The British Declassifed Files on British Guiana

The People's Progressive Party (PPP), led by Dr. Cheddi Jagan, was re-elected to office in August 1957 after the country was administered for four years by an Interim Government imposed by the British colonial rulers. Almost immediately, the new PPP Government commenced its campaign to win political independence for Guyana, but it faced stiff resistance from the British Government and the opposition parties in Guyana. Nevertheless, this did not deter the party from continuing the struggle, locally and internationally, for national liberation.

The PPP was again re-elected in August 1961, and it continued to press ahead with it efforts to win independence for the country. However, by this time, the opposition forces, strengthened by the covert and overt support of the American and British Governments, and also from international anti-communist trade unions and groups, intensified their efforts to overthrow the PPP Government and to block the movement towards political independence. (For additional information on the US role in Guyana during the 1961-1964 period, readers can check the US Declassified Documents on British Guiana at http://www.guyana.org/govt/declassified_documents.html and http://www.guyana.org/govt/US-declassifed-documents-1964-1968.html

The documents in this collection trace the political developments in Guyana from 1958 to 1964. In general they give the British perspective and view-point on the struggle for Guyana's political independence, particularly during the 1961-1964 period when efforts were stepped up by opposition forces to destablise and remove the administration of Dr. Cheddi Jagan. However, a number of documents also put forward the views of the PPP Government.

The source of most of these documents is the British Archives. Most of them were declassified quite recently and copies were made available by that source to the Cheddi Jagan Research Centre in Guyana. A few other documents (which were never classified or secret), and whose source is not the British Archives, are included in this collection to add to the historical perspective. The source of each of these additional documents is noted below the text.

1. COLONIAL OFFICE NOTE ON THE SITUATION IN BRITISH GUIANA IN 1958
(No date on document)*

In April 1953, the People's Progressive Party were elected to power in British Guiana under a new Constitution with universal adult franchise and a ministerial system. In a country of challenging difficulties their young Communist-inclined leaders had won their big following by unscrupulous demagogy, impossible promises and abuse of the established order. In October 1953, when it was clear that the Ministers were not attempting to work the Constitution and that economic disaster and civil disorder were imminent, the Constitution was suspended. The story is well known. The Robertson Commission which reported on the suspension (and found good reason for it, advised that there should be a period of marking time: ". . . . so long as the P.P.P. retains its present leadership and policies and there is no way in which any real measure of responsible government can be restored without the certainty that the country will again be subjected to constitutional crisis."

2. From the beginning of 1954 until August 1957, the Government was carried on by the Governor with his senior officials and wholly nominated Executive and Legislative Councils. During this period, with advice fro the World Bank, technical assistance from the United States, and with generous financial aid from Great Britain, a greatly increased development programme was pushed forward; commercial confidence was largely restored; by able leadership in the Secretariat combined with a great effort in the Colonial Office to recruit experienced officers, the Government Services were strengthened and improved; and vigorous efforts were made to teach the electorate to understand the problems with which the country was faced. This interim Government, nominated instead of elected, could never be popular. It was much maligned by the elected leaders who had been ousted. There were disappointments and delays, mistakes and misadventures. But it probably did more for the country than any other Government under British rule. As the shortages of manpower and material were gradually overcome, heartening programs began to be visible in town and country on nearly every side of governmental endeavour. The progress was not fast enough for the extremist agitators turned out of office who had nothing to do but criticise; but it was fast enough to alter the revolutionary feeling of frustration and desperation which had nurtured the 1953 hotheads and to replace it by nothing more than the normal grumbling of a friendly and reasonably administered people in a very difficult country. There were new and encouraging signs of a spirit of co-operation and self-help and of less dependence on the Central Government. On the industrial and agricultural side there were record sugar crops, a record rice crop and other signs of expansion. The sugar industry continued to plough back vast sums to rehabilitate their factories and to improve wages and housing and welfare. The trade union movement was strengthened and consolidated and industrial relations were good. The Demerara Bauxite Company after detailed negotiations with the Government decided to invest about Ł13 millions in establishing an alumina plant and an impressive start was made on the construction work. They also carried out costly surveys of hydro-electric possibilities. A company was formed with English, Canadian and American capital to exploit deposits of manganese in the north-west district. Several new small factories were built and brought into production. Arrangements were made for an [entire**] survey in the marine areas. In spite of the constitutional setback, revenue was buoyant and the economy was expanding.

3. But the problem of British Guiana remained. Good government, or comparatively good government, is in the colonies to-day no substitute for popular government. A split developed in the People's Progressive Party. Dr. Jagan found himself left with the East Indian followers, mostly in the country districts, while Mr. Burnham took with him the African and urban following. But the overwhelming political support for these two leaders remained, even if they were in opposition instead of together. They were the only leaders who had any chance of forming a popular Government in any future elections and they were learning nothing of the art of government. They were in their long-favoured role of being critics only, without responsibility, with plenty of time to plan and organise their forces. As the frustrations of "marking time" were prolonged, their support from the bulk of the electorate was growing instead of diminishing. While other colonial territories, and notably the nearby West Indian territories, were advancing, British Guiana was getting no nearer to self-government. The Commission's recommendation of marking time was inevitable when it was pronounced. But whatever the discipline, it is not possible to mark time indefinitely.

4. The problem was how to devise a possible way back to the path of constitutional progress without endangering such stability as had been regained; how to test those who were clearly the favourite leaders by giving them real responsibility without damaging too much the returning confidence of the people, commercial investors and those Western Governments on which British Guiana depends. A solution was sought by a modification of the Constitution which produced a half-way stage. It reintroduced elected members with the full franchise as before, together with the ministerial system. It enabled the Governor to put the responsibility clearly on those elected, while retaining sufficient power through additional nominations and other means to counterbalance irresponsibility if necessary.

5. The proposals were resisted by all local politicians, but the elections were held in August 1957. The moderate leaders failed to combine. Dr. Jagan, who was always sure to win the most seats, won an overall majority. On being assured of an original working majority both in Executive Council and Legislative Council, he agreed to take office. An effort to too persuade Mr. Burnham to join him in a National Government failed. He and four other members of his party, including his American-born wife, Janet, were appointed to Ministries and the responsibility for the country's progress is thus clearly on the shoulders of an elected leader. Mr. Burnham is also in the public eye with a measure of responsibility as Leader of the Opposition. Both erstwhile critics are facing realities under mutual criticism. Since taking office, whatever their long-term aims and whatever their feelings of frustration and confinement, the Ministers have pursued a moderate policy; in spite of their Communist leanings and their administrative inexperience, in the face of considerable financial difficulties and of growing political criticism they are trying very hard to govern the country sensibly and to avoid crises. Commerce and industry have shown patience and goodwill and there has been no noticeable recession of trade or investment.

6. When this result was achieved there were many who asked what had been gained by again subjecting British Guiana to a Government of inexperienced people, led by small Communist-trained core. The answer is that there is again the chance of finding a responsible elected Government. The suspension of the Constitution administered a shock which will not quickly be forgotten. The P.P.P. know that Great Britain takes her colonial responsibilities seriously, and that another constitutional crisis which was clearly their fault would kill them politically. They can only remain in the vanguard of the "national liberation movement" if they succeed as a Government. In the meantime the country has learnt that it has no hope of higher living standards without increased investment and that any behaviour which drives away capital is suicidal. Dr. Jagan can now lead a country which, for all its mass electorate voting on emotional and racial grounds, has freedom of the Press and freedom of speech and a large number of vociferous people who are beginning to understand the political and economic facts of life in the Western hemisphere. He is remarkably sensitive to public criticism and in his first six months has discontinued several cherished plans because of it.

7. At present in British Guiana there is no alternative elected Government to Jagan. If, for political or constitutional advantage, or because he is desperate at the opposition or the difficulties of administration, Dr. Jagan throws in his hand, British Guiana will be almost back to 1954. Such a resignation in an ever present danger. The official Opposition is at present incapable of forming an effective Government. It is far too much occupied with clever vote-catching pinpricks and insincerities even to realise that it has the task of showing itself a possible alternative Government. There would be no alternative but to mark time again with a largely-nominated Government. Dr. Jagan is a devoted Marxist whose whole adult thinking and study, both economic and political, have been anti-colonial, anti-British and pro-Russian. He is not likely to change his beliefs. Yet, Dr. Jagan now has responsibility firmly on his shoulders. If there has to be a return to a nominated Government, he will have failed. It in part of his party policy to pretend that he is only "participating" in the Government and that without the restrictions of Colonial Office control he could fulfil all the dreams of the people. But few believe it. He knows he is on trial and he is very much conscious of the following worries: -

(1) he dare not cause another constitutional crisis unless he can find an issue in which the whole people will be behind him;

(2) he dare not openly pursue radical policies which will discourage investment and development capital;

(3) he knows that, outside the hard-core, his followers are nationalists and not Communists and that it he is caught out in blatantly Communist action or intention it will not only damage his chances of constitutional advance and ruin his hopes of investment and development capital but will also lose him political support;

(4) his party is devoid of second-line leaders. The small Communist core or inner party dominates the Executive. There is nobody with any pretensions to leadership at the Central Government level in the lower half of the Executive or in the rank and file. Indeed he knows that the present Ministers are hardly up to their job. He himself is a theorist and a dialectitian He has not yet got around to producing practical policies. Too much depends on him and he is not equipped to translate thought into actions;

(5) if he does produce practical policies, for all his dreams of an all-powerful party machine, he must eventually have the worry, even if it is not yet realised, that to carry out his polices successfully he must depend on Executive Council officials and the Government services. The Government services are largely Burnhamite. They are nationalistic and progressive but they bold Dr. Jagan under grave suspicion and he has done little in the last six months to lessen that suspicion.

(6) his natural leaning to agriculture and the rural areas where his Indian supporters are strong is being exploited by the unscrupulous Opposition in such a way as to bring increasing danger of open racial conflict. Dr. Jagan fully realises the disaster which this would bring to the country but has not yet found a way to counter it effectively;

(7) his original idea, prompted from Ghana, was probably win early constitutional advance by good behaviour and then try to establish the Marxist paradise of his dreams. But he is being brought to realise that the struggle will not have ended if and when he turns out the British and wins "independence"; if he then reverted to being an acknowledged Communist pursuing Communist policies he would undoubtedly be suppressed by the American States and his country would probably lose its identity with him;

(8) he is in a difficult position about Federation. He is realising more and more how difficult it is to see any future sovereignty or independent economic stability for British Guiana, except as a unit of the West Indies Federation. The Opposition and most African Guianese are clamorously in favour of joining immediately. But Federation is emotionally unpopular with the East Indian supporters on whom he and his party must rely for election. If any Government or politician tries to force a decision too early it may add fuel to the dangerous flickerings of racialism. He can only play for time, and hope not to be overtaken by events.

(8) The policy of Her Majesty's Government is comparatively clear. So long as there is no stable alternative elected Government, in order to avoid the sterile reversion to marking time, we must support the Jagan Government wholeheartedly and give our best advice and help. We must in doing so explain the dangers of his Communism and of any actions which will discourage or hold back economic advance or otherwise destroy the confidence of those on whom we depend. At the same throughout the country we must build up faith in parliamentary democracy and the rule of law and our western way of life. We must strengthen and ensure the growth and continuance of an informed and effective Press and Opposition. We must encourage sound trade unionism which is not dominated by the political party in power. With the help of the British information services and the British Council and the United States information services, we must continue to help people to be more politically discriminating and in particular to recognise the threat of Communism and efforts to suppress the Opposition. We must go on maintaining and, if possible, increasing the quality and morale of the Government services both in the secretariats, the departments and the Ministries. We must go on spreading throughout the country, however ill-informed the electorate, the better knowledge of economic facts and of the future alternatives with which British Guiana is faced. To spread real understanding of the advantages and possible disadvantages of joining the Federation of the West Indies must be among our leading endeavours.

9. These things must be done while maintaining the confidence and the assistance of commerce and industry and investors. Above all, the necessary aid and development capital must be secured from the United Kingdom and the United States and, if possible, Canada, to enable British Guiana's development programme to be continued and completed and to be extended to the next stage beyond 1960 when the time comes. A slowing down or cessation of the development programme would win an inflammable sympathy for Dr. Jagan wider than his own party, which he might well exploit successfully. The whole position locally depends on our being able to convince everybody that he is being given a fair chance.

10. If Dr. Jagan can keep going without economic or constitutional crises, whether or not he has any real achievements to his credit, the pressure will grow for constitutional advance. Particularly if we succeed in avoiding the reversion to a nominated Government, popular opinion in the territory will not be satisfied for long that British Guiana should be behind Jamaica and Trinidad and Barbados. Whatever the pressure, we must maintain ultimate control through the continuance of checks and balances and the Governor's reserve powers at least until one of the following three things occurs: -

(a) Dr. Jagan gives up Communism and becomes a capable, practical nationalist in the context of the Western hemisphere, which is unlikely.

(b) Dr. Jagan, while retaining his personal ideologies and his political leadership, realises that Communism is impossible in a country the size of British Guiana on the American continent even if the country is independent rather than colonial. If he realises this he may possibly be led as a nationalist into practical policies which provide the chance of an honourable future for British Guiana. He may even acquire the habit.

(c) Dr. Jagan and his party, or what is left of his party, are discredited and there is a non-racial Opposition strong enough and sensible enough to take over the government of the country and lead it safely to self-government.

11. To summarise: Dr. Jagan is at present the only possible elected leader; he and his party must show their followers what they can do instead of merely criticising all the attempts of others. While they are making this effort it is better to keep them in power than to revert to a nominated Government. Everything possible is being done, not without some success, to produce a lasting atmosphere and understanding in British Guiana of all that goes to make up parliamentary democracy and Western way of life. Dr. Jagan is unlikely to alter his Communist beliefs, but his efforts to bring his country to self-government and in his knowledge that the followers on whom he depends for electoral support are nationalist rather than Communist, he may grow to appreciate that neither before nor after independence is Communism a practicable form of government in British Guiana's geographical and economic circumstances. Alternatively in his efforts to walk his tight-rope and in his lack of governmental experience and competent lieutenants he may lose popularity while his opponents get stronger and form a non-racial party capable of running the country.

12. We are no longer marking time. There will be many difficulties ahead. But the difficulties are no longer all on our side.

[Editor's Note: * This document was prepared and circulated in early 1958.
** This word is partly illegible in the copy of the original text, but it is believed to be "entire".]

2. LETTER FROM SIR PATRICK RENISON, GOVERNOR OF BRITISH GUIANA, TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES
(14 April 1959)

BRITISH GUIANA IN 1959
Governor of British Guiana to Secretary of State for the Colonies

In February 1958, I sent to you a despatch* in which I tried to summarise the whole political scene in British Guiana. In this present despatch I have the honour to try to bring the picture to date, and to give preliminary comments on the constitutional questions which must be solved this year.

2. Dr. Jagan and the People's Progressive Party have continued in power. They have faced difficult financial circumstances mainly owing to the fall in the world price of sugar and the recession in the aluminium industry. They have met mounting and often unfair opposition with which they have made little attempt to compromise. The Ministers maintain their own views and prejudices but have been able to work with the officials in Executive Council and in their Ministries and departments. They are not always experienced or practical or objective in their ideas. They would be in many more difficulties without the frank and impartial comments, the help and advice of the officials. In Executive Council their have been a number of exhausting differences of opinion; but no malice remains afterwards; both sides have been eager to avoid major crises. In the Ministers' favour it must be recorded that they work very long hours both in their offices and public duties and in explaining Government and party policy and actions throughout the length of the coastlands. That this working partnership is being maintained in the face of all the criticism and suspicions is a considerable achievement. I very much admire my senior officials. It has been shown that it is not impossible to carry on the administration in association with Jaganism under a Constitution of this type. It has yet to be proved whether it would be equally possible if a far greater measure of self-government were given.

3. Dr. Jagan himself with is insistent wife at his elbow dominates his party. Major decisions are made to his dictation in an inner council usually consisting of himself, his wife, Mr. Benn and Mr. Ram Karran. The party executive is then required to endorse these decisions. Those who are brave enough to resist or question are discredited among the rest of the party. Mr. Beharry alone gained some position as a dissident but has not the strength to lead a major break-away. The leaders' preoccupation with Ministerial duties has led to a marking time in party organisation and the spread of Communist teaching. But the party organisation, particularly in the rural areas, is a very long way ahead of its rivals.

4. There is no change in Dr. Jagan's Marxism. He fills his head with Marxist politico-economic theories. They seem to mean more to him than present realities. Perhaps he has faith that world Communism will triumph even in this hemisphere early enough for him to try out his theories. But with all his theories and arguments, and with all his obsessions and conceits, he has not insisted on any action which seems calculated purposefully to disrupt the present economy and way of life. The minor pinpricks have been all in keeping with much publicised past party manifestos. It has been noticeable that although the local economy is still buoyant, and all existing projects have been continued, since he came to power there has been no new major investment in the country. It is still difficult to say however whether this return to a previous rate in commercial and industrial development after the sudden flowering of alumina and manganese and oil exploration is due to the uncertainties of investors about Dr. Jagan's policies and abilities and long-term intentions, or merely to the general North American recession or the non-discovery of sufficiently favourable opportunities. He has learnt something about development finance; his visit to the United Kingdom and the United States and the subsequent visit here of a World Bank official have taught him that neither threats nor charm will bring money without sound plans, and that the scale of his dreams has little relation to the amount of development capital likely to be available and supportable in this country. He was a bit thrown off balance by his complete failure to frighten Her Majesty's Government into disproportionate financial help. And he was further shaken by the outright rejection of his subsequent call for coalition to "demand" more financial help and constitutional advance to internal self-government. He has not been so easy to work with since. But his economic theories and the economic vicissitudes of the country take a second place in his thinking. Self-government and the end of colonialism will always come first. It is for that reason that however difficult the finances and economics, however unfair and disconcerting the political opposition, however seemingly unaccommodating the Colonial Office and local officials, he does not want to give up office. He cannot let anybody else lead the national struggle for independence.

5. Dr. Jagan is feeling the strain of his position. He has ages ten years since the 1957 election. He will not accept without suspicion unwelcome advice, even professional advice of those outside his own way of thinking, however distinguished; he has almost nobody inside his party with the ability to help him to resolve his suspicions. He follows his star. He is forced to carry almost the whole intellectual burden himself. Instead of getting ahead with practical action he causes delays and frustration by his opinions and antagonisms by his dialectics and theorising. Examples of such delays concern the future of rice milling and the marketing of rice, the generation of electricity by nuclear reactors or conventional plant, taxation and development policy, the encouragement of trade unionism and the choice of economic advisers. He is losing popularity and he knows it but puts it behind him. The opposition to him in the urban and African areas is open and abusive. He must be worried that the latest split in his party executive is no longer led by African Left-wing intellectuals who find it impossible to work with him, but by Mr. Beharry, an East Indian and a popular member of the Government who has gained a slightly spurious reputation for getting things done. In his own East Indian rural areas Dr. Jagan is perhaps no longer a Messiah. His followers will now discuss and criticise his Government actions. But he has only to speak to them to win them back. They have certainly not yet reached the stage when they would vote for anybody else. Under our present franchise he would in my opinion undoubtedly still carry the P.P.P. to election victory. His Government does not know how to win friends. It does not seem to want to win friends. It will take on anybody. Let them all come! It has the courage of its convictions. But its convictions are too often irrational obsessions. I am sure that there is not yet an alternative elected Government. Dr. Jagan's resignation at present would be a disaster.

6. Mr. Burnham is the only alternative leader of national size. He is not an attractive character like Dr. Jagan. The West Indies do not respect him so much and he will never attract the world Press in the same way. He is cynical, superficial, unreliable, prejudiced and irrational. But he is the man who appeals to the African masses, and with his wit and cleverness he shows no signs of losing his leadership. In Legislative Council he sneeringly and unscrupulously attacks the Government without regard to the running of the country. He dominates the scene like a favourite pupil more than the Speaker should allow and frequently behaves more like a cross-examining counsel than a Parliamentary debater. Only Dr. Jagan of the elected Ministers has the authority to stand up to him and Dr. Jagan, with his stubborn confidence in his own opinions, has only minor interest in Parliamentary matters and seldom bestirs himself. But for all his unpleasantness Mr. Burnham seems to be growing and if his turn comes he is perhaps no longer unthinkable as a chief Minister or Premier however difficult and untrustworthy a colleague he might be. During the year, he has brought off on his terms rather than theirs the essential merger of his party with the more moderate African and commercial opinion represented by the United Democratic Party. The City Council by majority vote have elected him Mayor of Georgetown. He has established a considerable liaison between his party, the People's National Congress and Dr. Williams' party in Trinidad, the People's National Movement. He has still to succeed in attracting the non-Jaganite East Indians to his party and making it the Guianese Nationalist Party which might be able to challenge the P.P.P. in straight fight. Some people doubt whether he sincerely wishes to have East Indians with him. But he has come out openly against Communism and declared himself clearly for democratic Socialism within the Commonwealth and the Western world. He has never budged from his determination to bring British Guiana into the West Indies Federation. He is taking more advice and of better quality and may even as Mayor learn that with and cleverness are not a substitute for thoroughness and hard work. He has no love for Great Britain. He is as rabid an anti-colonialist as Dr. Jagan and will never allow himself to be outdistanced by the P.P.P. in demands for independence. He believes that Dr. Jagan's power in the land will be almost impossible to break while he can put the responsibility for shortcomings and failures on to the Governor and the Colonial Office. Mr. Burnham would wish to see complete self-government given to British Guiana with some checks and balances but without effective reserve powers because he is sure that Dr. Jagan would smash himself when he could no longer shift the responsibility on to somebody else. He is not so realistic about the economic disaster which might afflict the country in the process.

7. There has been no advance (indeed none was expected) in converting Dr. Jagan from his Marxist and Communist theorising. There continues to be the greatest doubt whether Dr. Jagan while retaining his beliefs may ever become consciously willing to compromise with realities and to try produce policies and procedures which will work in our economic and geographical situation. He is devoted to his own vision of the new world. On the other hand his intentions though very Left wing do not appear to be revolutionary. Hi continuance in power may lead to stagnation through incapacity and failure to attract investment, or damage to the economy through his personal obsessions rather than disruption through subversive Communist methods. The success of the year has been in building up a real opposition to Jaganism, Marxism and Communism. The dark edge to this success has been that it has largely been accomplished through racialism. I think the opposition is real and permanent. If we can widen it from the educated, thinking European-Portuguese-African section of the community to include more of the East Indian shopkeepers and landowners and professional men, whether or not they will join political parties, I think we shall have something with sufficient force and following to stand against any of Dr. Jagan's theories or longer-term intentions. Once we have got such a Guianese body of opinion, convinced in their own minds and not just to toady to officialdom, then I think that, even if his rural vote keeps Dr. Jagan in power, so far as major Communist disruption is concerned "he couldn't do it here." But I do think that by less than Communist action against his lifelong antagonists, he will, if unchecked, be likely to cause a set-back to the standard of living and major loss of some sections of the community. If we wish to bring his rule to an end, thee may be ways of convincing Dr. Jagan's rural followers that he is not the leader they want without smashing the whole economy of the country. Failure to solve the problems of the rice industry could hasten his downfall if the whole responsibility was put on him.

8. The Opposition is spear-headed by Mr. Burnham with the other non-P.P.P. elected and nominated members in the Legislative Council. Mr. Burnham and his followers of course back it up with considerable ability in his weekly newspaper, The New Nation. But that is only the beginning. Three of the four daily newspapers are virulently anti-Jagan and the other criticises him fearlessly. Like Mr. Burnham, to European eyes, they are disgustingly unfair and undiscriminating in their methods. Perhaps they have better understanding of what can sell a newspaper in this country. Their combined onslaught is reinforced by a wholly anti-Jagan T.U.C. supported by a weekly newspaper of their own. The trade unions are consolidating and becoming stronger and better led. Then there are the government services with their own associations and trade unions. They too are no lovers of the P.P.P. and they are prepared to fight Jaganism wherever it touches them adversely. Local business as represented by the Chamber of Commerce and overseas business as represented by Bookers, &c., struggle to remain neutral but are occasionally stung into protest and opposition by the gaucheness of the Jagan Government, its tactlessness and misunderstanding of business men and its unreadiness to be grateful for all the patience and assistance it is given. The hold over the local newspapers of reactionary local interests is diminishing now that the Argosy and the Chronicle have lost the valuable Government printing contracts through their own gross inefficiency. One of these papers may be taken over by East Indian interests. I do not believe that the East Indians with property and investments, who are planning to put up the money for the purchase, whatever their sympathy with Dr. Jagan as an East Indian, will be prepared to make their newspaper wholly subservient to the P.P.P. Party line (particularly if the party line became more Communist) when most of the papers must be sold in an anti-P.P.P. Georgetown. I think therefore that the emergence of an East Indians owned daily newspaper may be a good development which may teach East Indians that they have other interests if Dr. Jagan ever attempts to go too far. If at the same time the other newspapers can be reorganised and better run so that they are more discriminating in their criticism, the country will benefit. There are moves afoot in the commercial world which may lead to this.

9. The problem which will shortly face Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and on which I must give you advice later in the year, is how much constitutional advance to allow in British Guiana's present circumstances. The Constitutional Committee now sitting here, pushed by both Dr. Jagan and Mr. Burnham, will almost certainly ask for more than any Government in England will feel ready to give. The question which Her Majesty's Government will have to answer is whether there is enough solid opposition to Communism and to the prejudices of the party which may cause economic damage to warrant the grant of a constitution very near to internal self government when it is known that Dr. Jagan will almost certainly win the next election. The conundrum is beginning to be "How far will this better-informed British Guiana allow Dr. Jagan to go? One of the most interesting possibilities of reducing this question to more manageable proportions is the idea of altering our present "first past the post" system of franchise to a proportional representation transferable vote system. Mr. Burnham is campaigning vigorously for this change. I do not think it would be honourable nor to our long-term advantage to devise new systems merely to put the P.P.P. at an artificial disadvantage. But in this country with its racial composition I must support strongly any system of franchise which may reduce the dangers of racialism; they are at least as grave as the danger of Communism. The more I study the possibilities of proportional representation the more I believe that it may do this, although I have no misunderstanding of its disadvantages. The figures of the last two elections in 1953 and 1957 show clearly the disproportionate number of seats which the P.P.P. has won for their total number of votes. The East Indian preponderance is increasing. Proportional representation usually leads to a weak Government. But Dr. Jagan's Government will always be weak in the sense that like all Communist leaders, he seems unable to keep with him intelligent lieutenants of independent mind. It will be moreover always be suspected as racially East Indian and ideologically Communist. If he was forced to form a coalition in order to retain power it might bring more difficult for him to pursue an openly prejudiced or Communists course. A coalition Government of his opponents brought about through proportional representation, even if its majority over the P.P.P. was slim, could hardly engender less confidence than the present P.P.P. team. The coalition might prevent any extremism in Mr. Burnham's make up. As a broadly-based and anti-Communist Government it should give real encouragement to new investment and commercial development. It would probably bring us into the West Indies Federation, without which I see little economic or constitutional future for British Guiana. Above all it might help to solve racialism which, as I have said, now ranks with or above Communism as our chief security danger, since an anti-Jagan coalition would almost certainly represent all races.

10. It seems to me therefore that whether Mr. Burnham or Dr. Jagan is to lead the next Government (and many people think that Dr. Jagan for all the uncertainties may be preferable if, as I begin to believe, the Opposition will by then be permanently strong enough to hold him back from unwise prejudices and outright Communism) there may be more danger in not going far enough in constitutional advance than in going too far. We cannot yet throw away all reserve powers and checks and balances. Neither of the possible governments is yet ready to do without the advice in Executive Council of trained officials. They need not have votes. But it would be disastrous if we damaged the strength of the Opposition which we have been building to keep Dr. Jagan within reasonable bounds, by encouraging Mr. Burnham and perhaps the West Indies to unite with him against "colonialism" in demanding greater advance. To drive the two leaders into reunion against Great Britain would be to throw away all the work of the last six years. There may be wisdom in allowing very nearly all that Mr. Burnham asks for (including proportional representation) in order to keep him on the side of Western democracy and transfer to him and his Allies (who for that purpose will, no doubt, include the Governments of the west Indies) our present responsibilities for seeing that Dr. Jagan can never smash institutions vital to the present economy and never turn British Guiana into a Communist State.

11. We have found ways of working with Dr. Jagan. We have not changed his Marxist views oar local prejudices, but in a difficult financial year of much political opposition he has not made serious attempt to cause major disruption of rises. Unfortunately since he came to power there has been little investment. Dr. Jagan has his worries as leader of the majority party while Mr. Burnham, the less attractive character, is growing as his political rival. A real opposition to Jaganism, Marxism and Communism has been built up - political, newspaper, trade union, government services and business men. It is beginning to look strong enough to prevent Dr. Jagan from open Communism even if he continues in power without changing his views. Racialism is at least as dangerous as Communism. Both dangers might be reduced by a system of proportional representation. We may be able to give a large measure of constitutional advance, very near to self-government, if we can rely on the local opposition to Jaganism being of sufficient strength and permanency to take over Great Britain's responsibility for making major economic damage to British Guiana impossible whether through party prejudice or through outright Communism.

3. MINUTE FROM IAN McLEOD, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES, TO PRIME MINISTER HAROLD MACMILLAN
(7 March 1960)

The British Guiana Conference starts this morning and, although it is not a major conference it has explosive possibilities. You might like to know the state of play. In 1953 a new and advanced constitution had to be suspended after less than six months to prevent the subversion of Government by the majority party (the People's Progressive Party under Dr. Jagan). Later an interim constitution took its place, but there has been for some time a feeling that British Guiana has largely purged its offence and so Alan Lennox-Boyd agreed some time ago that this conference should he held.

2. At present out of a Legislature of 25 there are 14 elected members, of whom 9 belong to the P.P.P. The remainder belong to the People's National Congress, which is really a break-away from the P.P.P. and is led by Mr. Burnham. Both Jagan and Burnham are members of the small delegation of eight who are over here with the Governor and his principal advisers for the conference. The situation is complicated by the existence, as in Tanganyika and Uganda, of a constitutional committee report, and as this consisted of the members of the Legislative Council and was therefore dominated by Dr. Jagan its report is extreme. The majority of the delegation will be asking, following the committee's recommendations, for independence within the Commonwealth, for a wholly elected unicameral Legislature, for a Prime Minister and for powers for British Guiana to amend her own constitution. This would leave virtually no powers to the Governor.

3. All of this is, of course, quite unacceptable and in this lies the possibility of difficulty. We propose to offer a Premier, a bicameral system with a wholly nominated upper house, and that the Governor should retain the usual reserve powers in relation to defence, external affairs and the police, in particular, in full. Her Majesty would retain power to amend the constitution and the U.K. Parliament could legislate for British Guiana. All this is very much in the tradition of development in this part of the world and if I can get them to accept something like this it would put them in the same sort of position as, for example, Trinidad and Barbados will be. The difficulties, if they do not become apparent today at the formal meeting, will probably become clear early next week or perhaps towards the end of this week. I will, of course, keep you closely in touch with any major developments.

I am sending copies of this minute to the members of the Colonial Policy Committee.

4. MINUTE FROM IAN McLEOD, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES, TO PRIME MINISTER HAROLD MACMILLAN
(14 March 1960)

The British Guiana Conference is going more or less according to form. All the delegates have been demanding independence and I have indicated my willingness to offer something rather short of internal self-government particularly with reservations about the police. However, Jagan is being so insistent on the necessity of an immediate declaration of independence by us that I suspect he is more or less under instructions from his party to break rather than to agree to anything less. If this is so, the next day or so will make this clear and we would no doubt have to have an imposed constitution. However, this would be, and be seen to be, a great step forward for British Guiana and however much he might fulminate about it I think he would find it very difficult in practice not to operate it.

I will report orally on progress in this matter either to the Cabinet or to the C.P.C. meeting on Friday.

Since the Secretary of State's minute of March 14th he held various conference meetings and I have continued them. Discussions have again and again come back to questions about the Police. We have said that we will take no decision now on whether the Police should come under ministerial control when the new constitution comes into force (around August 1961); but that after a six months period, during which the Governor would be able to see how public opinion and the Police themselves reacted to such a prospect, a decision would be taken. All the British Guianian Delegation insist that during this trial period a single Minister should be charged with the responsibility for the Police, the Governor retaining overriding powers. We have refused to accept this; but we have said that if the decision at the end of the six months were in favour of handing over the Police in August 1961, then during the last few months before then the Governor would naturally do his best to train one Minister on Police matters.

3. In due course we would then no doubt impose a constitution which might differ, but not substantially, from what has so far been worked out and which would be a great step forward for British Guiana towards independence. Probably, but not certainly, Jagan and company would operate it.

4. The alternative would be to try to follow the Kenya Conference pattern and have all the Delegation record their objection regarding the Police and possibly some other minor matters, but get them to agree that despite this area of difference they will cooperate in the new constitution which has been hammered out. Broadly this would amount to internal self-government around August 1961, subject to a decision on the Police in six months. I think all in all advantage lies in trying for this.

P.S. Since dictating the above I have talked things over with the Lord Chancellor and the Commonwealth Secretary who both agree to my trying for the second course.

6. MEMORANDUM ON BRITISH GUIANA BY THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR COLONIAL AFFAIRS
(28 March 1960)

In constitutional talks over the past three weeks agreement has been reached on recommendations to the Cabinet which would, subject to two provisos, result in the grant of full internal self- government to the Colony at the end of the normal life of the present Legislature (August, 1961). The provisos are: suitable arrangements to safeguard the rights of public servants, and agreement within the next twelve months by the Colonial Secretary that responsibilities in regard to police and internal security should be transferred to elected Ministers in the new Constitution. There would then be reserved to Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, acting through the Governor, powers only in regard to defence and external affairs (excluding external trade) and the making or amending of the Constitution or its suspension in grave emergency.

2. At the very end of the talks the Minister of Commerce and Industry in British Guiana, Dr. Jagan, demanded that new constitutional instruments should forthwith be made which would provide for the Premier now to preside in Executive Council instead of the Governor. His reasons are that the Premier should gain experience; that Her Majesty's Government should show trust in the political leaders of British Guiana; and that the territory should at once be given a status equal to Trinidad.

3. Mr. Burnham, leader of the Opposition, who was associated with Dr. Jagan in the misdemeanours of the Government that led to the suspension of the Constitution in 1953, supported Dr. Jagan's demands. He probably did so believing that Dr. Jagan's administration would get in a mess (he is right!) and that he would reap the fruits at the next elections.

4. I undertook to ask the Cabinet whether, despite the original insistence of the Colonial Secretary that the Governor should continue to preside over Executive Council at the constitutional stage following the elections of August, 1961, and his reluctant concession that at that stage the Premier should preside, an amending Order should be submitted to Her Majesty in Council now, providing for the Premier to summon and preside over Executive Council while still reserving to the Governor discretionary right to summon and preside over meetings if he saw fit.

5. The Colonial Secretary had previously undertaken to report the views of the British Guiana delegation that the leader of the Government under the new Constitution should be "Prime Minister" and not "Premier" and the strong protest of the delegation at the Colonial Secretary's decision that it should be "Premier".

6. I had also undertaken to seek the views of Ministers on the request by the British Guiana delegation that a Bill should be passed to amend the British Guiana Act, 1928, by removing the power to legislate by Order in Council. This request was made although the Colonial Secretary had announced his willingness to affirm by Despatch that it would not be his intention, after the introduction of the new Constitution, to advise that the power to legislate for British Guiana by Order in Council under the British Guiana Act, 1928, should be used other than for the purpose of constitution-making or in grave emergency. The claim of the delegation was that the continuance of this general power was derogatory to the status of British Guiana and implied a lack of sincerity on the part of Her Majesty's Government in the expressed intention of leading the territory to independence, and that the Colony should be put in the same position in this respect as a number of other West Indian territories in which, for historical reasons, Her Majesty no longer has a general power to legislate by Order in Council.

7. The Governor and his official advisers judge that the immediate removal of the Governor from Executive Council, despite his retention until August, of general reserved powers, would be a grave blow to public opinion in British Guiana and the United States and would shock overseas investors. British Guiana depends almost entirely on overseas investment in sugar and the mining of bauxite and manganese. Dr. Jagan and his colleagues (with the possible exception of his communist wife, who is also a Minister) are inept administrators, The Governor would, upon the most liberal interpretation of his responsibilities, be compelled frequently to intervene to get decisions of Council altered, and this at best would mean much friction. Clearly it is undesirable that "reserved powers" should be used save on the most infrequent and important of occasions. There has been no discussion either in the Legislature or in public in British Guiana of substantial constitutional changes to take place earlier than the end of the normal life of the present Legislature, and not only has Dr. Jagan no public mandate to seek such changes but his majority is shaky.

8. I have offered instead that the title of "Premier" be brought into use at once by convention and that the Governor would liberally construe the present constitutional requirement that he preside in Council "so far as is practicable" and would from time to time absent himself so that the Premier would have experience in presiding. This was unacceptable to the delegation and if we, as I think we should for reasons given above, stand firm it may mean the breakdown of this conference.

10. This is a request made in part because the Guianese, having through their own misconduct had one Constitution suspended, are nervous of having any future Constitution suspended and in part for prestige reasons at home. The assurance offered by the Colonial Secretary that he would not advise the exercise of the power save for constitution-making or in grave emergency seems sufficient. This is not a sticking point for the delegation.

11. I have consulted the Colonial Secretary by telegram and he has replied agreeing with my views.

7. BRIEF PREPARED BY THE COLONIAL OFFICE FOR PRIME MINISTER HAROLD MACMILLAN FOR HIS MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KENNEDY IN WASHINGTON
(29 March 1961)

(This is a defensive brief for use if the Americans raise the question of British Guiana instead of waiting, as expected, for the official talks already planned).

(i) We are very ready to listen to whatever the Americans wish to say to us about British Guiana. The ground will be covered thoroughly by the Working Party of officials in London after Easter and by the Governor of British Guiana (Sir Ralph Grey) when he visits the State Department on 24th April.

(ii) We, too, arc anxious to do what we reasonably can to keep British Guiana resistant to communist influences, after it attains independence (probably in 1963).

(iii) The only communists, or near-communists, in the Colony are the leaders of the People's Progressive Party, the party now in power under Dr. Jagan. The Opposition parties, and the people of British Guiana, arc quite unsympathetic to communism. As long as the West does not let them down (by neglecting them, or pushing them in other ways into the arms of communist "friends") there is no reason to fear any abrupt change.

(iv) With the General Elections in August this year there is no scope at this stage for covert intervention to secure the defeat of Dr. Jagan's party. In any case, the increase in the number of constituencies from 14 to 35 is likely to loosen the P.P.P.'s hold on the electorate. Some observers predict that the result will be a close run thing and that if Dr. Jagan were to win he would have a considerable and stubborn Opposition to contend with.

(v) The British Guiana Constitutional Conference held in London in the Spring of 1960 determined the constitutional pattern - internal self-government in August, 1961, with future independence agreed in principle, - the date of independence to be determined by another Conference, if asked for by the Legislature, to be held at least a year, or possibly two years later. With public faith long pledged on this, only the most critical situation in British Guiana would warrant attempting to put the clock back.

(vi) There arc certain safeguards during the period of internal self-government - see paragraph 9 of the Brief.

(vii) Provided it is free, and seen to be free, of political entanglements, we consider that the proposed trade transactions between Cuba and British Guiana should be carefully examined on their merits. It is important that British Guiana Should be able to dispose of its surpluses, e.g. of timber and rice.

(viii) We believe that the best chance of maintaining political stability in the Colony and keeping the communist wolf from the door is to ensure a steady supply, in reasonably generous measure, of technical, economic and financial aid, provided as rapidly as possible after going through the fewest procedural loops.

8. ANNEX: BACKGROUND NOTE ON BRITISH GUIANA FOR THE KENNEDY-MACMILLAN MEETING PLANNED FOR WASHINGTON IN APRIL 1961-PREPARED BY THE COLONIAL OFFICE
(29 March 1961)

The Americans are very concerned about what they consider to he likely developments in British Guiana after internal self-government has been conferred in August, 1961 and if independence is granted a year or two later. Their concern appears to be twofold: -

(a) they do not want to see a communist or Castro-like government established on any part of the American continent;

(b) they do not want to see Castro given any sort of diplomatic triumph as might for instance result if Dr. Jagan came to some agreement with him.

2. It was at one time understood that President Kennedy might wish to discuss British Guiana with the Prime Minister. Subsequently, however, the Americans proposed that talks should first take place between United States and United Kingdom officials and they were intending to send a team over to London, probably before the time of the Prime Minister's departure. The latest information is, however, that they do not after all intend to send a team over but will rely on informal talks between the U.S. Embassy in London and U.K. officials. These are unlikely to be possible before the week commencing 10th April. In addition it has been arranged that the Governor of British Guiana (Sir Ralph Grey) will visit Washington for discussions with the State Department on the 24th April on his way home on leave. Mr. MacKintosh, Head of Colonial Office Department concerned, who is visiting the Caribbean, will be with him.

3. It is perhaps improbable in the circumstances that the President will raise the question. If he does, a possible "short answer" would be that talks between officials are to take place; but the Prime Minister will no doubt wish to have the background in case the President nevertheless wishes to have some discussion. Only the Prime Minister himself can judge, in the light of the general atmosphere of the talks, how far it will be prudent to "rib" the President over the paradox of the United States, of all countries, attempting to bring pressure on the U.K. to deny or delay self-government to a British colony on the American continent!

4. The brief on British Guiana prepared for the Prime Minister's visit to The West Indies (W.I.T(61)21) gives general information about the Colony and in Part "B" traces the political developments which have taken place since 1953 when constitution had to be suspended. Under the agreement reached at Lancaster House in March, 1960, full internal self-government will be introduced in August, 1961, subject to the qualification that the Secretary of State will decide in the light of reports received in about May whether or not control of the Police and Internal Security is to be included in the subjects to be devolved. Furthermore the principle of independence within the Commonwealth for British Guiana was accepted and it was agreed that a further conference would be called "to consider when it would be practicable to implement" the request for independence if such a request were made by both Houses of the British Guiana Legislature. It would be necessary for the August, 1961 Constitution to have been in force for at least two years before such a request could be entertained unless it should have been decided to give independence to the West Indies Federation; in which case the minimum period of two years, after the entry into force of the August, 1961 Constitution, would be reduced to one year.

4*. While the question whether control over Police and Internal Security should be devolved in August, 1961 is an open one, the Secretary of State will be bound to take into account reports rendered by the Governor and British Guiana Ministers in about May, 1961 on the extent to which certain interim arrangements for associating British Guiana Ministers with the subject over the past year have operated. At the Lancaster House Conference this was a stoutly fought issue. U.K. Ministers were initially reluctant to entertain the idea of responsibility for this subject devolving upon Ministers. In the face of very strong pressure from the British Guiana Delegations they agreed to a compromise under which a police council would ho established with British Guiana Ministers gradually assuming responsibilities previously exercised by the Chief Secretary. Those arrangements have been going reasonably satisfactorily and if the reports in May arc favourable it will be difficult to maintain that this responsibility should not be transferred.

5. It is agreed that there is no ground for complacency in respect of the future. It is likely that if, as seems probable, Dr. Jagan's Party wins the August 1961 elections, the new Government will fall short in administrative competence and wise judgment. Dr. Jagan is a woolly idealist, and has not distinguished himself for his administrative ability. Nor are his present colleagues impressive. This will undoubtedly afford favourable field for the promotion of communist influence. Whether or not Dr. and Mrs. (Janet) Jagan can hardly be described as communists (which is hardly proven) they undoubtedly have communist and fellow travelling contacts in the outside world.

6. It is however much easier to state the problem than to see a solution. What were or are the alternatives to allow the normal pattern of constitutional development to take its course?

a) It would in theory have been possible to have continued indefinitely under the arrangements which resulted from the suspension of the constitution in 1953. But this amounted to a colonial regime and to do so would have been totally unacceptable both in British Guiana and the outside world, including the United States. The policy actually adopted was to re-introduce Dr. Jagan and his colleagues by degrees into polite society and for three years up to 1960 the Jaganite Ministers have on the whole conducted themselves with reasonable responsibility. By the spring of 1960 there was tremendous pressure from nearly all parties in British Guiana for great and immediate advances. The more extreme demands were resisted but the grant of anything short of what finally emerged from the Lancaster House Conference would almost certainly have broken up the Conference and sent both Dr. Jagan and his colleagues and the leaders of the largest minority party back to Georgetown in a state of revolt which would have led to a constitutional crisis, the resignation of Ministers, friction and ill-feeling on all sides, and quite possibly violence. As it was, the agreement was accepted and during the year which has since elapsed there has been little friction and no violence and the Jagan Ministers have continued to show reasonable responsibility, in spite of their occasional sensational excursions, e.g. to Cuba, the United Nations and East Germany;

b) Is it suggested that the changes which were agreed in March, 1960 should not now be implemented, at least in full, because of the re-assessment of the situation today? Any such decision would be difficult to justify in the light of the behaviour of Ministers during the past year; would certainly with some justification call forth the most extreme denunciations in British Guiana of broken faith on the part of the U.K. Government; and would undoubtedly lead to major political friction and, quite possibly, to disturbances.

7. The right course seems to be to go ahead with the constitutional development to which we are already committed and hope that the general principle that power brings a sense of responsibility will operate at least in some degree in the case of British Guiana Ministers. If these developments are to take their course (to which there is no satisfactory alternative) there is much to be said for giving no ground to British Guiana Ministers to claim that their new powers have been grudgingly given, that they are being so hedged about by restrictions that they cannot accept full responsibility for their actions, and that the U.K. Government is demonstrating a lack of confidence in them. If they could claim that these things were true they would be more, rather than less, likely to increase their contacts with "iron curtain" countries.

8. Meanwhile it is to be hoped that the Americans will continue and if possible increase their economic and financial assistance towards development in British Guiana. It would be unfortunate if they were to lessen, or decline to increase, their aid on the ground that they were not justified in assisting a country which might "go bad". The most likely way of stimulating contacts between Dr. Jagan and the West is to shoe earnest of a desire to give practical assistance in development schemes; just as the most certain way of stimulating him to develop his less respectable contacts would be to give him cause to feel that he was being denied adequate help from the West. The U.K. Government is at present giving substantial financial assistance under the C.D. & W towards British Guiana development.

9. Meanwhile there will be some safeguards. After August, 1961, and until independence (whenever that may be) U.K. Government will retain its responsibility for External Affairs and Defence (subject to a devolution of responsibility in certain trade matters); secondly, the U.K. Government will in the same period retain constitutional powers to legislate in an emergency by Order in Council. They could by this means give the Governor emergency powers and even suspend the Constitution. This power could however only be used in the last resort and it would be more difficult both practically and psychologically to do so in 1962 than it was in 1953. Finally, the U.K. Government is not yet committed to transfer responsibility for Internal Security although, as stated above, it may difficult to withhold this without running into political difficulties, the effects of which might be on balance more disagreeable than the transfer of this responsibility.

10. The Americans would like to see British Guiana join the West Indies Federation; so should we. There would be mutual practical advantages; and it would make better sense for British Guiana to attain independence as part of the Federation and under its respectable umbrella. We are very ready to discuss further with the Americans (as we have done to some extent already) whether there are any ways in which the process could be encouraged. The matter would require most delicate handling however if it were not to be counter-productive. It would be fatal to give Dr. Jagan and his colleagues an impression that we or the Americans were trying to bring economic pressure to bear on them in order to shape their political future. It would be equally disastrous if, by making it seem more likely that British Guiana would join, Jamaica became less ready to vote favourably in the referendum (much Jamaica opinion would not welcome the adhesion of British Guiana). So, while we agree in principle, we must "gang warily" and probably take no initiative until (a) the British Guiana elections of August are over, and (b) The West Indies Independence Conference has been successfully concluded and the Jamaican referendum has been held and (one hopes) a more impressive government been established at the federal centre.

11. Publicity was given some time ago to the reported offer of economic aid to British Guiana from Cuba. The terms of the proposition have never been made precise but they relate primarily to the exploitation of British Guiana timber for export to Cuba. Any such arrangement would require the sanction of H.M.G. which would have to balance the difficulty of denying outside aid to British Guiana when the West was not providing as much development money as British Guiana Ministers claim is needed, against the obvious objections. Such information as we have however suggests that the proposition partakes more of trade than aid. Our thinking is that we should probe further to see whether there would be any real advantage for British Guiana. If so we should probably not seek to veto it. At the moment the matter is still being considered by the Departments concerned in Whitehall.

(Editor's Note: * Paragraph numbers are reproduced as they are shown in the original document.)

9. RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND AMERCIAN SECRETARIES OF STATE
(6 April 1961)

RECORD OF A MEETING HELD IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON THURSDAY, APRIL 6, 1961, AT 11 a.m.

UNITED KINGDOM	UNITED STATES
The Secretary of State	Mr. Rusk
Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar	Mr. Bowles
Sir Harold Caccia	Mr. Bruce
Lord Hood	Mr. Kohler
Mr. Samuel	Mr. McGhee
Mr. Ramsbotham	Mr. White
Mr. Wiggin	Mr. Burdett
Mr. Thomson	Mr. Swihart

Mr. Rusk referred to the United States Government's concern that when British Guiana became independent the United States might find themselves faced with another Castro-type situation. He recognised that it was paradoxical for the United States Government to advocate early independence as a general principle while urging Her Majesty's Government to go slow in British Guiana. He repeated the desire of the United States Government to explore with us ways and means of ensuring that an independent British Guiana was not dominated by the Communists.

2. The Secretary of State said that he fully understood the United States concern and that Her Majesty's Government were anxious to do everything possible to make sure that British Guiana developed on the right lines. It would, however, be difficult to put the clock back. The only Communists or near Communists in the Colony were the leaders of the People's Progressive Party. The Opposition parties and the people themselves were quite unsympathetic to Communism. We believed that the best chance of maintaining political stability in the Colony was to ensure a steady supply, in reasonably generous measure, of technical, economic and financial aid.

3. In the course of further discussion Mr. White referred to the American ideas of channelling trade and aid to British Guiana through the West Indies Federation in the hope that this would encourage the people of British Guiana to believe that their best interests lay in joining the Federation.

4. The Secretary of State mentioned the arrangements which had already been made for Anglo-American talks on British Guiana, namely, preliminary talks in London in the week beginning April 10 to be followed by talks in Washington on or about April 24 when the Governor of the Colony and the head of the Colonial Office department concerned visited Washington. It was agreed that further discussions would probably be required after this, and that these would best take place in London.

10. SUMMARY OF DRAFT BRIEF PREPARED BY THE COLONIAL OFFICE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO BERMUDA
(December 1961)

The American President may wish to discuss the situation in the Caribbean. If he does not it would be in our interests to do so. There events are moving fast and not always to our advantage. Whilst American defensive interest in the area is alarmed and quickening British interest in maintaining stability diminishes. In the 1960s the Colonial Office can no longer look after the American flank in the Caribbean than the British Navy the Monroe doctrine. It must therefore be recognised that in her own interests America must play a larger part in the British area.

During the immediate period of development of our responsibilities which will include independence for Jamaica and British Guiana and probably Trinidad, it is necessary that the Americans and ourselves should work closely together without inhibition.

Immediate problems face both out countries in the British Caribbean territories. Up till now these have been discussed piecemeal with the Americans at a lower level. The time has perhaps come for higher level talks with Presidential backing in Washington at an early date to discuss these immediate problems and the pattern we should seek to evolve in the Caribbean.

11. DRAFT BRIEF PREPARED BY BRITISH COLONIAL OFFICE
(Undated, but prepared in December 1961)

DRAFT BRIEF FOR PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO BERMUDA - ANGLO-U.S. APPROACH TO THE CARIBBEAN AREA

In his discussions with Sir Grantley Adams on the 4th December the Prime Minister undertook to raise with the President the possibility of devising a joint Anglo-American scheme for the development of British Honduras. A separate note on the problems of this territory is being submitted. (Separate notes are also being submitted on British Guiana and the Federation.) But the Colonial Office believe that it would be fruitless to discuss the problems of British Honduras except in the wider context of the Caribbean problem as a whole. The increase of general instability in Latin America, the rise of Castro and the imminent independence from British rule of Jamaica and soon thereafter of British Guiana and possibly Trinidad must mean that whilst on the one hand American defensive interest in the area is heightening, on the other British interest, and capacity, in maintaining a cordon sanitaire for the West is being lowered. In the 1960s the Colonial Office can no more look after the American flank in the Caribbean than the British Navy the Monroe doctrine. Nevertheless, not only is it important to both. Governments to maintain political stability in the area but probably neither Government could do it at this time without the help of the other. Whilst we can continue to offer our Commonwealth and Colonial connection, some aid, and some minor defence arrangements for internal security purposes, the time has come for the United States to make an economic contribution bigger than anything they have hitherto contemplated and far exceeding - not just matching - our own. If they do not there is a real danger of a spread of instability degenerating into Castroism. Hitherto, the U.S. efforts in this field in British Guiana, in the Federation and in British Honduras have been inadequate.

2. In view of the changing circumstances and of our own special problems the need for a change in American policy is urgent. The Colonial Secretary will visit the West Indies in January to see if he can find a basis for keeping in existence a federation of the Eastern Caribbean including Trinidad. There is already a good deal of evidence to show that, as the price for consenting to join such a federation, the Premier of Trinidad will demand economic assistance on a scale which the British Government, with all its other commitments, could not possibly afford. It is therefore already clear that our chances of success will depend upon how much help the Americans are prepared to give. It will, however, be extremely difficult to consult them about this with any chance of reaching firm decisions when they are in the middle of a conference. There is, therefore, a need for us to have reached some understanding with them on this point before formal negotiations with the West Indians start. If the Americans would agree, therefore, we should be prepared to send a mission to Washington within the next few weeks to have discussions with them on this subject. It is not felt here, however, that these discussions would reveal anything very new about American thinking or secure from them the kind of undertakings we desire, unless there had been a presidential directive to the effect that they would attach far greater importance to assisting this area than heretofore.

3. The need for a change in U.S. policy is as urgent in British Guiana. The colony's 5-year development plan, which is regarded as the minimum that must be done if the economy of the territory is not to regress, is running into financial difficulties, and Dr. Jagan has to raise some $BWI55 million, if it is to be completed. Moreover, he has ideas for vastly expanded expenditure on development (his favourite figure is $BWI400 million), and all his efforts are directed towards finding the finance for such a total. Her Majesty's Government cannot assist him further and Dr. Jagan is willing to look anywhere for money, including the Soviet bloc. Dr. Jagan, however got no firm promise of money and only a general undertaking on aid during his recent visit to Washington. He is now distrustful of American intentions, and the general atmosphere of bumbling associated with the American efforts to do something does nothing to change his convictions. In spite of their tactful reception of Dr. Jagan during his recent visit to Washington, their handling of the situation contrasts with what we have taken to be their policy of proving to British Guiana that its future lies in association with the West rather than in following the path taken by Dr. Castro, who is one of Dr. Jagan's heroes.

4. In British Honduras, too, there is a need, for different reasons, for aid. The country has been devastated by hurricane "Hattie", and after reconstruction and rehabilitation there will remain the basic need for development. If development were linked with a policy for controlled immigration, an outlet might be provided for a limited number of the excess populations in the British Caribbean territories.

5. Any mission we might send to Washington could also raise the problems of British Honduras and British Guiana as well as those of the Federation. If the initial American reaction to the mission is favourable, it is suggested that we might propose to them that our two Governments should explore the possibility of promoting the closer co-operation not merely of local groupings to avoid balkanisation, but of all the territories in the Caribbean which are still, in one way or another, democratically inclined or dependent upon the Western powers. If the Americans agreed to play a bigger part in the British territories, this, together with our own efforts and theirs in Puerto Rico and the efforts of the French and the Dutch in their areas, would go a long way towards preventing the whole area degenerating into Castroism.

12. TELEGRAM FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON
(4 January 1962)

The British Guiana Constitutional Conference of 1960 agreed on a formula for independence as a result of which an Independence Conference would not have been called before August 1962, with independence itself probably not taking effect much before mid 1963. In September 1961 the United Kingdom/United States Working Party agreed that the United Kingdom should endeavour to adhere to this for formula, but that if necessary there wou1d be further United Kingdom/United States consultations on the situation in British Guiana.

2. In October, 1961 both Houses of the British Guiana Legislature passed a Resolution asking Her Majesty's Government to fix a date for independence in 1962. The Resolution was approved by a very substantial majority and unanimously by the two main parties which between them obtained 85% of the votes in the recent General Elections. On December 13 Dr. Jagan asked the Colonial Secretary to give effect to the Resolution. In view of Her Majesty's Government's undertaking to consult further with the United States Government (which could not of course be disclosed) the Colonial Secretary told. Dr. Jagan that although the 1960 Constitutional Conference formula represented the agreed position, the Legislature's Resolution was a new development in so far as at the 1960 Conference there had not been near unanimity on the Guianese side on the question of independence. The Colonial Secretary therefore proposed to consult his colleagues at an early date and would inform Dr. Jagan of Her Majesty's Government's decision early in the new year. Dr. Jagan was deeply disappointed and has since taken the question to the United Nations, where his address to the Fourth Committee has led to the draft Resolution inviting Her Majesty's Government to resume negotiations with British Guiana. This Resolution is due to be debated at the resumed session in January.

3. While there are still arguments for adhering to the formula agreed in 1960, the balance of advantage now lies with accelerating the move towards independence. However divided on other subjects, both British Guiana parties are in agreement in their overwhelming desire for early independence and this is probably the one major issue on which Dr. Jagan could enlist mass support for his Government.

4. In so far as readiness for independence is concerned British Guiana's claim is as good, if not better than that of certain other territories that have recently attained independence or are about to do so. Delay would worsen Her Majesty's Government's relations with the present Government of British Guiana. If there are no early indications of progress towards independence and of a greater flow of aid, the present Government of British Guiana will be reinforced in its tendency to suspect the West as a whole. The lack of concrete response so far to Dr. Jagan's request for financial aid which he pressed during his visit to the United States has already aggravated the situation. Anti-British agitation would provide a happy hunting ground for those elements whose aim is to exacerbate racial tension in the Colony. Any outbreak of violence would be extremely difficult to control and Her Majesty's Government would find it difficult to justify the despatch of military reinforcements. Instead of its present policy of seeking aid without strings from all sources, the British Guiana Government might well turn more exclusively to those countries which are committed anti- colonialists. The Governor's existing capacity to exert influence over the P.P.P. Government through personal persuasion would be finally destroyed and the negotiations for independence (which is in any case inevitable) would be jeopardised, with the result of even greater pressure for an early date for our permanent withdrawal.

5. Unless there is an early announcement of the date for an Independence Conference the effects of Jagan's address to the United Nation's Fourth Committee will be serious. To insist on the 1960 formula might well lead the anti-colonial majority to action which could bring about a crisis in the relations between the United Kingdom and the United Nations, The outstanding draft reso1ution on British Guiana (which we regard as clearly ultra vires) would provide a pretext for this. This would be a heavy price to pay for delaying the inevitable Independence Conference for at most a few months.

6. Making use of the foregoing arguments and referring to the Secretary of State's conversation with Mr. Rusk on December 21 you should inform the State Department urgently that Her Majesty's Government propose to hold the British Guiana Independence Conference in May of this year i.e. some three months earlier than provided for in the 1960 formula. Subject to a satisfactory outcome, independence would be attained by about the end of 1962, although a date for independence would not be decided upon or communicated to Dr. Jagan before the Independence Conference. Her Majesty's Government hope that the United States Government can agree to their proposal. You should stress that they are very anxious to be in a position to convey their decision to Dr. Jagan before the United Nations session is resumed, in order to avoid any impression that this decision had been influenced by United Nations proceedings, which would be incorrect. You should accordingly request a reply by January 9.

13. ANNEX I: NOTE FROM BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE TO BRITISH MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
(9 January 1962)

Addressed to UKMis New York telegram No. 132 of January 9.
Repeated for information to Washington.

The Colonial Secretary and I have decided that our policy towards discussion of British colonial territories in the United Nations should be governed by the following principles:

2. We should take every opportunity of explaining in general terms our colonial record and policy, and with this end in view should be reluctant either to withdraw or to play only a passive part in the United Nations Committees concerned.

3. If the affairs of one of our dependent territories are discussed in a United Nations Committee, we should:

(i) make it clear that the United Nations has no right to intervene in our territories nor to hear petitioners from them and that such discussion is therefore ultra vires;

(iii) refuse to play any part in discussion during the formal appearance of any petitioners.

(i) in our general exposition of policy, to emphasize and enlarge on particular facts about the territory concerned (already contained in the political and other information, submitted to the United Nations), in order to remove any excuse for mis-statements and misrepresentation;

(ii) to correct briefly any glaring mis-statements of facts about our policy as may be necessary.

5. At the sane time we should firmly refuse to let ourselves, on such occasions, be submitted to cross-examination on the merits of our policies, or to be drawn into anything more than general statements on our future intentions about particular territories as already made public.

I wonder if you could obtain and pass on to me any information available from the Coonial Office about the probable date for British Guiana's independence. In the enclosure to American Department's secret letter of November 6 no definite date was given but some time this year (i.e. 1962) was mentioned. However judging from such newspaper reports as I have seen about Mr. Jagan's visit to London shortly before Christmas this is by no means a certainty. Since, however, Dr. Weiz of the Auswärtiges Amt is likely to ask me for information on this point, as well as for information as to when he can expect to hear further from Mr. Benn about possible aid projects to be financed by Germany, I should be glad to have some briefing on both points as soon as possible. I was incidentally very interested to read, in the Print, Ottawa dispatch No. 20 of November 6 which showed that the Canadians were fully as impressed by Mr. Jagan as the Germans had been by Mr. Benn, and that in both instances these governments felt, having met the politicians concerned that British Guiana seemed quite capable of running their own affairs. But no doubt both Mr. Jagan and Mr. Benn presented a very different picture of themselves during their foreign travels from that which they show to the Colonial Office and in Georgetown, when they have no call to be on their best behaviour.

2. All the same it would he very unfortunate if we let slide this opportunity of getting the Federal Government to help in British Guiana's development. This is true not only for the sake of British Guiana, but also in the wider context of German development aid as a whole. E.R.D. (to whom I am sending a copy of this letter) will be able to comment on this aspect, in which many departments in Whitehall are interested.

15. BRIEF PREPARED BY THE BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE FOR THE BRITISH DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
(The document has no date, but the text indicates it was prepared in shortly after 9 January 1962, but before 15 January 1962).

I.O.C.(61)119 Brief for 16th Session on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories.

In the last days of the first part of the 16th Session Dr. Jagan, Premier of British Guiana, was heard as a petitioner in the Fourth Committee, despite strong British objections. After he had made a speech roundly attacking British colonial policy in British Guiana and generally, a resolution was tabled with the following operative paragraphs.

"1. Requests the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of British Guiana to resume negotiations immediately with a view to reaching agreement on the date of Independence for British Guiana, bearing in mind the wishes of the people of British Guiana as expressed by their parliament.

2. Requests the Special Committee appointed by General Assembly Resolution 1654(XVI) of 27th November, 1961 to consider the question of Independence for British Guiana at the earliest possible stage of its operation, and report on the results of these considerations to the General Assembly at its Seventeenth Session."

2. This resolution was not pressed to a vote but the item on non-self-governing territories was kept open so that it could be debated at the Resumed Session.

3. Our policy on intervention by the United Nations in the administration of our territories has been considered in the light of these events and the conclusions reached were set out in the Foreign Office telegram No. 132 to New York, a copy of which is at Annex I. The part to be played by the British delegation in any debate on British Guiana in the Resumed Session must be governed by this.

4. Our objective, without entering into argument on the substance of the case in the Committee, is to get the resolution withdrawn or at least not pressed to the vote. We hope the announcement of a date for a conference on the independence of British Guiana, which will probably be made on or very soon after 15th January will help to secure this. When the announcement is made the delegation should therefore have it circulated by the Secretariat as part of our provision of political information in accordance with Lord Home's undertaking last September.

5. If nevertheless the question of British Guiana is raised again, it will presumably be in the form of a debate on the draft resolution. This will probably mean that there will be no suitable opportunity for a general exposition of our colonial policy during which the British representative could refer to the facts about British Guiana (on the lines of paragraph 4(i) of the policy statement at Annex I). The British representative should not therefore make any speech on British Guiana at the start of the proceedings. He should however intervene as early as possible in the debate to say that in our view the debate is ultra vires and that we could not recognise any resolution which might be adopted. He should refer to Lord Dundee's speech in Plenary on 27th November, and reaffirm that we are still responsible having regard to the circumstances of each case and do not need to be urged on in this task. We have undertaken to supply the United Nations with information about the progress we are making; and as part of this the delegation has circulated (or will shortly circulate) the text of an announcement concerning British Guiana. If the Fourth Committee persists in debating the matter dealt with in the draft resolution he will not be able to take cognisance of the proceedings since they would not in our view be in accordance with the Charter.

6. If, later in the proceedings, it seems advisable to make a further statement to correct any glaring mis-statements of fact about our policy in British Guiana, the delegation has discretion to make one limited intervention for this purpose only. In doing so, they should make it clear that it is without prejudice to our view that the whole proceedings are improper and they should not be drawn into any debate.

7. Material is being sent to the delegation separately which may be used for answering questions and giving facts in the lobbies. This material will be in a form suitable for transmission to the Secretariat in accordance with our undertaking to supply political information: and the delegation has discretion, if they think it will help for example in securing the withdrawal of the resolution, to ask for it to be circulated in whole or in part.

16. LETTER FROM DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES, TO LORD HOME, BRITISH SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 19 FEBRUARY 1962

You know from our correspondence in August of last year of my acute concern over the prospects of an independent British Guiana under the leadership of Cheddi Jagan. Subsequent to his victory in the August elections we agreed to try your policy of fostering an effective association between British Guiana and the West and an Anglo-American working party developed an appropriate program. At our request safeguards, including consultations about new elections, were included in case matter went awry. In pursuance of this program the President received Jagan on his visit to this country in October. I must tell you now that I have reached the conclusion that it is not possible for us to put up with an independent British Guiana under Jagan. We have had no real success in establishing a basis for understanding with him due in part to his grandiose expectations of economic aid. We have continued to receive disturbing reports of communist connections on the part of Jagan and persons closely associated with him. Partly reflective of ever growing concern over Cuba, public and Congressional opinion here is incensed at the thought of our dealing with Jagan. The Marxist-Leninist policy he professes parallels that of Castro which the OAS at the Punta del Este Conference declared incompatible with the Inter-American system. Current happenings in British Guiana indicate Jagan is not master of the situation at home without your support. There is some resemblance to the events of 1953. Thus, the continuation of Jagan in power is leading us to disaster in terms of the colony itself, strains on Anglo American relations and difficulties for the Inter-American system.

These considerations, I believe, make it mandatory that we concert on remedial steps. I am anxious to have your thoughts on what should be done in the immediate future. In the past your people have held, with considerable conviction, that there was no reasonable alternative to working with Jagan. I am convinced our experience so far, and now the disorders in Georgetown, makes it necessary to reexamine this premise. It seems to me clear that new elections should now be scheduled, and I hope we can agree that Jagan should not accede to power again.