagan, brought up on a sugar estate; Burnham, twice abused publicly overseas for being black; Jainarine Singh, a qualified agronomist, failed to obtain an appointment in this his country; Chase a reasonable trade unionist labelled communist unfairly; Lachhmansingh and King warned off certain sugar estates.

The majority of the other P.P.P. members in the House of Assembly appear to be supporters of the Extremists.

The "behind scenes" work being done by Mrs. Jagan and others is insidious and dangerous. She is a brilliant organizer and is by no means resting on her laurels and in every district where no P.P.P. unit presently exists, an organization is being developed. But no real opposition is being developed.

The sugar estates are to a considerable extent the crux of the situation. It is there that the extremist is well supported. It is so easy for him to point to the dreadful housing and social conditions which exist (and to ignore the improvements) and compare them with the comfortable quarters and the neat compounds and the recreational facilities of the staff who are predominantly European. It is also easy for him to allege unfair profits being transferred to absentee landlords and to blame, as is done, the British Government for the conditions which exist.

I have been in the homes, in the fields and in the workshops, and I believe that many of these people would have responded, and may yet respond, to sympathetic and sane leadership. I did not see one library on the estates I visited so the people read the extremist literature provided by the Party. A swimming bath might cost the companies the interest on the capital involved and although not vital would have reflected an interest of the owners in their workpeople. But it is in the housing aspect where I feel the companies have been so shortsighted. After the special sugar funds were instituted, the companies appear to have taken the line that the contribution of 10/-* a ton to the Labour Welfare Fund was their money and relieved them of the obligation of doing anything further in respect of general housing and unnecessary for them to take advantage of the very generous Income Tax concessions in respect to workers housing.

The attack on overseas officers in the Civil Service is fairly general and has not been relived by the numerous discussions I have had individually and collectively with Ministers. I feat too that there have been many weaknesses in the past in the Establishment Section of the Secretariat for which we are now suffering and that the previous Promotion Board was not objective or sufficient.

The most serious impact from a security point of view are the attacks on police morale. I believe the Force to be loyal but some Ministers (particularly Sydney King) have been provocative and threatening in recent public speeches.

We have not learned much of Mrs. Jagan's recent visit to Europe but from old remarks I suspect that in addition to the Communist literature we shall be receiving visits from overseas communists (not only West Indian) and possibly proposals for appointment of Russian technicians and professional officers at low rates of pay, if not an approach from a company of Russian origin anxious to develop our resources.

There is a lot of racial feeling here. In spite of the nationalistic slogans, there is a deep distrust by the African of the Indian and a physical fear of the African by the Indian. Many Africans hate the while man, while the Portuguese are probably more responsible than anybody for racial feelings. The African feels too that rice, which is predominantly an Indian crop, has received unfair preference in capital expenditure.

"White" clubs are a threat to security. One of these clubs recently blackballed a worthy Chinese citizen.

There is very little social contact between white people and others. At the Coronation Ball at Government House a group of "whites" left early after a "Paul Jones".

[Editor's note: * 10 shillings or half a pound (Sterling) = $2.40 (Eastern Caribbean currency) in 1953.]

13. LETTER FROM HENRY SEAFORD, GENERAL MANAGER OF BOOKER'S COMPANIES IN BRITISH GUIANA, TO JOCK CAMPBELL, MANAGING DIRECTOR OF BOOKER'S GROUP OF COMPANIES
(8 September 1953)

BOOKERS SHIPPING (Demerara) Ltd.,

Georgetown,
BRITISH GUIANA.
8th Septr., 1953.

My dear Jock,

I confirm despatch or my cable to you yesterday and receipt of your reply. Very many thanks for replying so quickly.

I want to assure you that there is no question of our panicking or not having confidence in ourselves to handle the present situation. We have had and dealt with many strikes on sugar estates and on the Waterfront, so while they are worrying at the time, it is only in so far as they mean a loss of profits. What is worrying me and my colleagues today is that the present situation can only be dealt with effectively by the Colonial Office and from our conversations with the powers-that-be, it is clear that they do not understand the position. What the majority of the Ministers is trying to do is to cause chaos in the Colony, then go to the Colonial Office and say that it is because they have not complete control, that these things are happening. Their aim is to get rid of all white officials and make life so unpleasant for other whites that they will get out. Schools are to be taught communism and those Masters that don't agree will be fired. Can you imagine what this Colony will be like in 5 years' time if this sort of thing continues. Unless something drastic is done, Bookers will cease to exist as a large firm in 5 years. This is a serious statement to make but I do it in all sincerity and because of my love for this firm. I believe a Deputation is going to the Colonial Office. Details have not been finalised yet. We thinks (sic) McDavid, Luckhoo and Dare will go with perhaps 3 others, two of whom should be Africans. I think you will be asked to lead the Deputation and I felt that if you could come out and see things for yourself you would be able to put up a better case for us. I have seen H.E. and he is a very worried man. I asked him one or two direct questions about the Colonial Office and from his hesitant and guarded replies I could see that he was not happy about their understanding the present position. Before sending my cable I consulted Woodward, Bane and Lewis and they unanimously thought that the Chairman of the Company should see things for himself. Lewis told me that he and Duncan had discussed that very point on Friday. Frankly I do not think that you or anybody else can do anything out here but I consider the future of Bookers is at stake and I felt that the Chairman should see the position for himself with a view to getting fully primed for the Colonial Office. You can put a far better case than anyone out here or in London provided you know the facts. I do not think your coming would cause any comments as I was told the other evening at Colgrain that you were coming out in October!

Attempts to bring out the Waterfront and Transport have so far failed, but Gov't think the Transport and Post Office will go out on Friday, 11th. There are so many rumours going around that it is as well not to believe any of them and I can assure you that we are carrying on just as though nothing had happened and that the strike on the Estates was just one of those things that happen periodically. Our estimates are being knocked sideways as just as we were beginning to show a profit on Wharves and Coastal Shipping sugar ceases to come. This, I know, you will fully understand.

Finally, I want to stress again that I don't think anyone can help us on the spot. Help must come from the Colonial Office, and my asking you to come out here was to see things for yourself as Chairmen and to help us with the C.O. I am sorry to say Gov't. Officials are going about with long and frightened faces. I am worried as the devil, but hope I don't show it. You may be interested to hear that Mr. Greave (C.D.C), when he left Colgrain on the night before leaving the Colony, said to Kathleen and me "What a lovely evening. It's the first house we have been to where we haven't heard Jagan, Jagan, Jagan all night". I just mention this to show that I have not the slightest intention of panicking.

My colleagues and I appreciate very much the confidence you have in us and will do all in our power to justify it. Needless to say Bookers are being called on by Gov't. to supply the men for all emergency measures.

Sonny's death was a terrible shock to us all. He wasn't feeling too well on Friday night, although he played bridge at the Club. Jimmy rang us up on Saturday morning to say he was calling in the doctor, Basil Wong. Kathleen then rang up Wong to tell him that we were very worried about his heart and would he please give him a very careful examination. This he did and said his heart and pulse were good, but just to satisfy us all, he would arrange for a cardiagraph on Monday morning. On Saturday night at 9.30 Kathleen rang up and was told he was not well, but better and sitting up. At 10.15 Jimmy rang up "Come at once", but we got there too late. I have forgotten the official name, but it was a clot to the heart.

Yours ever,

sd. Henry Seaford.

14. LETTER FROM TIMOTY LUKE TO PHILIP ROGERS OF THE COLONIAL OFFICE
(12 September 1953)

SECRET AND PERSONAL

Hastings House,
Barbados, B.W.I.
12th September, 1953

My dear Philip,

I have returned this morning from my first official visits to British Guiana and Trinidad. I will send you an account of my Trinidad visit within the next few days. This letter deals only with British Guiana.

During my week in the Colony, I was able to do a certain amount of travelling (I visited the Torani Canal and the Corentyne drainage and irrigation project); and I had lengthy discussions with Savage, the principal officials, the State Council, the Ministers and various leading citizens. I do not suppose that I can add much to the information about the local situation already in your possession, but you may like to know what general impressions I formed from my various talks.

The situation is unquestionably most disquieting; indeed, by the time you receive this letter a crisis may already have been precipitated by the general strike in the sugar industry which the P.P.P. called on Sunday, 30th August. As things were at the time of my visit, I formed the opinion that the senior officials are completely disheartened and pessimistic; that the public service is approaching demoralisation; that the business and commercial community are embittered and frightened; and that there is grave anxiety among responsible and fair-minded people like the Anglican Archbishop. I was told that all private investment has ceased; there is, for instance, unemployment in the building industry because virtually all private building has stopped. As you no doubt know, a run has started on the Government Savings Bank.

How has this situation arisen? The P.P.P.'s sweeping victory at the General Election was undoubtedly unexpected either by them or by anyone else. In a sense, the result was misleading, since the party obtained only 51% of the total votes; they owed their victory to the excellence of their party organisation and to the feebleness and fragmentation of the opposition parties. At any rate the P.P.P. found themselves in complete power with no administrative experience and a host of irresponsible election promises to honour. It was to be expected that their initial months of office would, in these circumstances, be a period of confusion and dislocation. I think that most of the leading officials and unofficials (though not all) were genuinely prepared to help the Ministers to fulfil their new responsibilities. Four months later, I was unable to find anyone, apart perhaps from Savage himself, who now believes that the P.P.P. is seriously trying to work the constitution or is likely to be prepared to do so in future. No one, of course, has anything to judge by except the speeches and isolated actions of individual Ministers; they have not so far disclosed their long-term policy at all in relation, for instance, to a future development programme or the coming budget. This, in itself, is not surprising or reprehensible; any new Government might be excused for delaying the disclosure of its plans until it had familiarised itself with the technique of administration and had studied the World Bank's report. In the meantime, however, the general behaviour of Ministers sufficiently explains the growing state of demoralisation I have described.

I gained the impression that, whatever their longer-term objectives, the Ministers are united in an immediate determination to extend the power of the P.P.P. so as to gain effective and enduring control of the country. By the creation and multiplication of cells, they are ceaselessly extending and elaborating the party organisation, in even the remotest part of the country. They are working to secure a monopoly of representation for the trade unions they control. They are wooing the political support of the lower-paid public servants by encouraging them to be disloyal to their seniors. There are already signs that they plan to abolish the dual control of the schools; many of the teachers are P.P.P. in sympathy and it would not be difficult, once they had gained full administrative control for the Minister, for them to bring the education curricula into line with their own ideological principles. They are building up their own Youth Movement, and are openly hostile to such competing organisations as the Y.M.C.A., the Boy Scouts and the Girl Guides.

These totalitarian tactics are familiar enough, though it is a shock to find them reproduced in a British Colony by a small group of arrogant & ignorant young men. It is natural to seek the source of the inspiration behind so effective a political movement, and I suspect that it is supplied by Janet Jagan. Whether or not she is a member of the Communist Party, she is thoroughly trained in Communist tactics and is, in addition, an exceptionable able, ruthless and energetic woman. I understand that she is not now on particularly good terms with her husband, and that her principal ally in the ministerial group is Sydney King, whom everyone agrees to be the most extreme, intractable and offensive of all the Ministers. It is at present no more than a matter for speculation how far the Ministers are united in either their long-term objectives or their short-term tactics. So far they have managed to maintain a monolithic unity; party discipline is strict and Ministers have formed themselves into an unofficial Council which decides ahead what policy to adopt on all matters coming before the Executive Council. What tensions there may be behind the façade are not evident, and it is at present impossible to say whether there are moderates within the group who may eventually assert themselves. Ashton Chase may be one. Jagan himself is, I think, a rather enigmatic figure; superficially, he is the most intelligent, and certainly the most agreeable and courteous, of the group. In private talks, he gives the impression of having a reasonable and not particular doctrinaire approach to problems, and I suppose that he may be a weak man driven to more extreme courses than he really likes. There were early hopes that Burnham would prove a moderating influence but he, like King, (the other West Indian among the Ministers), has suffered affronts in England that have made him bitterly anti-while and anti-British. Lachhmansingh and Jainarine Singh seem likely to follow the stronger elements in the group.

The position of the civil service is most unhappy. Ministers are conducting a campaign against overseas officials, and the British heads of departments and senior officials in particular have had to endure treatment that makes their position virtually intolerable. Ministers clearly aim at getting rid of them as quickly as possible, and there are signs that they will them turn their attention to purging the civil service of those who are not politically acceptable to them.

All this makes a depressing picture. I think, however, that it is important to remember that there is another side to it. Unquestionably there is plenty of material in British Guiana which provides grist for the P.P.P. mill. Savage told me that he is often in sympathy with his Ministers in their desire to make this or that reform, though not with their methods of doing it. In general, local employers have remained old-fashioned in their approach to labour problems; they have done much to improve the conditions of labour but much remains to be done. Some of the housing on the estates, for instance, is very bad indeed. I said above that I thought that the majority of officials and unofficials have originally tried to co-operate with and help the new Ministers. Undoubtedly, however, there has always been a minority of both classes that has made no attempt to do so, and their attitude has served to emphasise the isolation of the Ministers and to strengthen the hands of the extreme elements among them. It is obvious that in these conditions an enormous burden of responsibility rests on Savage himself. When I arrived, I was shocked at his apparent exhaustion, but his spirits are surprisingly buoyant. There is a strong tradition both of loyalty an of respect for the Governor's office in British Guiana, and Savage and Lady Savage, by their simple friendliness and their arduous touring, have done much to foster these sentiments and to earn a special affection for themselves. These may be major assets in the months ahead and I should not be surprised if the P.P.P. turned their attention before long to an attempt to undermine them by public attacks on Savage personally. As it is, he is, of course, under continuous pressure from his Ministers on all sorts of matters, and it is far from easy for him to decide when, within the spirit of the constitution, he should give way and when he should stand firm. On the other hand, he is, inevitably, under persistent criticism from the business community for his "weakness". Personally, I think he has pursued the right and only defensible policy of showing himself conspicuously determined to try to make the new constitution work.

He is, of course, in the best position to judge future prospects and I think he still has hopes though perhaps diminishing hopes, that patient co-operation with the Ministers may induce them to pursue a reasonable and constructive policy within the framework of the constitution. He recognises, however, that Janet Jagan and Sydney King may have no intention of allowing this to happen, and that their object may be to provoke a crisis before their colleagues have settled down to pursue conventional policies and before the Opposition has had time to rally its demoralised forces.

Here lies one of the major difficulties of the situation. The P.P.P. succeeded because the Opposition parties failed in organisation, in energy, and in clarity of purpose. Many of the opposition elements in the country have learned nothing from this failure. They are waiting in paralysed hostility for H.M.G. to rescue them from the consequences of a constitution which they have always disliked and which they are confident must break down. One of the wiser ones recognise, however, that some effect political party alternative to the P.P.P. must be organised, and efforts are being made, by Raatgever among others, to unite the opposition into a single well organised party. But they need time; they hope that a major crisis can be avoided for at least a year or eighteen months. All agree that an early election would merely return the P.P.P. to power - presumably with a "mandate" for radical constitutional changes.

My own discussions with the Ministers were amicable enough. We talked about the implications of the World Bank Report about which (not unexpectedly) they are far from enthusiastic. They told me that they are working on a future development programme, based on the Bank Report, and that their long-term policy will emerge, later in the autumn, from that end from their first budget. Their approach to future development problems revealed nothing of their extreme political ideas; they showed themselves in their talks with me, no more than a group of eager but thoroughly inexperienced young men anxious to achieve everything at once. Jagan, for instance, argued that it was essential to carry out the full Hutchinson £30 millions scheme within the next five years as a grand West Indian operation involving the participation of all British Caribbean Governments and large-scale planned immigration. I carefully avoided political issues, of course, but I felt justified in pointing out the inconsistency of many of their public statements with their apparent anxiety, in their discussions with me, to pursue a development policy dependent for its success on heavy capital investment from overseas. They expressed themselves as unable to understand why the external investor should be reluctant to put funds into the Colony. Had they not given assurances, in their election programme, that external capital would be encouraged and safeguarded on reasonable terms? At any rate, they expressed an unexpected inclination to seek the help of the Development and Welfare Organisation in working out their development programme, and Savage is hopeful that he may be able to induce one or two of the Minister to come to Barbados in due course for discussions on it with my Advisers and myself. He feels that this would have the added advantage of subjecting them to the sobering influence of Grantley Adams and Walcott! He is also, for the same reason, encouraging his Ministers to invite the R.E.C. to hold their November meeting in British Guiana.

I send you this letter with some hesitation, partly because it deals so largely with matters outside my official competence, partly because a [*] visit is not long [**] estimate of so complex a situation, and particularly because the position may have been so radically altered in the week since I left, that parts at least of it may now be out of date. But there has been so much gossip and speculation about the situation in British Guiana that I thought it might be helpful to you to have as careful a summary as I could make of the impressions I gained during my visit. It is easy enough now to see that it would have been wiser not to have given British Guiana adult suffrage and full ministerial government at a single step. In my view, however, the real significance of recent events in British Guiana lies in the evidence they provide of the dangers inherent in a political vacuum. The P.P.P. succeeded not only by [skilled] organisation, by promising redress of every grievances, and by the wildest promises; they succeeded because the moderate parties failed in every quality necessary for success under a democratic constitution. What has happened in British Guiana can presumably happen elsewhere. I have, for instance, found a number of people in Trinidad who are seriously concerned at the failure of the present political leaders and representatives to organize anything approaching an effective party organization committed to a defined political programme. Conditions in Trinidad re, of course, very different from those in British Guiana, but the fact remains that the opportunity does exist there for a determined party, like the P.P.P., to fill the vacuum left by the present absence of any party system.

Yours ever,

(sgd.) Timmy Luke

[To:] PHILIP ROGERS, ESQ., C.M.G.

[Editor's Notes:
* One illegible word is missing.
** About ten words are illegible in the available copy of the text.]

15. LETTER FROM SIR ALFRED SAVAGE, GOVERNOR OF BRITISH GUIANA, TO SIR THOMAS LLOYD OF THE COLONIAL OFFICE
(13 September 1953)

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
GEORGETOWN.
BRITISH GUIANA
13th September, 1953

Dear Lloyd,

I apologise for the delay in replying to your letter of the 22nd July but apart from the considerable travelling I have undertaken, the problem is unique and complex and I wanted to have more experience of the Ministers and their actions before wring you fully. Of course I agree generally with the different points of policy to which you refer and I assure you I will keep the Secretary of State well informed of developments. But I feel the real problem is something far more subtle and difficult and will not be solved merely by the use of reserve powers.

The new Constitution has operated now for roughly four months. It is a fact that the P.P.P. have no planned policy and except for Jagan, the new Ministers had had no experience of Government departments or of normal administration. I still think that it is true to say that that they were themselves unprepared for their landslide victory at the polls and had expected to find themselves in the role of a strong obstructive and disrupting opposition. It was inevitable that the new Government would suffer from growing pains, make some mistakes and until the International Bank Report arrived (which was to be the basis of a planned programme of development and taxation) it would be attacked by the opposition inside and outside the Legislature for not making progress. I say it had no planned policy; although its election manifesto indicated brad lines of policy, it was a scurrilous document which I suggested to each Minister would best be forgotten if we were to obtain the confidence of the country and of overseas territories on whom we should depend for the capital for development.

In early conversations (and indeed subsequently to date) some of the P.P.P Ministers and members of the House volunteered to me privately that they intended to work for a stable and not extremist policy. But all exhibit the deepest bitterness against H.M.G. and the companies and businesses I have ever experienced. Their general line is that all previous governments were dominated by big business and now they intend to dominate the country in the interests of the "working class". Added to this is a fanatical hatred by the African Ministers of the white race.

In spite of the growing difficulties I persisted in a policy of tolerance, goodwill and co-operation, but it became evident that there was little intention on their part to co-operate with me or the other members of Executive Council or, in some cases, with Heads of Departments. This does not mean to say that some progress has not been made but, as I pointed out to Jagan weeks ago, most Ministers appeared to spend most of their time on matters with a political flavour and some on questions affecting the Civil Service which were outside of their constitutional purview. Also it would be fair to say that there have been one or two notable occasions when we have been able to persuade them to drop or defer some proposed objectionable policy particularly in economic matters. As a general rule, however, they face us in Executive Council with their minds made up as the result of previous discussion at what they have recently termed their "Council of Ministers" - (I have asked them to desist from using this expression) - and it is practically impossible to induce them to accept any reasonable compromise. I have no doubt that if they would adopt a more co-operative policy with the officials much more could be achieved.

But whilst in Executive Council Ministers have behaved themselves with a certain amount of propriety (although Sydney King and Burnham have on occasion shown a scarcely veiled insolence of manner), outside it their actions and speeches are quite irresponsible and during the recent crisis have verged on the seditious. In the House of Assembly this week Burnham has spoken of meeting "with sufficient force" any attempt to withdraw the new constitution and of being "willing to shed their blood, if necessary, for freedom".

The obvious question which poses itself is whether or not they intend to continue to work within the framework of the new constitution. I believe that at present some of them do, in the expectation that Her Majesty's Government would concede full self-government in 1956, although it remains to be seen what their reaction would be if and when the State Council imposes a check on any measure put forward by the House of Assembly. But the extremist element, with Mrs. Jagan and Sydney King in the van, appear to believe that by creating disorder and economic chaos they could force the issue of self-government earlier. For the moment there is no doubt that the extremists dominate the position and the moderates, if indeed they are moderates, are afraid to declare themselves publicly and even tend to vie with the extremists on some issues - maybe through fear of losing ground - but they effect is the same. An example of this is the recently formed "African and Colonial Affairs Committee", of which Burnham and Chase are leading lights: one of its objects is probably to build up their political strength and prestige vis-à-vis the Jagan group, but it specialises in vicious anti-British, anti-white propaganda of the worst type.

Hence these party differences do not assist the cause of moderation - rather the reverse. In any case there is no doubt that the governor, the official members of Executive Council and the State Council are the common enemy and it may well be that before you receive this letter a resolution may be tabled in the House saying that the Government is unable to carry out its plans without full self-government.

The technique of the extremists for the present appears to be to press for legislative action only in mattes which will not split the party and in the meantime to develop its organisation throughout the country and to obtain party control of every possible human activity. They are hard at work trying to undermine the Civil Service, exploiting every possibly cause of discontent, resorting to intimidation: they have their cells and spies in most departments. The police are thought to be 75% reliable at the moment, but here again malcontents are being used as foci for the spread of disaffection. Recognized youth organisations, the Boy Scouts and Girl Guides, the Y.M.C.A. and so on, are subjected to attack and the communist Pioneer Youth Movement is being given their official support. In this and countless other directions the foundations of society are being attacked insidiously almost without check.

By this insidious undermining process, the party could in time secure a more or less complete grip of the country, irrespectively of whether I step in, as I shall no doubt have to do before long, and use my reserved powers on this or that individual issue. The crucial question is how long and how far should we allow this process to continue and how can we stop it? It seemed to me that the crux of the position lies with the 51% of voters who put the P.P.P. in power. An effective number might perhaps vote against the P.P.P. on the next occasion through dissatisfaction with their policy, but even here there is the intimidation factor to be reckoned with. My personal policy has been to get among the 51% to demonstrate that I am deeply interested in their well being and constant contact with small groups when travelling try to get their confidence for there are many who would respond to sound leadership. The enclosed notes will give you more of the background.

The 49% who voted against the P.P.P. are completely lacking in effective leadership and cohesion and have little moral courage. Even the prestige which still attaches to the position of Governor here has the unfortunate result that in time of difficulty such as this the "opposition" tend to look helplessly to him for intervention, when the solution really lies in their own hands. Of course it may be that the outcome of the present strike or some other factor will cause a revulsion of feeling against the P.P.P. but in the absence of other leadership, particularly in the sugar areas, they would probably succumb to the intimidation and other pressures which I have mentioned above and drift back. In fact, I am rapidly coming to the conclusion that unless the opposition elements in the country rouse themselves quickly and wake up to their obligations and opportunities, then to retain British Guiana in the Commonwealth we shall have to go back on the new Constitution which would mean the use of force and the maintenance of military forces here for some considerable time.

At a recent meeting with the leading businessmen here I pressed the problem on them and the part that they could play in arresting the deterioration of the situation. Unfortunately, I feel that some of them, supported particularly by the Portuguese community, consider the best solution is to hasten the breakdown of the constitution and to press Her Majesty's Government to go back to a less liberal system.

Also may I say with respect that if Her Majesty's Government considers domestically and at an international level that British Guiana must be kept within the Commonwealth it must give more assistance in the propaganda field on which communist propaganda thrives.

Finally, as regards policy in the event of resignation of Minister from Executive Council and/or from the House of Assembly, I understand the remaining numbers will allow us to continue without a general election but I have asked the Attorney General to prepare a memorandum on this and other contingencies and will forward it as soon as possible.

I realise that this letter is very patchy but you will realise that I am writing under heavy pressure. I should welcome an opportunity for discussion but that is not possible for the present and so I am looking forward very much to the visit of the Minister of State nest month.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd) Alfred Savage.

[To:] Sir Thomas Lloyd G.C.M.G., K.C.B.
Colonial Office.

16. TELEGRAM (No. 20) FROM COLONIAL SECRETARY TO GOVERNOR OF BRITISH GUIANA
(19 September 1953)

TOP SECRET

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES

TO BRITISH GUIANA (Sir A. Savage)

Cypher (O.T.P.) WIS 98/4/02

Sent 19th September, 1953 17.45 hrs.

IMMEDIATE TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL
Personal No. 20

Your telegram Personal No. 37.

Following from Rogers in Lloyd's absence.

1. Legal and Constitutional implications of breakdown have already been under consideration here. Legal Advisers views on main points are set out in following paragraph.

(a) Those provisions of Constitution Order in Council which relate to constitution and powers of legislature can only be suspended, amended or revoked by and Order in Council which would have to be laid in draft before both Houses of Parliament for forty sitting days.

(b) There is doubt whether the Emergency Powers Order in Council, 1939, validly applies to British Guiana, since it could be held to constitute a form of legislature, which can only be done by the special procedure laid down in the British Guiana Act, 1928. This doubt can be removed by an Order in Council under the Act of 1928. See paragraph 5 below.

(c) Emergency laws can be made by Order in Council under the power reserved in Section 94(2) of the British Guiana Constitution Order. Such an Order (provided it did not amend the constitution or powers of the Legislature) would not have to be laid before Parliament in draft. By such an Order, e.g., the provisions of Section 7 of the Order, which oblige the Governor to consult Executive Council in certain circumstances, could be deleted.

(d) The Constitution Order in Council does not give you power to dismiss Ministers, but you have power under Section 10(2) to propose to Executive Council the dismissal of individual Ministers.

(e ) You have power under Section 21 to withdraw the responsibility for any Department or subject which you originally gave to any member of the Executive Council and to give it to another member of the Council (other than the Minister elected by the State Council).

(f) If P.P.P. Ministers absented themselves from Executive Council, it would be legally possible to hold meeting without them (provided that no one present drew attention to the absence of a quorum).

(g) You can, after consultations with Executive Council (if necessary, using your reserved executive power), decide whether or not the Legislative Chambers should be dissolved and fresh elections held.

(h) Your reserved executive power should enable you to carry out the administration of the Colony against hostile Ministers. There are possible difficulties in the use of your reserved legislative power in certain circumstances on which I shall be writing to you.

2. I gather from paragraph 4 of your telegram No. 37 that you do NOT consider that dissolution of Legislature and holding of fresh election would meet present needs. We entirely agree. As it seems unfortunately legally impossible to amend or suspend Constitution immediately on breakdown you will have to take all possible action to enable you to carry on Government without P.P.P. Ministers until necessary Order in Council was passed. You would presumably at once transfer departmental responsibilities from P.P.P. Ministers to official members of Executive Council and then use your reserved powers as necessary to carry on administration against hostile Ministers and hostile House of Assembly.

3. We should be glad to know whether you agree with views in foregoing paragraph. It will no doubt be necessary to provide in abovementioned Order in Council for interim Constitution, and also very desirable to prepare statement to be issued immediately on breakdown explaining the reasons for it, the responsibility of the P.P.P. Ministers, and also our intention to set up an interim Constitution with which the Guianese would be fully associated. We shall be telegraphing to you further on these points. We suggest that, in meantime, you should urgently consider, in consultation with your legal advisers, what provisions are likely to be required on such an Order.

4. Foregoing does not cover an emergency in a particular district which could be tackled by proclamation on that district under Summary Jurisdiction (Offences) Ordinance Part 4.

5. We are putting in hand forthwith an Order in Council removing doubts as to application to British Guiana of Order in Council 1939. This will obviate making by Order in Council of emergency laws, see paragraph 1(c) above. The Order will of course have to be laid for forty sittings days after Houses of Parliament reassemble on 20th October and we do not propose to lay it but rather it to keep it secret until breakdown occurs.

Distribution:

H. 453
Secretary of State
P.S. to Minister of State
Sir T. Lloyd
P.S. to Parliamentary U/S.
Sir C. Jeffries
Sir H. Poynton
Mr. K. H. Davies
Mr. P. R. Maynard
Mr. P. Rogers
Mr. N. L. Mayle
Mr. J. W. Vernon

17. EXTRACT FROM THE NOTES ON THE MEETING OF THE BRITISH GOVERNEMNT'S COMMITTEE ON SECURITY
24 September 1953

EXTRACT FROM C.O.S. (63) 108th MEETING HELD 24.9.53

TOP SECRET
U.K. EYES ONLY

4. DISTRIBUTION IN BRITISH GUIANA
TOP SECRET

THE COMMITTEE was informed that the Colonial Office wished to raise certain matters in connection with the current disturbances in British Guiana.

MR. ROGERS (Colonial Office) said that as a result of the present constitutional situation in British Guiana, the Secretary of State for the Colonies was contemplating removing the powers from local government Ministers and instructing the Governor to fall back on his reserve powers for governing the territory as a Crown Colony: the Governor was being requested to indicate the assistance he might require from outside the territory in order to maintain law and order. The Secretary of State for the Colonies had indicated that he would consult the Cabinet, but it was not yet known in what precise form he proposed doing this.

Mr. Rogers added that the danger in British Guiana was one of mob riots; organized rebellion seemed unlikely. It was possible that the Governor could maintain stability with assistance only from the British battalion in Jamaica.

In view of the difficulties for shipping in the local waters, it might be preferable for reinforcements to be shipped to Trinidad, and thence moved by air into British Guiana. Since the transportation of the unit vehicles for these reinforcements would prove difficult, reliance might have to be placed on the requisitioning of local vehicles, at any rate for the initial stages.

In view of the Colonial Office, it seemed unlikely that the commitment for outside military assistance would be of longer duration than 3 months; however, one could never tell.

SIR HAROLD REDMAN said that both the local volunteer forces and the police in British Guiana were said to be loyal.

In the whole Caribbean Area, there was one United Kingdom battalion of infantry, of which one Company was perforce in British Honduras and could not readily be committed elsewhere. This battalion was already at 48 hours' notice to fly in locally chartered aircraft from Jamaica to British Guiana. If it was decided that further reinforcements were required, these could come only from the United Kingdom, either from the one remaining brigade already earmarked for the Middle East - in this connection it was important to note that a critical period had now been reached in our negotiations with Egypt - or else from one of three infantry battalions recently returned from long tours overseas. None of these units was ready for service in the tropics, and a minimum of ten days' notice would be required before embarkation.

The provision of an aircraft carrier to transport these additional reinforcements, should they be required, would very greatly assist matters, since unit vehicles and heavy equipment could then be taken with the men. Air transportation from the United Kingdom would take a slightly shorter overall period, but this would entail the men being without their vehicles.

As a timely show of force might prevent the disturbances becoming acute, it was most important that the Governor should not precipitate trouble by political steps before arrangements for and despatch of the reinforcements had been effected. The important factor from the War Office point of view concerned a proper military appreciation of the situation, indicating the size of reinforcements required, the vehicle problem, together with detailed timings.

SIR JOHN BAKER suggested that military reinforcements without vehicles would not be fully effective. As he saw the problem, there was at present no need to contemplate reinforcements beyond those already in the Caribbean Area. Local shipping could transport the vehicles of the battalion from Jamaica. On the question of an airlift of troops from the United Kingdom, all available R.A.F. transport aircraft were already committed to important schedules. A few charter aircraft might be provided for the purpose, but no vehicles could be transported, and there were inherent political difficulties in the flights involved.

REAR ADMIRAL ELKINS (representing V.D,F.S.) said that no aircraft carriers were available, due to the present heavy commitments. A frigate was at present at Trinidad: she could proceed to British Guiana. H.M.S. Sheffield was due shortly to relieve H.M.S. Superb in American waters and could also be sent to British Guiana, carrying some 200 troops. But there was one important factor which militated against the use of H.M. ships, and this lay in the navigational and berthing difficulties in British Guyana. In discussion the following points were agreed:

(a) No executive action should be taken until more detailed knowledge of the situation was received. In this connection, the Governor's assessment should be awaited, and in addition, the Commander Caribbean Area should be instructed to proceed to British Guyana forthwith with a representative of the battalion in Jamaica with a view to submitting detailed appreciation of the situation from the military point of view, and particularly of the scale and timing of reinforcements.

(b) It was important that no action should be taken in the United Kingdom which would give rise to undue and premature publicity.

(c) In the meanwhile, present arrangements for the use of the battalion in Jamaica should stand, and consideration should be given to the use of the frigate now at Trinidad in the area of the disturbances. The Commander-in-Chief, West Indies Station, should be kept closely informed.

(d) Whatever commitment transpired, Ministerial approval would certainly be required.

(e) In the event of reinforcements being sent to British Guiana, it was important to ensure that the operation effected surprise; this would entail careful co-ordination of all political and military steps.

(f) The Governor of British Guiana should be informed of the extreme difficulty facing the United Kingdom on the question of reinforcements generally, and his attention drawn to the consequential need to "nip the trouble in the bud" if possible.

THE COMMITTEE:-

(1) Invited the Colonial Office to take note of their views, to act accordingly, and to keep them informed.

(2) Invited the War Office to take action as necessary in (a) and (c) above.

(3) Invited the Admiralty to take action as at (c) above.

(4) Take note that Sir Nevil Brownjohn would keep the Minister of Defence informed.

18. TELEGRAM (No. 21) FROM COLONIAL SECRETARY TO GOVERNOR OF BRITISH GUIANA
(24 September 1953)

TOP SECRET

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES

TO BRITISH GUIANA (Sir A. Savage)

Cypher (O.T.P.) WIS 58/4/08

Sent 24th September, 1953. 19.45 hrs.

IMMEDIATE
TOP SECRET
PERSONAL No. 21

Your telegrams Personal N. 37, No. 49 and No. 51 and my telegram Personal No. 20.

POLITICAL SITUATION

It has become increasingly clear to me from your recent reports including your letter to Lloyd of the 15th September that there was no prospect of Ministers acting responsibly and foregoing their extremist aims. It was clearly right on the introduction of the new Constitution to try to do all that tact, patience and tolerance could achieve to win them away from the extremists and to see whether the responsibilities of office would make them see reason. It is however clear that they have no intention of working the present Constitution in the interests of the people of British Guiana as a whole, but are seeking a one party totalitarian control of the country and a link-up with Russia which we obviously cannot contemplate.

2. Ministers have no doubt been trying to avoid a break until they could acquire more powers and the P.P.P. more adherents. In this way they are gradually undermining our position. We cannot allow this to continue and a halt must now be called. The report of sympathy strikes in your Personal telegrams Nos. 49 and 51, however much Ministers may attempt to disown responsibility for them, completes the justification for immediate action. Their general record is such that I have decided this latest development makes a break inevitable and that we must now act against them.

3. Pending formal suspension of the Constitution the action to be taken as we see it, once adequate force is available, (see Paragraph 4 below), is for you to remove Portfolios from Ministers and to govern on your reserve powers (see paragraph 2 of my telegram Personal No. 20). When you do this it seems to me important that you should at the same time place the dangerous leaders of the P.P.P. under restraint and raid their premises for incriminating documents. Power to enable you to do this will be included in the Order in Council referred to in paragraph 5 below.

4. Before you can take this action we must be certain that you have adequate forces available to maintain law and order. In view of paragraph 8 of your telegram No. 340 I am assuming that outside forces will be needed. I should be grateful for an estimate from you of the numbers needed and what arrangements you propose for deploying them immediately on arrival in the Colony. Meanwhile I am discussing the problem with military here. You should arrange for Commander, Caribbean Area visit you forthwith to discuss details. You will appreciate difficulty of making any reinforcements available from outside the Caribbean and length of time that would be involved.

5. You must also have in this crisis full emergency legal powers for preservation of public order and the maintenance of supplies and services. In view of the doubt referred to in paragraph 1(b) of my Personal telegram No. 20 whether the Emergency Powers Order in Council of the kind referred to in paragraph 1(c) of my telegram (which need not be laid in draft) should be made as soon as possible giving you such powers. I have in mind applying by reference such of the Defence Regulations as were in force in British Guiana during the war as would appear to be appropriate, but I should be grateful if you would let me know as soon as possible what powers you yourself think you will need. I will attempt to get this Order in Council made in the next 10 days, but it can be kept secret until all other arrangements for making the break are complete.

6. We must also have ready a statement for immediate issue when you take action giving the reasons for the withdrawal of Ministers' powers. I suggest that amongst other things this statement should make it clear that British Guiana was given its new constitution in the hope that it would seize this opportunity to advance along the road to responsible self-government within the British Commonwealth; that the constitution had been perverted by a small clique of Communist sympathisers who sought to impose totalitarianism on the territory and were bringing economic life of the country to a standstill; that the Ministers had abused their authority in various ways which should be listed; that the withdrawal of their powers from Ministers would have to be followed by the suspension of the constitution; that you had the necessary emergency powers to ensure law and order and the safety of property and were proposing to do so; that it was Her Majesty's Government's intention to give the territory a revised constitution which would permit the British Guianese themselves to continue to partake in their own government; and that in the meantime you propose to take all possible measures to improve housing and the other social services and to ensure the rapid economic development of the territory's resources.

7. The Order suspending the constitution will be prepared here and referred to you for comments. This will need to be laid in draft before Parliament, which will be done, if possible, as soon as it reassembles. I propose that this Order should also provide for the setting up of an interim Government. I have in mind a nominated Executive Council (which you could, but need not, consult and whose advice you need not take) and a nominated single legislative chamber including on both bodies as many members of the P.P.P. as will be prepared to co-operate.

8. A Commission of Enquiry will also have to be appointed into the events in British Guiana which have led to this breakdown and to propose a new constitution. Reference might be made to such a Commission of Enquiry in the public statement referred to in paragraph 6 above.

9. Arrival of forces, arrest of dangerous persons, publication of emergency Order in Council and issue of statement, would, of cour